California Court of Appeal Mar 11, 2024 No. E079536Unpublished
Filed 3/11/24 P. v. Williams CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E079536
v. (Super.Ct.No. FVA1001628)
MATTHEW BOEMAN WILLIAMS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Ingrid Adamson
Uhler, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Jennifer A. Gambale, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Kathryn A. Kirschbaum and
Collette C. Cavalier, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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In 2011, Matthew Boeman Williams pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and
assault with a deadly weapon and admitted a firearm use enhancement. In 2022, he filed
a petition to vacate his manslaughter conviction under former Penal Code
section 1170.95 (undesignated statutory references are to this code), now codified as
Section 188 now provides that, except for first degree felony murder, “in order to
be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice
shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.”
(§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) Section 188’s requirement that a principal act with malice
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eliminates all murder liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
(People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 839, superseded by statute on other grounds.)
As amended, section 189 limits the first degree felony murder rule by imposing
new requirements for its application. The statute provides that, unless the victim is a
peace officer killed in the line of duty, “a defendant who was not the actual killer and did
not have an intent to kill is not liable for felony murder unless he or she ‘was a major
participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.’”
(People v. Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666, 672, review dism. Dec. 1, 2021, S266336.)
Senate Bill 1437 also created a mechanism for retroactive application of amended
sections 188 and 189 to certain defendants convicted of murder under prior law. (People
v. Rivera (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217, 232 (Rivera).) Section 1172.6 allows any person
convicted of manslaughter to file a petition with the sentencing court to vacate the
conviction and to be resentenced on any remaining counts when the following conditions
are met: “(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that
allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, or attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. [¶] (2) The petitioner was
convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter following a trial or accepted a
plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder or
attempted murder. [¶] (3) The petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or
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attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective
January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)-(3).)
Upon the filing of a facially sufficient petition, the trial court must appoint counsel
for the petitioner if requested and must determine whether the petitioner has made a
prima facie showing of eligibility for relief. (§ 1172.6, subds. (b)(3) & (c); Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 960, 962-965.) In conducting the prima facie review, the court may
consider the record of conviction but should not engage in factfinding, weigh the
evidence, or reject the petition’s allegations on the basis of adverse credibility
determinations. (Lewis, at pp. 970-972, 974.) “‘“[T]he court takes [the] petitioner’s
factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the
petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so,
the court must issue an order to show cause.”’” (Id. at p. 971.) If the record of
conviction “‘“contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,”’” then the
court may reject those allegations. (Ibid.)
Williams argues, and the People agree, that the trial court’s decision to deny his
petition without issuing an order to show cause was erroneous and must be reversed. We
agree.
The trial court denied Williams’s petition because “based on [its] review of both
the charging document and the preliminary hearing transcript, the defendant or petitioner
was the actual shooter and [did] not [make] a prima facie showing that he [did] not fall
within the new laws involving murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter.” We
independently review the trial court’s determination that Williams failed to make a prima
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facie showing under section 1172.6. (People v. Bratton (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1100,
1113.) We agree with Williams and the People that the trial court’s reasoning was
erroneous.
Williams’s petition contained all of the required allegations under section 1172.6,
subdivision (a)(1)-(3). The court had to assume the truth of those allegations unless the
record of conviction contained facts refuting them.
The information alleged murder with malice aforethought and willful, deliberate,
and premeditated attempted murders, all of which allowed the People to proceed on any
theory of murder or attempted murder. (See § 1172.6, subd. (a)(1); People v. Davenport
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 476, 484 (Davenport) [“‘The allegation that a murder was
committed “‘willfully, unlawfully, and with malice aforethought’” is a well-recognized
way of charging murder in [a] generic sense,’” which “does ‘not limit the People to
prosecuting [defendant] on any particular theories’”].) Accordingly, Williams could have
been convicted of murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the
felony murder rule, or another theory in which malice is imputed. Consequently, the
information did not render Williams ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter
of law.
Nothing about Williams’s plea established that he was ineligible for relief either.
The court noted that the information charged Williams “with murder with a personal
discharge and intentional discharge causing death to the victim in this matter.” But those
were just allegations. Williams pled guilty to only voluntary manslaughter and assault
with a deadly weapon. He did not admit to any specific theory of murder or attempted
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murder when he pled guilty. (See § 1172.6, subd. (a)(2); People v. Flores (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 974, 987 (Flores) [“In entering his plea, petitioner did not admit to or
stipulate to any particular theory of murder. Neither the charge nor the plea excludes
petitioner from resentencing eligibility as a matter of law.”].)
Moreover, Williams’s admission to the personal use of a firearm under
section 12022.5, subdivision (a), does not conclusively establish that he was ineligible for
relief. (See People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1120 [“The finding of personal use,
however, [does] not in itself prove defendant was the actual killer.”].) He did not admit
that he was the only shooter, that one of the bullets from his gun struck the victim, or that
he intended to shoot the victim.
Williams argues that the court’s consideration of the preliminary hearing
testimony, “absent an admission the testimony is true or a stipulation that the transcript
provides a factual basis for the plea, involves judicial factfinding not appropriate at the
prima facie review stage.”
There is a split of authority regarding the extent to which facts described in
testimony at the preliminary hearing can be used to refute the allegations of a
section 1172.6 petition on prima facie review. (Compare Rivera, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 226, 238; and Flores, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 991; with Davenport, supra, 71
Cal.App.5th at p. 481; People v. Patton (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 649, 658, review granted
June 28, 2023, S279670; and People v. Pickett (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 982, 992, review
granted Oct. 11, 2023, S281643.) In this case we need not take a position on that split,
because the transcript of the preliminary hearing does not establish that Williams was the
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actual killer or that he acted with malice. An officer testified that Williams admitted that
he had “fired a weapon, but that that was in response to firing coming at him[,]” and “he
thought one of his bullets may have killed the girl.” Other testimony showed, however,
that there were “two, possibly three other guns involved in this shooting” and that any of
those weapons could have fired the bullet that caused the victim’s wounds. Therefore, as
the People concede, the preliminary hearing transcript does not conclusively establish as
a matter of law that Williams was the actual killer or that he acted with malice.
We conclude that Williams’s petition states a prima facie case for relief and that
the record of conviction does not refute his allegation that he is eligible for relief. The
trial court therefore erred by denying the petition without issuing an order to show cause.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Williams’s section 1172.6 petition is reversed. The case is
remanded to the trial court with directions to issue an order to show cause under
subdivision (c) of section 1172.6.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ J. We concur:
MILLER ACTING P. J.
RAPHAEL J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The trial court erred in denying the defendant's section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage because the record of conviction did not conclusively establish his ineligibility for relief as a matter of law.
Issues
Did the trial court engage in improper factfinding at the prima facie stage by relying on the preliminary hearing transcript to deny the petition?
Does the record of conviction refute the defendant's prima facie showing of eligibility for relief under section 1172.6?
Disposition. Reversed and remanded
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The trial court’s determination that he was the actual shooter required the court to engage in improper factfinding at the prima facie stage.”
“The People concede that the court erred because there is nothing in the record of conviction precluding relief as a matter of law.”
“We conclude that Williams’s petition states a prima facie case for relief and that the record of conviction does not refute his allegation that he is eligible for relief.”