California Court of Appeal Mar 6, 2024 No. E079447Unpublished
Filed 3/6/24 Sarah B. v. Evans CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
SARAH B.,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E079447
v. (Super.Ct.No. CVPS2202003)
STEVEN EVANS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Ronald L. Johnson,
Judge. Reversed with directions.
Daniel J. Tripathi for Defendant and Appellant.
Sarah B., in pro. per, and for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Steven Evans appeals from the trial court’s order granting a three-year civil
harassment restraining order against him. (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6; unlabeled statutory
references are to this code.) We conclude that the trial court prejudicially erred by not
allowing Evans to introduce certain evidence. We accordingly reverse the order and
remand with directions.
BACKGROUND
On May 25, 2022, Sarah B. applied for a civil harassment restraining order against
“Except as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence is admissible.”
(Evid. Code, § 351.) “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence, including evidence relevant
to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency in reason to
prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action.” (Evid. Code, § 210.) “The test of relevance is whether the evidence tends
‘logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference’ to establish material facts . . . .”
(People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 177, overruled on another ground by People v.
Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 117-118.) We review for abuse of discretion “any ruling
by a trial court on the admissibility of evidence.” (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th
690, 717.)
5
The erroneous exclusion of evidence warrants reversal only if the effect of “the
error or errors complained of resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” (Evid. Code, § 354.)
“A miscarriage of justice should be declared only when the reviewing court is convinced
after an examination of the entire case, including the evidence, that it is reasonably
probable a result more favorable to the appellant would have been reached absent the
error.” (Brokopp v. Ford Motor Co. (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 841, 853 (Brokopp).)
Sarah repeatedly attested that she was concerned about the recent incident in
which Evans approached her truck, attempted to open her door, and hit her windshield.
The incident accordingly was of central relevance to the court’s determination of whether
Evans unlawfully harassed Sarah. Evans and Sarah agreed about certain aspects of the
incident, such as that it occurred because Evans was attempting to effect personal service
on Sarah and that Evans’s hand made contact with Sarah’s windshield during the
incident. But they otherwise disputed what happened, and they provided conflicting
versions of the incident. Evans claimed that Sarah had attempted to run him over, while
Sarah said that Evans approached the truck and attempted to “yank[]” open the door. A
video recording of the incident likely would shed light on what actually happened.
Moreover, the recording was additionally relevant to assessing the credibility of both
parties. (Evid. Code, § 210.) The parties’ credibility was particularly important given
that the bulk of the evidence in the case was their testimony. In light of the importance of
what transpired during the truck incident to the court’s determination of the ultimate
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issue, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the video
recording of that incident.
We also conclude that the erroneous exclusion of that evidence was prejudicial. It
is reasonably probable that the recording portrayed the incident favorably to Evans, given
that he offered to introduce it. It therefore is also reasonably probable that the recording
would have impacted the trial court’s perception of Sarah’s overall credibility and thus
could have undermined Sarah’s entire case.1 We accordingly conclude that absent the
erroneous exclusion of the video recording, it is reasonably probable that the trial court
would have reached a result more favorable to Evans. (Evid. Code, § 354; Brokopp,
supra, 71 Cal.App.3d at p. 853.) Because we conclude that the evidentiary error was
prejudicial, we need not and do not address Evans’s remaining arguments.2
1 Evans also argues that the trial court prejudicially erred by not allowing him to admit evidence supporting the motion to deem Sarah a vexatious litigant, which he claims was “integral” to his opposition to Sarah’s “civil harassment claim.” Evans did not attempt to introduce such evidence at the restraining order hearing, so the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to admit evidence that no party sought to introduce. (People v. Espinoza (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1304; see also Evid. Code, § 354, subd. (a).) We nevertheless note that evidence showing that Sarah has engaged in conduct that would justify deeming her a vexatious litigant (§ 391, subd. (b)) could be relevant to evaluating Sarah’s credibility.
2 We also deny the parties’ various requests that we augment the record, receive additional evidence, and take judicial notice of various documents on appeal—mainly records from other court proceedings that were not introduced in this proceeding— because the documents are not relevant to our analysis of the issues in this appeal. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2 [“any matter to be judicially noticed must be relevant to a material issue”].)
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DISPOSITION
We reverse the June 15, 2022, order granting the civil harassment restraining order
against Evans. We remand the matter to the trial court to hold a new evidentiary hearing
on Sarah’s May 25, 2022, application for a civil harassment restraining order. Evans
shall recover his costs of appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ J.
We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
CODRINGTON J.
8
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The trial court prejudicially erred by excluding a video recording offered by the defendant that depicted the central incident of alleged harassment, necessitating a new evidentiary hearing.
Issues
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by excluding a video recording of the incident involving the parties' vehicles?
Was the exclusion of the video recording prejudicial to the defendant's case?
Disposition. reversed and remanded
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We conclude that the trial court prejudicially erred by not allowing Evans to introduce certain evidence.”
“Because we conclude that the evidentiary error was prejudicial, we need not and do not address Evans’s remaining arguments.”