California Court of Appeal Feb 22, 2024 No. E080145Unpublished
Filed 2/22/24 P. v. Osborne CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E080145
v. (Super.Ct.No. INF1801872)
HEIDI ELIZABETH OSBORNE, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge.
Affirmed.
Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney, and Jesse Male, Deputy District Attorney,
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
William D. Farber, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Respondent.
1
In June 2019, the Riverside County District Attorney (the Prosecutor) filed an
information charging defendant, Heidi Elizabeth Osborne, with second degree burglary.
(Pen. Code, § 459.) In October 2022, defendant moved to dismiss the case due to her
right to a speedy trial being violated. The trial court granted the motion. The
Prosecutor contends the trial court erred because the delay was due to the pandemic,
which was an exceptional circumstance creating good cause for the delay in bringing
In her motion to dismiss, defendant contended, “there are 2,800 backlogged cases
with approximately 18 available trial courtrooms.” Defendant asserted she would “face
years of continuances if the court[ ] . . . allow[ed] continuances indefinitely.” In
opposition, the Prosecutor contended they were ready for trial, but the court lacked an
available trial department. The Prosecutor contended the pandemic, which was an
exceptional circumstance, created the trial delay so the case should be continued—not
dismissed.
On October 28, 2022, during the hearing on defendant’s motion, the trial court
explained that it was dismissing the case “for the reasons articulated and reasons [sic] in
People versus Freeman,” which is another trial court case that was dismissed on October
28, 2022. In the Freeman case, the trial court said, “[W]e had no open and available
courtrooms in order to send this case to.”
2
The trial court explained: there were 15 criminal departments in the midst of
trying cases; four civil departments were trying criminal cases; the court had applied for
assistance from the assigned judge program, but no assistance had come; and Riverside
County needs 115 judicial officers, but has funding for only “75 judges and 15
subordinate judicial officers,” and of those, there are “eight current vacancies.” The
trial court determined that the Superior Court of Riverside County is “operating at about
70 percent of [its] assessed need,” and its “deficit of authorized and funded judicial
positions is the second worst in the state, second only to San Bernardino County.”
DISCUSSION
The Prosecutor contends the trial court erred by dismissing the case because the
pandemic was an exceptional circumstance that permitted the court to exceed speedy
trial deadlines.
“Under [Penal Code] section 1382, subdivision (a)(2), ‘[t]he presumptive time
period established by state law for bringing a felony case to trial is 60 days from the
date a defendant is arraigned on an information or indictment.’ [Citation.] If a felony
case is not brought to trial within that deadline, the trial court ‘shall order the action to
be dismissed’ unless there is good cause for the delay. [Citation.]
“Good cause does not exist ‘when the lack of a judge or courtroom available to
timely bring a criminal defendant to trial is fairly and reasonably attributable to the fault
or neglect of the state.’ [Citation.] Court congestion therefore does not constitute good
cause unless it is caused by ‘ “exceptional circumstance[s].” ’ [Citation.] [¶] The trial
3
court has ‘broad discretion to determine whether good cause exists to grant a
continuance of the trial.’ [Citation.] We therefore review a trial court’s good-cause
determination for an abuse of discretion.” (People v. Superior Court (Tapia) (2023) 93
Cal.App.5th 394, 402 (Tapia).)
Tapia concerned the dismissal of a criminal case by the Superior Court of
Riverside County in October 2022, due to the lack of an available courtroom. (Tapia,
supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 400.) In Tapia, this court explained that the Superior Court
of Riverside County is “severely underfunded and understaffed,” and noted its status as
“the second or third most underfunded trial court in California.” (Tapia, supra, 93
Cal.App.5th at pp. 403-404, fn. omitted.) This court denied the Prosecutor’s writ
petition that challenged the dismissal of the case, reasoning, “Given the Superior
Court’s chronic congestion that has existed for nearly two decades and remains
unresolved to this day, [the trial court] reasonably could find that [the petitioner’s] case
could not timely be brought to trial because [the fact that] there was no available judge
was ‘fairly attributable to the state’s failure, over a considerable period of time, to
provide a number of judges sufficient to meet the needs of Riverside County’s rapidly
growing population and caseload—a circumstance fairly attributable to the fault or
neglect of the state.’ ” (Id. at p. 407.) In sum, the lower court reasonably found that the
petitioner’s case could not be tried in a timely manner “simply because there are ‘[n]ot
enough judges.’ ” (Id. at p. 408.) Our Supreme Court denied the Prosecutor’s petition
for review in Tapia on September 27, 2023, S281419.
4
We follow this court’s decision in Tapia. It was within reason for the trial court
to conclude that in October 2022—two and one-half years after the start of the
pandemic—the Superior Court of Riverside County was doing “everything within its
means to bring criminal cases to trial within [Penal Code] section 1382’s deadline.
Despite its best efforts, the superior court simply does not have enough judges to
adequately tackle its chronic congestion, . . .” (Tapia, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 407-
408.) Because the delay was due to chronic court congestion, there was no good cause
for failing to bring the case to trial in a timely manner. Thus, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion.
The Prosecutor argues that the pandemic is an exceptional circumstance creating
good cause for the delay in bringing the case to trial. However, October 2022 was two
and one-half years after the start of the pandemic. While the pandemic was an ongoing
circumstance in October 2022, to describe anything that has been going on for two and
one-half years as “exceptional” would undermine the word “exceptional.” In other
words, anything lasting for two and one-half years tends to become more ordinary than
exceptional. Thus, the trial court reasonably rejected the theory that in October 2022,
the pandemic provided good cause for further delaying defendant’s trial.
5
DISPOSITION
The dismissal order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
MENETREZ J.
6
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case for a speedy trial violation, as chronic court congestion due to a lack of judicial resources—rather than exceptional circumstances—caused the delay.
Issues
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by finding that the pandemic did not constitute good cause for a speedy trial delay in October 2022?
Does chronic court congestion caused by a lack of judicial resources constitute good cause for exceeding speedy trial deadlines under Penal Code section 1382?
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Because the delay was due to chronic court congestion, there was no good cause for failing to bring the case to trial in a timely manner.”
“to describe anything that has been going on for two and one-half years as “exceptional” would undermine the word “exceptional.””