People v. Chapman CA3

Filed 2/8/24 P. v. Chapman CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento) ----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, C098801

v. (Super. Ct. No. 03F08560)

LOVELLE MARQUIS CHAPMAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Lovelle Marquis Chapman filed a petition for resentencing in the trial court under Penal Code former section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6).1 The trial court denied the petition at the prima facie stage.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered former section 1170.95 to section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) There were no substantive changes to the statute. Although defendant filed his petition under former section 1170.95, we cite to current section 1172.6 throughout this opinion.

1

Appealing from the denial, defendant argues the trial court engaged in impermissible factfinding. We conclude, however, that defendant’s record of conviction establishes he was not facing a conviction for murder under a theory for which malice could be imputed when he entered his no contest plea to voluntary manslaughter as the actual killer, and thus he is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. We will affirm the trial court’s postjudgment order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing. BACKGROUND Defendant’s group had a confrontation with another group at a party. After leaving, defendant and his group drove by the party and defendant fired multiple shots at party attendees, killing one of them. There was only one shooter. (People v. Chapman (June 27, 2008, C054401) [nonpub. opn.] (Chapman).) In 2006, a jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and found true two firearm enhancements, including that defendant personally and intentionally fired a gun proximately causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate prison term of 40 years to life. Defendant appealed, challenging the applicability to his case of felony murder and the natural and probable consequences doctrine. This court held that the crime did not support jury instructions on second degree felony murder, and it was also error to instruct on the natural and probable consequences theory of second degree murder because defendant was the alleged direct perpetrator. This court reversed and remanded for retrial on the remaining valid theory, malice aforethought second degree murder. (Chapman, supra, C054401.) Retrial proceedings began in 2009. The amended information alleged that defendant personally committed murder with malice aforethought (§ 187, subd. (a)), personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), and committed five counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) against five