Yager v. Superior Court CA4/2 (2024) · DecisionDepot
Yager v. Superior Court CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Jan 22, 2024 No. E082465Unpublished
Filed 1/22/24 Yager v. Superior Court CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
PAUL YAGER,
Petitioner, E082465
v. (Super.Ct.No. COM029661)
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF OPINION RIVERSIDE COUNTY,
Respondent;
THE PEOPLE,
Real Party in Interest.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate. Petition granted.
Paul Yager, in pro. per, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
No appearance for Real Party in Interest.
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Petitioner Paul Yager (Yager), an inmate at a federal prison in California, has an
arrest warrant and charges pending in the Riverside County Superior Court that prevent
him from being transferred to a residential re-entry program. Yager twice attempted to
file a motion to dismiss the Riverside County charges. Both times, despite a proof of
service that showed Yager served the district attorney’s office, the superior court clerk
rejected the motion and directed Yager “to Penal Code [section] 1381, which requires
you to serve your request on the Office of the District Attorney.”
Yager sought review by petitioning for writ of mandate in the California Supreme
Court, which transferred the matter to this court. After reviewing Yager’s writ petition,
we requested a response and advised the parties we may issue a peremptory writ in the
first instance under Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178.
No response was filed. We agree with Yager that the superior court clerk improperly
rejected his motion to dismiss. However, rather than ordering dismissal of the charges as
Yager requests, we direct the superior court to file and rule on Yager’s motion. We
express no opinion on the merits of the motion.
DISCUSSION
Penal Code sections 1381 and 1381.5 allow individuals serving a term of
imprisonment in California, and who have state charges pending against them, to demand
the district attorney’s office proceed to trial on the charges, and to file a motion to
dismiss if their case is not brought to trial within the timelines set forth in the statutes.
Penal Code section 1381 governs defendants who are housed in state correctional
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institutions, and Penal Code section 1381.5 governs defendants, like Yager, who are
housed in federal correctional institutions located in California. Under Penal Code
section 1381, upon receiving a written demand for trial, the district attorney’s office has
90 days to bring the defendant to trial, unless the defendant requests or consents to a
continuance in open court. Similarly, under Penal Code section 1381.5, when the district
attorney’s office receives a demand for trial, it is required to “promptly inquire of the
warden or other head of the federal correctional institution in which such defendant is
confined whether and when such defendant can be released for trial or for sentencing.”
Upon receiving “an assent from authorized federal authorities for release of the defendant
for trial or sentencing . . . the district attorney . . . shall bring him to trial or sentencing
within 90 days . . . unless the federal authorities specify a date of release after 90 days, in
which event the district attorney shall bring the prisoner to trial or sentencing at such
specified time” unless the defendant requests or consents to a continuance in open court.
(Pen. Code, § 1381.5)
On March 28, 2023, Yager served the district attorney’s office with a written
“notice of demand for trial or disposition” under Penal Code sections 1381 and 1381.5.
On June 28, 2023, Yager attempted to file a “motion to dismiss for failure to
comply with demand for speedy trial” under Penal Code section 1382. Despite a
declaration that stated Yager served the district attorney’s office with a demand for trial
on March 28, 2023, and a proof of service that showed Yager served the district
attorney’s office with a copy of the motion to dismiss, the superior court clerk rejected
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the motion and returned it unfiled, with an ink stamp on the back of the envelope that
directed Yager “to Penal Code [section 1381], which requires you to serve your request
on the Office of the District Attorney.”
On July 13, 2023, Yager resubmitted the motion with a letter to the clerk
explaining that he had served the district attorney’s office, as required, and that he was
entitled to file the motion because the district attorney’s office did not respond to his
demand for trial within 90 days. The clerk again rejected the motion and returned it to
Yager with the same ink stamp on the back of the envelope that directed him “to serve
[his] request on the Office of the District Attorney” under Penal Code section 1381.
The clerk improperly rejected Yager’s motion to dismiss for failure to serve the
district attorney’s office. The motion reflected that he had served the district attorney’s
office—both with the demand for trial and with the motion to dismiss. When the clerk
improperly refuses to file a motion, mandate is appropriate to direct a lower court to file
and rule on the merits of the motion. (Voit v. Superior Court (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th
1285, 1287-1288.) “If a document is presented to the clerk’s office for filing in a form
that complies with the rules of court, the clerk’s office has a ministerial duty to file it.”
(Id. at p. 1287.) Whether or not Yager is entitled to dismissal of the charges, the clerk
had a ministerial duty file his motion.
Having followed the procedures and given the notice described in Palma v. U.S.
Industrial Fasteners, Inc., supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 178, we find this matter appropriate for
issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance because there has been clear error
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under well-settled principles of law and undisputed facts. (Lewis v. Superior Court
(1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1240-1241.)
DISPOSITION
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue, directing the respondent superior court to
file and rule on Yager’s June 28, 2023 “motion to dismiss for failure to comply with
demand for speedy trial.” This decision shall be final as to this court immediately.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).)
The clerk of this court is DIRECTED to attach a copy of Yager’s motion to
dismiss to the remittitur.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAPHAEL Acting P. J.
We concur:
MILLER J.
FIELDS J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the superior court clerk had a ministerial duty to file the petitioner's motion to dismiss because it complied with filing requirements, and therefore improperly rejected it.
Issues
Whether the superior court clerk improperly rejected the petitioner's motion to dismiss despite proof of service on the district attorney's office.
Disposition. Petition granted.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“If a document is presented to the clerk’s office for filing in a form that complies with the rules of court, the clerk’s office has a ministerial duty to file it.”
“The clerk improperly rejected Yager’s motion to dismiss for failure to serve the district attorney’s office.”