Barkett v. Foundation Management CA4/1 (2013) · DecisionDepot
Barkett v. Foundation Management CA4/1
California Court of Appeal Jun 27, 2013 No. D062559Unpublished
Filed 6/27/13 Barkett v. Foundation Management CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
WILLIAM J. BARKETT, D062559
Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2012-00093474- CU-EN-CTL) FOUNDATION MANAGEMENT, INC. ,
Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Lisa C.
Schall, Judge. Affirmed.
Gilmore, Wood, Vinnard & Magness and David M. Gilmore for Appellant.
Law Offices of Brian H. Krikorian and Brian H. Krikorian for Respondent.
William Barkett appeals from an order denying his motion to vacate a sister-state
judgment in favor of Foundation Management, Inc. (Foundation). (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1710.10 et seq.)1 We affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In September 2007, Merjan Financial Corporation (a California entity) borrowed
$1.4 million from Foundation, a Washington state corporation. The loan was secured by
a deed of trust on commercial property in California. In the promissory note, the parties
agreed Washington state law would govern the construction and interpretation of the
note. The parties also agreed to an interest rate of 15 percent, and in the event of a
Szynalski v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1, 7 ["[a]greeing to resolve a
particular dispute in a specific jurisdiction . . . is one means of expressing consent to
personal jurisdiction"].) Because personal jurisdiction is a waivable right, it can be
waived in a contract if the contract was " 'freely negotiated' " and not unreasonable or
unjust. (Burger King, supra, at p. 473, fn. 14.) There was no showing that the Guaranty
agreement was not freely negotiated or was unreasonable or unjust.
Barkett devotes most of his appellate briefs to his arguments regarding the nature
of his contacts with Washington state. However, based on our conclusion that Barkett
consented to jurisdiction, we need not engage in an analysis of these contacts and
whether there were sufficient minimum contacts to support jurisdiction under
Washington's long arm statute. (Szynalski v. Superior Court, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at
p. 7; Estate of Heil, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 1512.)
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Barkett additionally contends the court erred in denying his motion to vacate the
California judgment because the Guaranty agreement violated fundamental public
policies of California. However, there is no "public policy" exception to the enforcement
of a sister-state judgment, particularly when the judgment is a money judgment. (Traci &
Marx Co. v. Legal Options, Inc. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 155, 158; id. at p. 161 (conc.
opn. of Mosk, J.); Silbrico Corp. v. Raanan (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 202, 207-208; World
Wide Imports, Inc. v. Bartel (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 1006, 1011.) " 'California law is
clear that the differing public policy or laws of the enforcing state cannot contravene the
full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. As has been repeatedly stated, California
must, regardless of policy objections, recognize the judgment of another state as res
judicata.' " (R.S. v. Pacificare Life & Health Ins. Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 192, 207;
Traci & Marx Co., supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 158.)
Even if such an exception exists, Barkett identifies no fundamental California
policy at stake here. Foundation's claim involves merely the enforcement of a written
guaranty agreement. With respect to the usury claims, Barkett expressly agreed that
Washington law applied. Under Washington law, usury laws are inapplicable to a
commercial transaction. (Trust of Strand v. Wel-Co Group, Inc. (Wash.App. 2004) 86
P.3d 818, 821.) This legislative judgment does not offend California's public policy.
Moreover, under California law, loans arranged by licensed real estate brokers and
secured by real property are exempt from usury prohibitions. (See Cal. Const., art. XV,
§ 1; Civ. Code, § 1916.1; Park Terrace Limited v. Teasdale (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 802,
805-809.)
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We likewise reject Barkett's arguments that the court erred in denying his motion
to vacate because Foundation was not properly registered and/or licensed in California.
Barkett had a full opportunity to raise this issue in the Washington court, and the court's
judgment is binding on a California court. Moreover, it is not clear on this record that
registration or a license was required in this case.
DISPOSITION
Order affirmed. Appellant to bear respondent's costs on appeal.
HALLER, J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, Acting P. J.
MCDONALD, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the denial of a motion to vacate a sister-state judgment, holding that the appellant consented to the rendering court's personal jurisdiction through both a contractual forum-selection clause and a general appearance without objection. Furthermore, the court held that there is no public policy exception to the full faith and credit requirement for enforcing a sister-state money judgment.
Issues
Did the Washington court have personal jurisdiction over the appellant to support the entry of a sister-state judgment in California?
Does a public policy exception exist to the enforcement of a sister-state money judgment under the Full Faith and Credit Clause?
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“In this case, the record establishes that Barkett consented to jurisdiction and thus submitted to the jurisdiction of the Washington court.”