People v. Propps CA2/5

Filed 12/29/23 P. v. Propps CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B320370

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. v. NA104701)

CHRISTOPHER ARMOND PROPPS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Chestopher L. Taylor, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Stanley Dale Radtke, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Rene Judkiewicz, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Christopher Propps (defendant) of second degree robbery in 2016. Defendant was sentenced to 35 years to life under the Three Strikes law. In a prior opinion on defendant’s appeal from the criminal judgment, we affirmed defendant’s conviction but held the matter must be remanded to give the trial court an opportunity to decide if defendant was eligible for mental health diversion and to exercise newly conferred discretion to strike one or both of the prior serious felony conviction enhancements imposed under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a).1 (People v. Propps (May 8, 2019, No. B281522) [nonpub. opn.] (Propps).) On remand, defendant made an oral People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 motion to replace his trial counsel, which the trial court denied. The court exercised its discretion to strike defendant’s section 667, subdivision (a) enhancements, but stated our remittitur precluded it from considering any other modifications to defendant’s sentence. We consider whether the trial court erred in denying defendant’s Marsden motion and whether, as the Attorney General concedes, the court should have conducted a full resentencing.