California Court of Appeal Dec 27, 2023 No. E078074Unpublished
Filed 12/27/23 Estate of Parks CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
Estate of BESSIE RUTH PARKS, Deceased.
RUQAYYAH N. PARKS, E078074 Petitioner and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. PRRI2000883) v. OPINION REGINALD G. MICKENS,
Objector and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Kenneth J. Fernandez,
Judge. Affirmed.
Reginald G. Mickens, in pro. per. for Objector and Appellant.
Law Offices of Amanda A. Stewart and Amanda A. Stewart, for Petitioner and
Respondent.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant, Reginald Mickens, proceeding in pro. per., appeals the probate court’s
order appointing respondent, Ruqayyah Parks, as the administrator of the estate of his
deceased mother, Bessie Ruth Parks. Because of the many deficiencies in Mickens’s
opening brief, we affirm.
II. 1 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mickens filed a Petition for Probate of Lost Will seeking to be appointed 2 administrator of Bessie’s estate. Mickens alleged Bessie had a lost will that appointed
him and others the administrators of her estate. The case was assigned to the Honorable
Thomas Cahraman. After Mickens filed a peremptory challenge against Judge
Cahraman, the case was assigned to the Honorable Kenneth Fernandez. Ruqayyah filed a
competition petition for probate seeking to be appointed administrator of Bessie’s estate.
After a number of continuances, Judge Fernandez held a hearing on the competing
petitions. By that point, Mickens still had not filed a copy of Bessie’s allegedly lost will.
Judge Fernandez denied Mickens’s petition, overruled his objections to Ruqayyah’s
petition, and found that Bessie died intestate. Judge Fernandez later granted Ruqayyah’s
1 Our recitation of the background of this case is truncated given the problems with Mickens’s opening brief, which we discuss below. 2 We refer to Ruqayyah and Bessie by their first names because of their shared last name. We mean no disrespect.
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petition and granted her “letters of administration” for Bessie’s estate, meaning that she
became administrator of the estate with full authority. Mickens timely appealed.
III.
DISCUSSION
Mickens challenges the probate court’s order appointing Ruqayyah as the
administrator of Bessie’s estate. His opening brief has several deficiencies that require us 3 affirm the order.
First, the opening brief’s statement of appealability reads in full, “Appeal From an
Order Before Trial of the Superior Court, County of Riverside. (1RT 56) Hon. Kenneth
Fernandez, Judge.” This fails to comply with California Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(2)(B), which requires an appellant to “[s]tate that the judgment appealed from is
final, or explain why the order appealed from is appealable.” As a result, we exercise our
discretion to disregard Mickens’s entire opening brief. (See Lester v. Lennane (2000) 84
Cal.App.4th 536, 557.)
Ruqayyah does not argue the probate court’s order is nonappealable. But because
“the question of appealability goes to our jurisdiction, we are dutybound to consider it on
our own motion.” (Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 398.) We have jurisdiction
under Probate Code section 1303, subdivision (a), which makes an order “[g]ranting . . .
3 Mickens notified this court that he would not file a reply brief, and he did not do so. However, after oral argument, Mickens attempted to file additional documents into the record. We rejected the documents and decline to consider them. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.256(d)(1).)
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letters [of administration] to a personal representative” appealable. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 904.1, subd. (a)(10) [“appeal may be taken ‘[f]rom an order made appealable by the
Probate Code’”]; Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 99; Estate of Jones (2004)
122 Cal.App.4th 326, 331.)
Another problem with Mickens’s opening brief is that it does not identify the
applicable standard of review or tailor its arguments to that standard. We interpret this as
a concession that Mickens’s appeal lacks merit. (See Ewald v. Nationstar Mortgage,
LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 947, 948; Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE
Systems, Inc. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 465; People v. Foss (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th
113, 126.)
Third, and most importantly, the argument section of Mickens’s opening brief
contains no coherent argument or citations to authority or the record. Instead, it reads in
full: “On July 6th, 2020, Reginald Mickens filed a peremptory challenge 170.6, case
RIP1501062, on Thomas H. Cahraman, the judge in Department 8. On July 8th, 2020, it
was granted. Case reassigned to Judge Kenneth Fernandez and Superior Court California
county Riverside historic courthouse department 11th for all purposes. During this time
frame, the only case active was conservator case RIP1501062. On July 28th, 2020, A
Nunc Pro Tunc Hearing was held at 8:18 am in Dept 11, Judge Thomas H. Cahraman. It
appears that Judge Thomas went into court 11 and separated the conservator case and the
probate case from one another. The purpose of filing the 170.6 W hill remove Judge
Thomas H. Cahraman from the case completely. Judge Kenneth Fernandez takes notice
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of the Riverside Superior Probate Conservatorship case RIP1501062. It appears that
Judge William Berry and Judge Kenneth Fernandez did not read the conservatorship case
RIP1501062 and issued letters of administration to Ruqayyah [N.] Parks. After she was
removed as the conservator of the Estate in the conservatorship case RIP1501062.”
Simply put, Mickens has failed to articulate an intelligible argument supported by
appropriate authority and citations to the record in the argument section of his opening
brief. We therefore need not consider it. (See Wright v. City of Los Angeles (2001) 93
Cal.App.4th 683, 689 [“Generally, asserted grounds for appeal that are unsupported by
any citation to authority and that merely complain of error without presenting a coherent
legal argument are deemed abandoned and unworthy of discussion.”]; 300 DeHaro Street
Investors v. Department of Housing & Community Development (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th
1240, 1257 [appellant forfeited argument “by failing to brief it properly under a separate
heading . . . and . . . failing to provide adequate legal analysis”]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(1)(B) [each brief must “[s]tate each point under a separate heading or
subheading summarizing the point, and support each point by argument and, if possible,
by citation of authority”].)
We recognize Mickens is representing himself without an attorney. But he still
must “‘be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater
consideration than other litigants and attorneys.’” (First American Title Co. v. Mirzaian
(2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 956, 958, fn. 1.) His opening brief violates several rules,
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contains no reasoned argument supported by legal authority and the record, and is
essentially unintelligible.
In other words, we can glean no coherent argument from Mickens’s opening brief.
As a reviewing court, “[w]e are not required to examine undeveloped claims or to supply
arguments for the litigants.” (Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41,
52.) We therefore deem “all points asserted in this appeal to be forfeited as unsupported
by ‘adequate factual or legal analysis.’” (Singh v. Lipworth (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 813,
817.) As a result, we affirm the order appealed from without discussing the merits.
(Ewald v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 948.)
We affirm the order for the additional reason that Mickens’s record is inadequate.
The appellant bears the burden of proving an adequate record on appeal, and an
appellant’s failure to do so “‘requires that the issue be resolved against [appellant].’”
(Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 187.) The only
filing in Mickens’s record is the probate court’s order appointing Ruqayyah the estate
administrator. We cannot properly review that order without at least reviewing
Mickens’s and Ruqayyah’s petitions to be appointed administrator. Because Mickens has
not provided us an adequate record on appeal, we must affirm. (Ibid.)
Finally, we acknowledge and appreciate Mickens’s vigorous and respectful
argument at oral argument. However, for the reasons explained above, the law requires
us to affirm probate court’s order.
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IV.
DISPOSITION
The probate court’s order appointing Ruqayyah administrator of Bessie’s estate is
affirmed. Ruqayyah may recover her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
RAPHAEL J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the probate court's order appointing the respondent as administrator of the estate because the appellant's opening brief failed to comply with appellate rules, lacked coherent legal arguments, and failed to provide an adequate record for review.
Issues
Whether the probate court's order appointing an estate administrator should be reversed due to procedural deficiencies in the appellant's opening brief.
Whether the appellant provided an adequate record to support his challenge to the probate court's order.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Because of the many deficiencies in Mickens’s opening brief, we affirm.”
“Simply put, Mickens has failed to articulate an intelligible argument supported by appropriate authority and citations to the record in the argument section of his opening brief.”
“Because Mickens has not provided us an adequate record on appeal, we must affirm.”