People v. Ruiz CA1/3

Filed 12/22/23 P. v. Ruiz CA1/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A167157 v. JUAN CARLOS RUIZ, (San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. SC046239C) Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1 In 2001, a jury convicted Juan Carlos Ruiz of the murder of William Tejada, a fellow gang member, and the trial court sentenced him to 25 years to life for the murder. This court affirmed the murder conviction. (People v. Reyes, et al. (Apr. 19, 2004, A097648) [nonpub. opn.].) In January 2019, Ruiz petitioned for resentencing under former Penal Code section 1170.95 (subsequent unlabeled statutory references are to this code),2 alleging the criminal complaint allowed the prosecution to proceed under the theories of felony murder or natural and probable consequences,

1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1.) 2 Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered section 1170.95

to section 1172.6, with no substantive changes in the statute. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We cite to section 1172.6 for ease of reference. 1

that he was convicted pursuant to one of those theories, and that he could not presently be convicted of murder due to recent changes in the Penal Code. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); §§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e).) The trial court issued an order to show cause, and it conducted an evidentiary hearing in December 2022. The court ultimately denied the petition, concluding Ruiz was “an active participant in the murder,” “had the intent to kill at the time of the commission of the crime and acted with malice aforethought.” In so concluding, the court — over defense objection — relied upon Ruiz’s testimony from a youthful offender parole hearing in October 2021. In 2021, Ruiz testified he felt Tejada “had to be murdered . . . . And so, I ended up murdering [him], because he was an informant.” Ruiz admitted “directing conversations with [his] co-defendants . . . . [W]e caught [Tejada] unawares . . . I murdered him. I convinced five other co-defendants . . . to take a man’s life. I beat him, I kicked him, I stabbed him.” He also said, “[s]omeone had handed me a screwdriver” and “because he was still alive, I wanted to end it. . . . I walked over to him, I stood over him and I stabbed him in the eye, I checked his pulse, and I stabbed him in the other eye. My intention was to end his life, because I didn’t think [he] . . . deserved to live.” Ruiz contends the trial court erred by considering his parole hearing testimony. We disagree and address his arguments in turn. We review the court’s ruling on the admissibility of the evidence for abuse of discretion. (People v. Duran (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 920, 927–928.) First, Ruiz argues his youthful parole hearing testimony was “coerced and therefore per se unreliable and inadmissible.” He reasons parole hearings are inherently coercive because they create “a strong incentive” to