California Court of Appeal Dec 21, 2023 No. E080712Unpublished
Filed 12/21/23 P. v. Walz CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E080712
v. (Super.Ct.No. SCR41000)
PHILLIP EDWARD WALZ, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Gregory S. Tavill,
Judge. Affirmed.
Christopher Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Heather B. Arambarri and
Steve Oetting, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Defendant and appellant Phillip Edward Walz is serving a sentence of life without
the possibility of parole (LWOP) for his conviction of first degree murder. (Pen. Code,1
§ 187.) In January 2023, he filed a motion for an evidence preservation hearing pursuant
to section 1203.01 and People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin),2 seeking to
make a record of mitigating evidence connected to his youth. The superior court denied
the motion. On appeal, defendant contends the denial of his request for a Franklin
hearing violates equal protection. Alternatively, he contends he should be granted a
Franklin hearing pending Senate Bill No. 94’s enactment into law. As we explain, we
reject his contentions and affirm.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND FACTS
In April 1983, defendant, who was 20 years old at the time, killed Michael
Thomas. Subsequently, a jury convicted him of first degree murder with special
circumstances, along with numerous counts of other offenses, and he was sentenced to
LWOP. On January 28, 2023, defendant filed a motion for a Franklin hearing and for
appointment of counsel to assist in the hearing. The superior court denied the motion,
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 A Franklin hearing allows a convict to preserve evidence of youth-related mitigating factors for purposes of a future youthful offender parole hearing pursuant to section 3051. (See Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261; see also In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 448-459.) Juvenile offenders (i.e., those under 18 when they offended) who are sentenced to LWOP are eventually entitled to a section 3051 hearing; youthful offenders (i.e., those between 18 and 25 when they offended) who are sentenced to LWOP are not. (§ 3051, subds. (a)(1), (b), (h).)
2
holding defendant was “not eligible for Youth Offender parole[, nor] entitled to the
expanded evidentiary preservation procedures contemplated by Franklin.”
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends his “rights to equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and under article I, section 7 of the
California Constitution, require that he be granted a Franklin hearing.” He concedes this
court has rejected this same contention in People v. Ngo (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 116
(Ngo), review granted May 17, 2023, S279458. Nonetheless, he argues “the legal
landscape has changed since this Court issued its Ngo decision” because (1) that decision
is on review before the California Supreme Court, (2) there is a split of authority
regarding the merits of the argument he is raising (Ngo, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th 116
[section 3051’s distinction between youthful offenders with LWOP and non-LWOP
sentences does not violate equal protection.]; People v. Hardin (2023) 84 Cal.App.5th
People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193, 204-205; In re Murray (2021) 68
Cal.App.5th 456, 463-465; People v. Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 769, 779-781.)
Notwithstanding the above, defendant invites this court to reconsider Ngo based
on Senate Bill No. 94. We decline the invitation. As respondent aptly notes, it is
inappropriate for us to rely on “proposed” legislation as a basis for reconsidering our
prior decision. (Ngo, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 129 [“Almost any statute could be
amended—or a new one enacted—so as to provide almost anything”].) To do so requires
us to accept defendant’s assumption of the new legislation’s language. What if Senate
Bill No. 94 does not pass? What if the new legislation’s language differs from
defendant’s assumption? “The ripeness requirement . . . ‘prevents courts from issuing
purely advisory opinions, or considering a hypothetical state of facts in order to give
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general guidance rather than to resolve a specific legal dispute.’ [Citation.] In other
words, a controversy is not ripe until ‘“the facts have sufficiently congealed to permit an
intelligent and useful decision to be made.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Garcia
(2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 316, 328.)
III. DISPOSITION
The order appealed from is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
MENETREZ J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that a youthful offender (aged 18-25) sentenced to life without the possibility of parole is not entitled to a Franklin evidence preservation hearing, as the statutory distinction between such offenders and juvenile offenders does not violate equal protection.
Issues
Does the denial of a Franklin hearing to a youthful offender sentenced to life without parole violate equal protection?
Should a Franklin hearing be granted based on the potential future enactment of Senate Bill No. 94?
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“A youthful offender sentenced to LWOP is not entitled to parole at all.”
“It is inappropriate for us to rely on “proposed” legislation as a basis for reconsidering our prior decision.”