Vacation Rental Owners etc. v. City of Rancho Mirage CA4/2 (2023) · DecisionDepot
Vacation Rental Owners etc. v. City of Rancho Mirage CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Dec 15, 2023 No. E078784Unpublished
Filed 12/15/23 Vacation Rental Owners etc. v. City of Rancho Mirage CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
VACATION RENTAL OWNERS AND NEIGHBORS OF RANCHO MIRAGE et al., E078784
Plaintiffs and Respondents, (Super.Ct.No. CVRI2100368)
v. OPINION
CITY OF RANCHO MIRAGE et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Russell L. Moore, Judge.
Appeal dismissed.
Law Offices of Quintanilla & Associates, Michael R. Cobden, Steven B.
Quintanilla, Colin D. Kirkpatrick; Colantuono, Highsmith & Whatley, Holly O. Whatley
and Alena Shamos for Defendants and Appellants.
Slovak, Baron, Empey, Murphy & Pinkney, and Shaun M. Murphy for Plaintiffs
and Respondents.
1
This is the third appeal arising from a lawsuit challenging the validity of an
ordinance in the City of Rancho Mirage (the city) banning short-term rentals in most
residential neighborhoods. The trial court issued a preliminary injunction directing the
city not to enforce the ordinance and instead to issue short-term rental permits to certain
applicants whose residential properties were permitted for such rentals before the new
Point, supra, at p. 5.) Subdivision (a)(2) of section 904.1 (section 904.1(a)(2)) allows an
appeal from “an order made after a judgment made appealable by paragraph (1).”
2 We deny petitioners’ request for judicial notice of filings in the trial court that occurred after the notice of appeal was filed in this case, because the documents are not relevant to any material issue on appeal. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2.)
10
Under section 904(a)(1), an appeal may not be taken from “a judgment of
contempt that is made final and conclusive by Section 1222.” Section 1222 provides that
“[t]he judgment and orders of the court or judge, made in cases of contempt, are final and
conclusive.” Thus, under those statutory provisions, “[i]t is well settled that orders and
judgments made in cases of contempt are not appealable.” (John Breuner Co. v. Bryant
(1951) 36 Cal.2d 877, 878 (Breuner); McCord v. Smith (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 358, 367.)
“The proper method to challenge a contempt order is to seek extraordinary writ
relief, either through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, certiorari, or prohibition.”
(In re M.R. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 49, 65; People v. Gonzalez (1996) 12 Cal.4th 804,
816 [“review of the contempt judgment is by extraordinary writ”].) The city does not
dispute that point. Rather, the city contends that it is not appealing from the order of
contempt but instead is appealing from the order awarding attorney fees, which the city
claims “is appealable as a final judgment” under section 904.1(a)(1). We disagree.
In support of its contention that the order awarding attorney fees under section
1218(a) is an appealable final judgment, the city cites Rickley v. Goodfriend (2012) 207
Cal.App.4th 1528 (Rickley) and L.A. Times v. Alameda Corridor Transp. Auth. (2001) 88
Cal.App.4th 1381 (L.A. Times). Both cases are distinguishable and do not aid the city.
Rickley involved an appeal from the denial of an attorney fee award to a pro se litigant in
a postjudgment contempt proceeding. (Rickley, supra, at p. 1532.) The Court of Appeal
considered the merits of the appeal without addressing its jurisdiction. (Id. at pp. 1532-
1538.) It is “‘axiomatic that a decision does not stand for a proposition not considered by
11
the court.’” (Wishnev v. The Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. (2019) 8 Cal.5th 199,
217.) In any event, because the order concerning attorney fees in Rickley was issued after
entry of judgment, the order was made appealable as a postjudgment order under section
904.1(a)(2).
Here, by contrast, the court awarded attorney fees after issuing a preliminary
injunction, not after it entered a final judgment. Accordingly, unlike the order awarding
attorney fees under section 1218(a) in Rickley, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th 1528, the order
here is interlocutory and not appealable as a postjudgment order under section
904.1(a)(2).
L.A. Times, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th 1381 is similarly unavailing. In that case, the
Los Angeles Times appealed from an order denying its motion for attorney fees incurred
in a mandamus proceeding in which it sought to obtain documents from a municipal
agency under the then-applicable California Public Records Act (former Gov.
Code, § 6250 et seq.). (L.A. Times, at p. 1384.) The trial court ordered the agency to
disclose certain documents, and neither party sought review of the order. (Id. at
pp. 1384-1385.) Several months later, the Los Angeles Times sought attorney fees under
a California Public Records Act provision that requires such an award for a plaintiff who
prevails in litigation brought under the statute. (Id. at p. 1385.) The trial court denied the
motion for attorney fees, and the Los Angeles Times appealed from that denial. (Id. at
p. 1384.) The agency moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the order was only
reviewable by extraordinary writ because the order concerning disclosure was not
12
appealable under the statute and could only be reviewed by extraordinary writ. (Id. at
pp. 1384-1385.) The Court of Appeal denied the motion, reasoning that “both case
precedent and legislative history [of the then-applicable California Public Records Act]
confirm that, while disclosure orders are reviewable only by extraordinary writ, the
Legislature did not intend to eliminate review by appeal of orders involving only attorney
fees and costs.” (Id. at p. 1388.)
In L.A. Times, the municipal agency also argued that the order denying attorney
fees was not an appealable postjudgment order because the underlying order was not
appealable. (L.A. Times, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 1388.) L.A. Times rejected the
argument, concluding that the fees order was an appealable final judgment under section
904.1(a)(1) even though the underlying order was not appealable. (L.A. Times, at
p. 1388.) L.A. Times reasoned that “the order denying attorney fees itself has ‘all the
earmarks of a final judgment.’ Nothing remains for future consideration, and no other
opportunity exists for appellate review.” (Id. at pp. 1388-1389.)
The city argues that the same reasoning applies here. It contends that “the trial
court completed the contempt proceedings when it awarded attorney fees,” so “[n]othing
remains for future consideration, and there is no other opportunity for appellate review of
the award of fees.” We disagree. While it is true that nothing remains for future
consideration of the attorney fee award or in the underlying contempt proceeding, the
order awarding attorney fees here is not immune from appellate review. The order was
already subject to appellate review. The city filed a petition for writ of mandate
13
challenging the award, and we summarily denied the petition. Thus, like the order of
contempt, an order awarding attorney fees under section 1218(a) is reviewable (and was
actually reviewed in this case) by extraordinary writ.
Moreover, we see no indication that the Legislature intended attorney fees orders
for contempt proceedings to be treated as separately appealable orders. The city’s own
arguments in this appeal—which largely attack the contempt order itself as a basis for
attacking the fees and costs award—show that allowing parties to appeal an order
awarding attorney fees under section 1218(a) would potentially render the underlying
finding of contempt subject to review by appeal rather than by extraordinary writ, which
is directly contrary to the statutory directive that contempt orders and judgments are not
appealable. (§§ 904.1(a)(1), 1222; Breuner, supra, 36 Cal.2d at p. 878.)
For these reasons, we conclude that the interlocutory order awarding petitioners
attorney fees under section 1218(a) for the contempt proceedings associated with the
October 13, 2021, finding of contempt against the city is not appealable.
We deny the city’s request to exercise our discretion to treat the appeal as a
petition for writ of mandate. Although we have the power “to treat the purported appeal
as a petition for writ of mandate, we should not exercise that power except under unusual
circumstances.” (Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 401.) No such circumstance
exists here. We previously reviewed the challenge as a petition for writ of mandate. We
see no reason to duplicate our efforts.
14
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. Vacation Rental and Allicia Davis shall recover their