T.J. v. Superior Court CA4/2 (2023) · DecisionDepot
T.J. v. Superior Court CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Dec 11, 2023 No. E082175Unpublished
Filed 12/11/23 T.J. v. Superior Court CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
T.J. et al.,
Petitioners, E082175
v. (Super.Ct.No. DPSW2200017)
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF OPINION RIVERSIDE COUNTY,
Respondent;
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES,
Real Party in Interest.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ. Sean P. Crandell,
Judge. Petitions denied.
Laurie Minter for Petitioner, T.J.
Chrystal James for Petitioner, M.P.
No appearance for Respondent.
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Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Teresa K.B. Beecham and Catherine E. Rupp,
Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner M.P. (mother) filed a petition for extraordinary writ pursuant to
California Rules of Court, rule 8.452 challenging the juvenile court’s order terminating
contends she was not provided with reasonable services because DPSS did not liberalize
her visits, as she had supervised visits at the DPSS office for the majority of the case, and
DPSS prevented her from ever progressing to unsupervised visits.{MW 9, 11} Father
claims that he was not given a reasonable opportunity to visit the children, and that DPSS
was unwilling to change the location of his visits from the DPSS office.{FW 12} He
also claims there was an eight-week delay in receiving counseling services due to DPSS’s
error in listing the wrong last name for him in the referral.{FW 11} We conclude that
mother and father were provided with reasonable services.
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1. Standard of Review
“On appeal, it is our task to determine whether the record discloses substantial
evidence which supports the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable services designed to
aid the parent in overcoming the problems which led to loss of custody were provided or
offered.” (In re Joanna Y. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 433, 439.) “In reviewing the
reasonableness of the services provided, this court must view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the respondent. We must indulge in all legitimate and reasonable inferences
to uphold the verdict. If there is substantial evidence supporting the judgment, our duty
ends and the judgment must not be disturbed.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th
538, 545 (Misako R.).)
2. Mother and Father Were Offered Consistent Visitation
Mother’s and father’s case plans required them to complete individual counseling,
a domestic violence program, a parenting education program, and a substance abuse
program, including testing.{CT 158-163} They were referred to counseling services and
domestic violence services through Marsell, and parenting education and substance abuse
services through MFI.{CT 149, 344, 345} The parents do not complain about the
reasonableness of any of these services.
Instead, mother specifically contends she was not provided with reasonable
services because DPSS restricted her visits to supervised visitation at DPSS offices,
which resulted in X.J. refusing to have visits with her. In other words, she claims X.J.
refused visitations “due to not wanting to be at the DPSS office.” Mother notes that
DPSS did not allow her to move to community visits until just weeks before the review
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hearing. She points out that, as soon as she was allowed to have visits in the community,
X.J. decided to participate in visits with her.{MW 9, 10} Additionally, mother claims
DPSS prohibited the maternal grandmother from continuing to supervise her visits
because the social worker mistakenly believed the maternal grandmother was colluding
with her to provide her with unauthorized visits.{MW 9-10} Father similarly claims he
had visits for months with both children when they were supervised by the maternal
grandmother; however, when DPSS withdrew the authorization for her to supervise and
visits went back to the DPSS office, X.J. would no longer visit with him.{FW 12}
The record plainly belies mother’s and father’s claims. On July 28, 2022, the
court ordered separate visitation twice a week and subsequently authorized the maternal
grandmother to supervise.{RT 18, CT 148} On August 1, the social worker attempted to
schedule visits, but mother did not answer the phone. Father was uncooperative with the
social worker and disconnected the phone call.{CT 148} On August 5, the parents
visited Z.J. separately at the DPSS office, but X.J. refused to go and simply said she did
not want to visit.{CT 148} The court subsequently authorized the maternal grandmother
to supervise visits at her home, and both mother and father later reported that the visits
were going well.{RT 24, CT 213} However, on October 12, X.J. reported to the social
worker that father and Z.J. fell into the pool at the maternal grandmother’s home. The
social worker informed the parents that the visits would be moved back to the DPSS
office temporarily, due to concerns about what happened, and both father and mother
called X.J. a liar.{CT 351-352} At the contested jurisdiction hearing on October 19, the
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court was informed that the maternal grandmother no longer wanted to supervise visits
and did not want visits to take place at her home.{RT 31-32}
On November 9, 2022, father had a visit scheduled with X.J., but she was crying
and said she did not want to go. She ended up going, but father did not show, and X.J.
said she no longer wanted to visit him.{CT 352}
The parents’ visitations became more inconsistent, and on December 14, 2022, a
CFTM was held to discuss the issue.{CT 354} The maternal great-grandmother agreed
with the social worker that the visits should be moved to the DPSS office to be
supervised by DPSS, as she had observed father being aggressive and inappropriate at the
last visit in her home.{CT 354-355} Subsequently, the parents missed several of their
scheduled visits, and X.J. said she no longer wanted to visit with them. When asked for
a reason, she just said she did not want to do so.{CT 355-356} On February 21, 2023,
the maternal great-grandmother cancelled the visits due to Z.J. being sick, and the parents
were offered a virtual visit but did not respond.{CT 356} X.J. told the social worker
several times that she did not enjoy visits with the parents and refused to go at various
times.{CT 356-357} The parents had a visit with Z.J. on March 8, but they then failed
to show for a scheduled visit on March 29.{CT 357} The record reflects that DPSS was
flexible and offered the parents tele-video visits; however, they only attended some.{CT
618}
Furthermore, at the review hearing, the social worker confirmed that the parents
were not consistent in their visits.{RT 413-414} He noted there had been some visits in
the community lately, supervised by the maternal great-grandmother, which included
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X.J.{RT 421, 431} The social worker testified that there was a time when X.J. declined
to have visits, even visits in the community.{RT 431} He testified that the parents had
visits at the maternal great-grandmother’s home, but the visits were moved to the DPSS
office since the maternal great-grandmother felt uncomfortable having the visits in her
home. At some point, DPSS did allow visits in the community to occur again.{RT 431-
433} However, at the time of the review hearing, the visits were back in the DPSS
office, due to there being constant arguments between the parents, the maternal great-
grandmother, and X.J.{RT 434-435}
Thus, contrary to the parents’ claims, the record clearly shows they were offered
regular and flexible visitation, but they were inconsistent in attending the visits. Further,
X.J.’s refusal to visit with them had nothing to do with the location of the visits; rather,
she said several times she did not like visiting with them. Moreover, DPSS did not
prohibit the maternal grandmother from supervising visits or prevent mother from
progressing to unsupervised visits. Rather, the maternal grandmother did supervise
visits for a time, but then no longer wanted to supervise visits. The visits remained
supervised due to the circumstances and the parents’ inappropriate behavior. As to
father’s claim that he suffered an eight-week delay in receiving counseling services
because of DPSS’s error in listing the wrong name on the referral, any error was
harmless, since he never attended any of the counseling sessions he was offered
thereafter.{FW 10} (See supra, § C.2.)
Ultimately, “[t]he standard is not whether the services provided were the best that
might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the
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circumstances.” (Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 547.) Construing all reasonable
inferences in favor of the juvenile court’s findings regarding the reasonableness of
DPSS’s efforts, as we must, we conclude the services provided to mother and father were
reasonable under the circumstances. (Ibid.)
C. The Court Properly Terminated the Parents’ Reunification Services
Mother contends the court erred in terminating her services since she substantially
completed her case plan, there was no evidence she failed to regularly participate or make
substantive progress, and there was a substantial probability that, given six more months
of services, the children would have been returned to her care.{MW 7-9} Father
similarly claims he substantially completed his case plan, and there was no substantial
evidence that, given six more months of service, he would not be able to reunify with the
children.{FW 13-15} They both claim they were actively participating in their
substance abuse treatment programs, participating in testing, and having positive visits
with the children.{MW 9, FW 15} The record simply does not support their claims, and
there was substantial evidence to support the court’s order terminating services.
1. Standard of Review
“We review an order terminating reunification services to determine if it is
supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] In making this determination, we review
the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations and draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders. [Citation.]
‘We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely
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determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.’ ” (Kevin
R. v. Superior Court (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 676, 688-689.)
2. Mother and Father Failed to Participate Regularly and Make Substantive
Progress in Their Case Plans
We initially note that Z.J. was under three years of age when he was removed
from the parents’ custody.{CT 12} Pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (a)(1)(B),
reunification services may be limited to six months for these very young minors.
(See M.V. v. Superior Court (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 166, 175.) Moreover, because X.J.
is a member of Z.J.’s “sibling group,” X.J.’s reunification services may be similarly
circumscribed pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (a)(1)(C). Specifically, at a six-
month review hearing, reunification services for members of a sibling group may be
terminated, and a permanency planning hearing scheduled, if the juvenile court “finds by
clear and convincing evidence that the parent failed to participate regularly and make
substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment plan.” (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(3).)
The court here ordered mother and father to participate in individual counseling,
complete a domestic violence program, complete a parenting education program, and
participate in a substance abuse program and testing.{RT, 38-39, CT 158-160} Mother
initially told the social worker she was not interested in the services and refused to accept
a copy of the case plan or referral letter.{CT 343} She was referred to MFI for
substance abuse treatment and testing and adamantly refused to participate. Although
mother later completed the MFI assessment, she refused to enroll.{CT 344} Mother did
submit to substance abuse testing several times from September 2022 to March 2023, but
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missed five tests during that period.{CT 344-345} She was referred to a parenting
program in August 2022, but there was no record of her enrolling or participating in
it.{CT 345} She enrolled in a domestic violence program, but she was discharged due to
poor attendance.{CT 346} By the time of the six-month review hearing, mother had
only completed her counseling requirement.{CT 345}
Similarly, father completed an assessment at MFI for substance abuse, but he did
not enroll and indicated he did not need a substance abuse treatment program.{CT 348}
He submitted to several substance abuse tests and tested positive for marijuana twice.{CT
348-349} Father said he enrolled in a parenting program in August 2022, but there was
no record of enrollment, participation, or completion.{CT 349} He was referred to
Marsell for individual counseling and a domestic violence program, and he started
services in August 2022, but was later discharged for lack of attendance. He had
numerous sessions of individual therapy scheduled and did not show up to any of
them.{CT 349-350} As to the domestic violence program, Marsell reached out several
times to schedule father for continued services, but he did not respond.{CT 350}
Moreover, father was arrested on March 29, 2023, and charged with inflicting corporal
injury on a spouse.{CT 350, 481} Thus, he evidently had not benefited from the
services.
On this record, it is clear that mother and father failed to regularly participate or
make substantive progress in their case plans, and there was no substantial probability
that, given six more months of services, the children would have been returned to their
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care. Therefore, the evidence supported the court’s decision to terminate their
reunification services.
D. The Court Properly Found That Return of the Children to the Parents’
Custody Would Be Detrimental
Finally, mother and father argue that the court erred in finding there was a
substantial risk of detriment to the children if returned to their care. They assert that
they had adequate housing and stable employment, and had completed the majority of
their case plans.{MW 12, FW 16}
Section 366.21, subdivision (e)(1), provides that the failure of the parent to
participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs
“shall be prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental.” (§ 366.21, subd.
(e)(1).) In view of the parents’ failure to participate regularly and make substantive
progress in their case plans, the court properly concluded that return of the children to
their custody would be detrimental. (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(1).) (See supra, § C.) A
thorough review of the record demonstrates that the evidence amply supports that
finding.
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DISPOSITION
The writ petitions are denied. The requests for a temporary stay of the section
366.26 hearing are also denied.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS J. We concur:
MILLER Acting P.J.
CODRINGTON J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the Department of Public Social Services provided reasonable reunification services and that the parents failed to participate regularly or make substantive progress in their court-ordered case plans, justifying the termination of services and the setting of a section 366.26 hearing.
Issues
Did the Department of Public Social Services provide reasonable reunification services to the parents?
Did the juvenile court err in finding that returning the children to parental custody would create a substantial risk of detriment?
Did the parents participate regularly and make substantive progress in their court-ordered treatment programs?
Disposition. denied
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We conclude they were both provided with reasonable services and failed to substantially complete their case plans and make substantive progress.”
“The court found that DPSS had provided reasonable services, the parents failed to participate regularly and make substantial progress in their case plans”
“The failure of the parent . . . to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental.”