California Court of Appeal Dec 6, 2023 No. E079724Unpublished
Filed 12/6/23 In re A.P. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re A.P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, E079724 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. J292403) v. OPINION A.P.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Charles J. Umeda,
Judge. Affirmed with directions.
Alex Kreit, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Laura Baggett and Robin
Urbanski, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Appellant and defendant A.P. (minor) appeals from the juvenile court’s
dispositional order committing him to a secure youth treatment facility (SYTF) known as
Gateway to ARISE (ARISE). He argues that the court abused its discretion because its
finding that a short-term residential therapeutic program (STRTP) was unsuitable was not
supported by substantial evidence. Minor also argues that the court failed to set a
maximum term of confinement as required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 875.
Section 727, subdivision (a)(4)(E), authorizes placement of a minor in an STRTP.
That provision notes that an STRTP is defined in section 11400, subdivision (ad), which
describes an STRTP as “a nondetention, licensed community care facility.”
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As to the fourth factor, minor argues that the record does not contain sufficient
evidence that the goals of rehabilitation and community safety could not be met by
placement in a less restrictive setting, namely, an STRTP. We disagree. As the court
noted, minor’s offenses were “serious and violent”—he pointed a gun at the victims’
faces while robbing them, and he then fired the gun at them when they pursued him.
While in juvenile hall awaiting disposition, minor exhibited poor behavior and attitude,
and he refused to obey staff or follow staff instructions. He also threatened to commit an
even more serious crime when released, adding that “he wasn’t joking and that he was
okay with going to prison.” Williams testified that minor “would be a flight risk,” and
minor’s own retained expert testified that there was a significant risk that minor would try
to abscond from placement. Thus, the record supports a determination that a nonsecure
facility like an STRTP would not adequately serve the goals of rehabilitation and
community safety—minor would probably try to run away, thereby endangering the
public and losing the benefits of the treatment programs available at his placement. For
all of these reasons, the record amply supports the court’s findings that minor “cannot
behave in [a] non-disruptive manner that is necessary for [placement in an] STRTP
setting” and that minor “poses a potential danger to other residen[ts] at [an] STRTP.”
Minor’s arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. First, minor argues that the
record does not contain sufficient evidence of the inadequacy of an STRTP, “because the
record does not contain any evidence about the requirements for placement or
programming available at an STRTP.” The argument lacks merit. The record contains
evidence that a placement like an STRTP is an unsecured facility, as provided by statute
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(§ 11400, subd. (ad)). Given the evidence of the seriousness of minor’s offenses, his
conduct in juvenile hall, and his risk of flight, the record contains more than sufficient
evidence to support the trial court’s finding that placement in an STRTP would be
unsuitable because it would not adequately serve the goals of rehabilitation and
community safety.
Second, minor argues that both experts “recommended the court consider a less
restrictive placement.” The argument fails because under the substantial evidence
standard of review, the trial court’s findings must be affirmed if the record contains
sufficient evidence to support them, even if the record also contains conflicting evidence.
(In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 601.) Thus, even if both experts had testified
unequivocally that an SYTF commitment would not be an appropriate disposition, the
trial court would not be bound by those opinions if the record also contained sufficient
evidence to support a contrary finding. Moreover, Dr. Graham-Howard believed
incorrectly that minor’s intellectual disability made him ineligible for commitment to
ARISE, and she testified that if it did not, then “he would be an appropriate candidate”
for the program.
Third, minor quotes a passage from one of the probation department’s reports and
argues that “the probation department’s stated reasons for not seeking a placement are
incompatible with section 875.” The argument fails because, regardless of the statements
in the quoted passage of the report, the record contains substantial evidence supporting
the trial court’s determination that no less restrictive, alternative placement would be
appropriate. As already discussed, Williams’s testimony explained why placement in an
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unsecured facility like an STRTP would be inadequate, and minor’s own expert agreed
that minor “would be an appropriate candidate” for an SYTF if he is not ineligible, which
he is not.
Fourth, minor argues that the circumstances of his case “demonstrate that his
potential suitability for an alternative placement was at least plausible.” Assuming for
the sake of argument that minor’s assertion is true, his argument still fails to show any
error under the applicable standard of review. We review the commitment decision for
abuse of discretion (In re Angela M., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1396), and we review
the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence (In re Nicole H. (2016) 244
Cal.App.4th 1150, 1154). Even if it was plausible that minor was potentially suitable for
a less restrictive placement, it does not follow that the trial court’s commitment decision
was irrational or arbitrary (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 640 [defining the abuse
of discretion standard]) or that the record does not contain substantial evidence to support
it.
Minor also argues that there was insufficient evidence that minor’s need for
remedial assistance with his intellectual disability could be met at ARISE. The argument
lacks merit. Williams testified that minor’s intellectual disability would not affect his
ability to function or benefit from the programs at ARISE. Holmes testified that ARISE
had an academic program that could be tailored to each youth, and it could reach out to
other facilities to provide a needed program that was unavailable at ARISE. Moreover, a
psychological evaluation report by Dr. Shannon Johnson explained that test results
concerning minor’s intelligence level should “not [be] considered to be an accurate
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reflection of [minor’s] intellectual functioning.” And again, Dr. Graham-Howard agreed
that if minor’s intellectual disability diagnosis did not exclude him from ARISE, which it
does not, then he would be an appropriate candidate and could be properly rehabilitated
there.
Finally minor cites In re Carlos J. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1 in support of his
contention that the trial court abused its discretion by committing him to ARISE, but the
case is inapposite. In In re Carlos J., the record contained no evidence concerning the
programs available at the facility to which the ward was committed. (Id. at p. 4.) Here,
the record does contain such evidence—Holmes testified in detail about the programs
offered at ARISE.
For all of these reasons, minor has not shown that the court’s determination that a
less restrictive, alternative disposition was unsuitable was an abuse of discretion or was
not supported by substantial evidence.
II. The Court Properly Set a Maximum Term of Confinement
Minor argues that the court failed to set a maximum term of confinement based
upon the facts and circumstances of the case. He asserts that the court set a baseline term
of two years and also stated that the “total custody time” was three years eight months,
the court never “stated that it had decided to set three years and 8 months as the
maximum term of confinement, based upon the facts and circumstances of the case.”
Alternatively, minor points out that the disposition report erroneously lists a 32-month
commitment instead of a two-year baseline commitment with a maximum term of
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confinement of three years eight months. We agree that the disposition report contains a
clerical error, but we otherwise reject minor’s argument.
A juvenile court has discretion to impose a period of confinement that is less than
the maximum allowed under the law. (See In re Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 491-
492 (Julian R.).) Section 875, subdivision (c)(1), requires the court to “set a maximum
term of confinement for the ward based upon the facts and circumstances of the matter or
matters that brought or continued the ward under the jurisdiction of the court and as
deemed appropriate to achieve rehabilitation.” Section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(B),
provides that, “[t]he maximum term of confinement shall not exceed the middle term of
imprisonment that can be imposed upon an adult convicted of the same offense or
offenses.”
This court must presume that the juvenile court understood that it could impose a
lower maximum term of confinement if such an order was justified under the
circumstances. (See Julian R., supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 498-499.) The court here set the
maximum term of confinement at three years eight months. Although the court used the
words “total custody time,” we do not believe that the court’s oral pronouncement can
reasonably be interpreted as referring to something other than the maximum term of
confinement. Nothing in the record rebuts the presumption that the court understood its
discretionary authority, and the facts and circumstances of minor’s behavior amply
support the court’s decision in setting the maximum term.
Finally, minor argues that because the disposition report states a confinement term
of 32 months, we should remand for the juvenile court to correct the report to reflect a
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baseline term of two years and a maximum term of confinement. Respondent agrees that
the clerical error should be corrected.
Clerical error occurs when a document fails to reflect the court’s intended ruling.
(People v. Clark (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 248, 256.) Clerical errors may be corrected at
any time. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.) Accordingly, we will direct
the superior court to correct the disposition report to reflect the disposition of a baseline
term of two years and a maximum confinement term of three years eight months.
DISPOSITION
The superior court is directed to correct the juvenile detention disposition report to
reflect the disposition of a baseline term of two years and a maximum term of
confinement of three years eight months. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
MILLER J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in committing the minor to a secure youth treatment facility (SYTF) because substantial evidence supported the finding that less restrictive alternatives were unsuitable, though the court must correct a clerical error in the disposition report regarding the term of confinement.
Issues
Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by finding that a less restrictive, alternative disposition was unsuitable for the minor.
Whether the juvenile court failed to properly set a maximum term of confinement as required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 875.
Whether the disposition report contains a clerical error regarding the baseline and maximum terms of confinement.
Disposition. Affirmed with directions
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The record amply supports the court’s findings that minor “cannot behave in [a] non-disruptive manner that is necessary for [placement in an] STRTP setting” and that minor “poses a potential danger to other residen[ts] at [an] STRTP.””
“The superior court is directed to correct the juvenile detention disposition report to reflect the disposition of a baseline term of two years and a maximum term of confinement of three years eight months.”