California Court of Appeal Nov 30, 2023 No. E080013Unpublished
Filed 11/30/23 P. v. Ramirez CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E080013
v. (Super.Ct.No. FVI17001930)
NATHAN JOAO RAMIREZ, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Joseph B. Widman,
Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Melanie L. Skehar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier and
Kathryn Kirschbaum, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
After defendant and appellant Nathan Joao Ramirez admitted to violating his
probation, in 2019 he was sentenced under Penal Code1 section 1170,
subdivision (h)(5)(A), to a split sentence of four years, with two years to be served in
Section 1203.2, subdivision (a), provides in relevant part that at any time during
the period of supervision the court may, upon rearrest of the person or issuance of a
warrant for rearrest, “revoke and terminate the supervision of the person if the interests of
justice so require and the court, in its judgment, has reason to believe from the report of
the probation or parole officer or otherwise that the person has violated any of the
conditions of their supervision, or has subsequently committed other offenses, regardless
of whether the person has been prosecuted for those offenses.” (§ 1203.2, subd. (a),
italics added.)
Under section 1203.2, subdivision (b)(1), “[u]pon its own motion or upon the
petition of the supervised person, the probation or parole officer, or the district attorney,
the court may modify, revoke, or terminate supervision of the person pursuant to this
subdivision.” (§ 1203.2, subd. (b)(1), italics added.) That subdivision further provides,
“After the receipt of a written report from the probation or parole officer, the court shall
read and consider the report and either its motion or the petition and may modify, revoke,
or terminate the supervision of the supervised person upon the grounds set forth in
subdivision (a) if the interests of justice so require.” (§ 1203.2, subd. (b)(1), italics
added.) Finally, under section 1203.3, subdivision (a), the trial court “has the authority at
any time during the term of mandatory supervision pursuant to subparagraph (B) of
paragraph (5) of subdivision (h) of Section 1170 to revoke, modify, or change the
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conditions of the court’s order suspending the execution of the concluding portion of the
supervised person’s term.” (§ 1203.3, subd. (a).)
Analyzing the express words of the statutory language, giving them a plain and
commonsense meaning of sections 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B), 1203.2, subdivisions (a)
and (b), and 1203.3, a trial court has the authority to revoke, modify, and/or terminate
mandatory supervision by court order. Hence, the trial court here erred when it believed
it did not have the authority to terminate defendant’s mandatory supervision. Our
conclusion is supported by People v. Camp (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 461 (Camp), a case
relied upon by defendant.
In Camp, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th 461, the People challenged the trial court’s
decision to terminate the mandatory supervision portion of the defendant’s split sentence
early and modify his sentence to release him to the custody of the Immigration and
Customs Enforcement Agency for deportation. (Id. at p. 464.) The People argued the
trial court lacked “‘authority to substantially modify the original judgment after it ha[d]
been imposed and executed.’” (Id. at p. 470.) Our colleagues in Division One rejected
the People’s argument and held, under section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B), a trial court
may terminate a defendant’s mandatory supervision early without ordering the defendant
to serve the suspended portion of the sentence. (Camp, at pp. 464, 474.) The court
further noted, “neither former section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B)(i), nor subdivisions (a)
and (b) of section 1203.2 or section 1203.3 contains any language that would suggest that
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a court’s power to terminate mandatory supervision is restricted in any manner.” (Id. at
p. 474.)
We find Camp’s majority opinion persuasive and decline the People’s invitation to
follow the dissenting opinion in Camp. (See People v. Lopez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 569, 585
[“dissenting opinions are not binding precedent”].) Thus, under section 1170,
subdivision (h)(5)(B), the trial court had the express statutory authority to terminate
defendant’s mandatory supervision for violating the conditions of his supervision. As the
Camp court noted, section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B), “contain[s] no limitation of any
kind on a trial court’s exercise of [its] authority” to terminate mandatory supervision.
(Camp, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 470.)
We now turn to section 1203.2a. As explained previously, section 1203.2a, in
relevant part states: “If any defendant who has been released on probation is committed
to a prison in this state or another state for another offense, the court which released him
or her on probation shall have jurisdiction to impose sentence . . . .” (§ 1203.2a, italics
added.) By its express terms, examined in its entirety, section 1203.2a provides
procedures for service of sentences by probationers incarcerated for a subsequent
offense. However, defendant had been given a split sentence followed by mandatory
supervision, not probation. “Under the Realignment Act, qualified persons convicted of
nonserious and nonviolent felonies are sentenced to county jail instead of state prison.
[Citation.] Trial courts have discretion to commit the defendant to county jail for a full
term in custody, or to impose a hybrid or split sentence consisting of county jail followed
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by a period of mandatory supervision.” (People v. Catalan (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 173,
178.) “A split sentence is a hybrid sentence in which a trial court suspends execution of a
portion of the term and releases the defendant into the community under the mandatory
supervision of the county probation department. Such sentences are imposed pursuant to
Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B)(i), a provision originally adopted as part
of the ‘2011 Realignment Legislation addressing public safety.’” (Camp, supra, 233
Cal.App.4th at p. 464, fn. 1.)
Examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning,
we believe that section 1203.2a applies to persons placed on probation. “‘“‘“When the
language of a statute is clear, we need go no further.”’”’” (Clark, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th
at p. 144.) Furthermore, following the passage of the Realignment Act in 2011, the
Legislature did not amend section 1203.2a. The Legislature “‘is deemed to be aware of
statutes and judicial decisions already in existence, and to have enacted or amended a
statute in light thereof. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Yartz (2005) 37 Cal.4th 529,
538.) Under such circumstances, we may assume that “the Legislature intended to
maintain a consistent body of rules and to adopt the meaning of statutory terms already
construed.” (Scott, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1424.)
As explained above, the Realignment Act, codified under section 1170,
subdivision (h)(5)(B), itself expressly sets forth, and limits, the means by which
mandatory supervision may be revoked, modified, or terminated and does not include
section 1203.2a among them. By its express terms, then, the Realignment Act precludes
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defendant’s claim that he could invoke the procedures generally available through
section 1203.2a to terminate or modify his mandatory supervision. “The words of the
statute should be given their ordinary and usual meaning and should be construed in their
statutory context.’ [Citation.] If the statutory language is unambiguous, ‘we presume the
Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute governs.’” (Whaley
v. Sony Computer Entertainment America, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 479, 484-485;
People v. Manzo (2012) 53 Cal.4th 880, 885.) Here, the Legislature unambiguously
limited the statutory mechanisms by which mandatory supervision may be revoked or
modified, and we may not disregard that express directive.2
In sum, defendant did not qualify for section 1203.2a, but did so under
section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B). While the trial court was correct that defendant did
not qualify for the relief he sought under section 1203.2a, the court was unaware that
defendant did so under sections 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B), and 1203.2, subdivision (a).
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order denying defendant’s request to terminate
his mandatory supervision and remand the matter for the trial court to rehear defendant’s
motion to terminate his mandatory supervision.
2 If section 1203.2a was inadvertently excluded from section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B), in the Realignment Act, that oversight can be corrected by the Legislature.
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IV.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying defendant’s request to terminate his mandatory
supervision is reversed and the matter is remanded for a rehearing consistent with this