Stone v. Kim CA2/8
Filed 11/20/23 Stone v. Kim CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
CHRISTOPHER STONE, B324466
Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 22STCV00607 v.
CHARLES KIM,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Barbara Ann Meiers, Judge. Affirmed. Christopher Stone, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Charles Kim, in pro. per., for Defendant and Respondent. ____________________ Christopher Stone, a nonattorney, brought pro. per. Private Attorneys General Act claims (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) (the Act, also sometimes called PAGA) against his former employer,
Charles Kim. The trial court sustained a demurrer, dismissed the case, and awarded costs in Kim’s favor. We affirm. A party bringing claims under the Act represents a state agency and nonattorneys cannot represent other entities in court. The costs award was proper because Kim was the prevailing party. The Act allows employees to file lawsuits on behalf of the state to help the state with labor law enforcement. (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 538 & 545; Lab. Code, § 2699.) Employees sue as proxies or agents of the state’s labor law enforcement agency. (Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 986 (Arias).) The United States Supreme Court distinguished between representative and individual components of claims under the Act for the issue of arbitrability. (Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. __, __ [142 S.Ct. 1906, 1916 & 1924–1925] (Viking).) The Court noted, however, that all actions under the Act are representative “in that they are brought by employees acting as representatives—that is, as agents or proxies—of the State.” (Id. at p. __ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1916]; see id. at p. __ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1920] [a plaintiff under the Act “represents a single principal, the [state agency]”].) After Viking, the California Supreme Court has reaffirmed that employees who bring actions under the Act are proxies or agents of the state. (Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1116.) An employee plaintiff represents the same legal right and interest as the state agency: recovery of civil penalties the agency would have assessed and collected. (Arias, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 986.) A judgment under the Act binds both the employee and the state. (Ibid.)
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