subd. (a)), and one strike prior (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (c), (e)(1), & 1170.12,
subd. (c)(1).) On December 23, 2016, a jury found defendant guilty on all charges except
for count 2 (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378.) On February 15, 2017, in exchange for a
stipulated sentence of 11 years, defendant pled guilty to count 2 and admitted both prison
priors, his serious felony prior, and his strike prior. Defendant was then sentenced on all
counts and allegations. 3 Of relevance, for each prison prior (section 667.5(b)), the trial
court imposed one year and then stayed the punishment.
1 All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 This court omits a recitation of the facts underlying the convictions because it is not relevant to the issue on appeal.
3 This court omits a detailed recitation of the trial court’s sentence as it is irrelevant to the issue on appeal.
2
On June 16, 2022, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR) identified defendant as an inmate who was serving a sentence containing a
section 667.5(b) prior. The CDCR notified the trial court, and a hearing to recall and
resentence defendant pursuant to section 1172.75, subdivision (a), occurred on
August 22, 2022. At the resentencing, the trial court vacated the sentence for defendant’s
two section 667.5(b) priors and ordered them stricken. Defendant argued for a full
resentencing hearing going beyond striking his two priors. Defendant provided
documentation detailing positive changes he had made in the time since his conviction.
The trial court reserved ruling allowing the parties to provide further briefing on the issue
of resentencing.
Defendant filed a brief arguing he is entitled to a full resentencing hearing.
Defendant reasoned that to deny a full resentencing hearing because his section 667.5(b)
priors were stayed is contrary to the plain language of the statute and the legislative
intent. Defendant also cited specifically how his sentence could and should be modified.
The People filed an opposition arguing defendant is not entitled to a full resentencing
hearing because the plain language of the statute demonstrates relief under
section 1172.75 is reserved for persons whose sentence was increased by the imposition
of section 667.5(b) priors. The People also argued that even if the language of the statute
is ambiguous, the legislative history shows that the intended benefit was only for those
defendants whose sentence was increased by the enhancements. Defendant filed a reply
to the People’s opposition brief, arguing that a stayed prison prior is still an imposed
3
prison prior for the purposes of section 1172.75. Defendant also argued in his reply that
the absence of express language in the statute distinguishing stayed priors from executed
priors demonstrates the Legislature’s intent to treat the two situations the same.
A second resentencing hearing occurred on October 25, 2022. Following briefing
and argument by both parties, the trial court denied defendant’s request for a full
resentencing hearing. The trial court filed a written ruling reasoning that defendant is not
entitled to resentencing because his section 667.5(b) priors were imposed and stayed
instead of imposed and executed.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on October 26, 2022.
DISCUSSION
A. Section 1172.75 Statutory Analysis
Senate Bill No. 483 (Senate Bill 483) (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) added
section 1171.1 4 to the Penal Code (Stats. 2021, ch. 728). Section 1172.75,
subdivision (a), states that “[a]ny sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to
January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any
enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense . . . is legally
invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) Section 1172.75 instructs the CDCR to identify those
persons in their custody currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an
enhancement under section 667.5(b) (excluding sexually violent offenses) and provide
such information to the sentencing court that imposed the enhancement. (§ 1172.75,
4 Subsequently renumbered without substantive change as section 1172.75. (Stats 2022, ch. 58, §12, eff. June 30, 2022.)
4
subd. (b).) Subsequently, the sentencing court “shall review the judgment and verify that
the current judgment includes a sentencing enhancement described in subdivision (a).”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) “If the court determines that the current judgment includes an
enhancement described in subdivision (a), the court shall recall the sentence and
resentence the defendant.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).)
Section 1172.75 sets out specific instructions for resentencing. (§ 1172.5,
subd. (d)(1)-(5).) Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1), provides in part, “Resentencing
pursuant to this section shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as
a result of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety. . . .” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(1).)
“ ‘ “ ‘ “As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here
is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.]
We begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and common sense
meaning.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “[W]e look to ‘the entire substance of the statute . . . in
order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision . . . . [Citations.]’ [Citation.]
That is, we construe the words in question ‘ “in context, keeping in mind the nature and
obvious purpose of the statute . . . .” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] We must harmonize ‘the
various parts of a statutory enactment . . . by considering the particular clause or section
in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961.)
5
In People v. Gonzalez, the California Supreme Court addressed the meaning of the
word “impose” as it applied to section 12022.53. (People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th
1118 (Gonzalez).) The court in Gonzalez analyzed whether the section 12022.5
enhancement must be stricken or if it could be imposed and stayed. (Id. at pp. 1122-
1123.) The issue arose out of the Legislature’s use of the term “ ‘imposed.’ ” (Id. at
p. 1125.) The court concluded that in order for the statute at issue to “make sense” the
use of the term “ ‘impose’ ” “must be interpreted as shorthand for ‘impose and
execute.’ ” (Id. at p. 1127.) The court in Gonzalez stressed the need to “harmonize the
statute internally.” (Id. at p. 1126.) Specifically, the court compared and analyzed the
language in subdivision (f) and subdivision (j) of section 12022.53 in finding “[i]n both
instances, the word ‘impose’ ensures that the statute’s punishment and legislative intent
will be carried out only if it is interpreted as shorthand for ‘impose and then execute.’ ”
(Id. at p. 1127.) “The principle that a word’s meaning may be determined by reference to
the rest of the statute allows us to extend this interpretation to the use of ‘impose’
throughout section 12022.53[, subdivision] (f).” (Ibid.)
Here, it is necessary to look at the statute as a whole to interpret the meaning of
term “impose.” Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1), is particularly relevant in this
analysis. (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1) [“Resentencing pursuant to this section shall result in a
lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the
repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety”], italics added.)
6
Section 1172.75 subdivision (d)(1)’s requirement that the resentencing shall result in a
lesser sentence than the one originally imposed necessitates the conclusion that the
repealed enhancement increased the length of the sentence. The only way for the
repealed enhancement to have increased the length of a sentence is for the enhancement
to have been imposed and executed. If the repealed enhancement was imposed and
stayed, the sentence would not have been increased, as was the case here. To interpret
“imposed” as used in section 1172.75, subdivision (a), to include when a sentence was
“imposed and stayed” would require any sentencing court faced with an “imposed and
stayed” enhancement to arbitrarily lower a sentence simply because the judgment
contained a stayed enhancement.
Defendant argues the analysis and holding of Gonzalez are distinguishable from
the statute and facts before this court. Defendant draws a distinction citing the term
“impose” being used twice in section 12022.53, subdivision (f), whereas here, the term
“impose” is only used once. Defendant suggests because the term “impose” only appears
once in section 1172.75 subdivision (a), it does not result in internal inconsistency.
However, the number of times a term is used within a subdivision is not dispositive as to
internal consistency or lack thereof. As discussed in Gonzalez, the court examined the
interplay between subdivision (f) and the other subdivisions within section 12022.53 in
concluding that “imposed and executed” was the only interpretation that harmonized the
statute as a whole. (Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 1127-1128 [analyzing the
interaction between § 12022.53, subd. (f), (g), (h), & (i)]). The same is true for
7
section 1172.75. In order to harmonize subdivision (d)(1)’s requirement with
subdivision (a), the meaning of “impose” must be interpreted to mean “imposed and
executed.” Any other interpretation would cause disharmony between subdivision (a)
and subdivision (d)(1) of section 1172.75.
In support of his argument of the meaning of “impose,” defendant argues that the
Gonzalez decision put the Legislature on notice of the potential for ambiguity in using the
term “impose” without further clarification. Defendant concludes the Legislature’s
failure to qualify the term demonstrates the Legislature’s intent for both usages
(“imposed and stayed” and “imposed and executed”) to be operative under
section 1172.75. However, an equally plausible conclusion could be drawn from the
same facts. It could be argued the Legislature was aware of the holding in Gonzalez
finding that “imposed” meant “imposed and executed” and used the term “imposed” in
accordance with the holding in Gonzalez. Ultimately, it is the term’s use within the
context of the statute as a whole that guides the definition, not the exact terminology used
or omitted. (Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 1126-1128.)
When reviewing the statute as a whole, the statutory construction that harmonizes
the instructions and provisions contained within the statute is one that defines “imposed”
as meaning “imposed and executed.” As such, the principles of statutory construction
dictate that the term “imposed” as used in section 1172.75, applies only to sentences that
are “imposed and executed.”
8
B. Legislative History
1. Senate Bill No. 136
Governor Gavin Newsom signed Senate Bill No. 136 (Senate Bill 136) (2019-
2020 Reg. Sess.) on October 8, 2019. Senate Bill 136 is intended to “ ‘repeal[] a
common and costly one-year enhancement that applies for each prior felony prison term
or felony county jail term an individual has served.’ ” (Sen. Bill 136, Assembly Floor
Analysis, 3d reading, as amended Sept. 3, 2019.) “The imposition of this enhancement is
ineffective in protecting public safety, is wasteful of public resources, and is damaging to
the families and communities that disproportionately suffer from these long sentences.”
(Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as
amended January 15, 2019, at p. 2.) Senate Bill 136’s author argued, “[t]his single
enhancement, applied wholesale and scattershot, is a massive driver of prison and jail
populations and associated costs to taxpayers and to the families of incarcerated
Californians.” (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 136 (2019-2020
Reg. Sess.) as amended January 15, 2019, at p. 3.) In discussing the potential benefits of
enactment, Senate Bill 136’s author offered that “[r]epealing ineffective sentencing
enhancements will save hundreds of millions of dollars, reduce prison and jail
populations, mitigate racial and gender disparities in incarceration, and end the double
punishment for prior convictions.” (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill
No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended January 15, 2019, at p. 3.)
9
2. Senate Bill 483
Senate Bill 483 is intended to “apply retroactively the repeal of sentence
enhancements for prior prison or county jail felony terms and for prior convictions of
specified crimes related to controlled substances.” (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis
of Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended March 3, 2021, at p. 1, italics
omitted.) Noting that “[e]nhancements add time to a person’s sentence . . . ,” the
Committee on Revision of the Penal Code recommended retroactively applying the
elimination of section 667.5(b) enhancements to people currently held in prisons and
jails, “ensuring that no one is serving time based on outdated rules.” (Sen. Com. on Pub.
Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended March 3, 2021,
at pp. 1-3.) “The retroactive RISE Act is another step forward in sustaining legislative
momentum to eliminate unjust sentence enhancements and end wasteful incarceration
spending in favor of community reinvestment.” (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of
Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended March 3, 2021, at p. 6.)
C. The Legislative History of Senate Bills 136 and 483 Illustrates Section 1172.75
was Intended to Apply to Sentences Imposed and Executed
If a statute is ambiguous, extrinsic aids, including legislative history may be
considered in resolving the ambiguity. (Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1126.)
“ ‘ “Literal construction should not prevail if it is contrary to the legislative intent
apparent in the statute . . . ; and if a statute is amenable to two alternative interpretations,
the one that leads to the more reasonable result will be followed [citation].”
10
[Citations.]’ ” (Gonzalez, at p. 1126 quoting People v. Shabazz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 55, 67-
68.)
Here, it is relevant to review the legislative history of both Senate Bill 136 and 483
as Senate Bill 483 provided retroactive relief for the repeal executed in Senate Bill 136.
(Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as
amended March 3, 2021, at p. 2.) The legislative history of Senate Bill 136 illustrates
three primary motivations for the enactment of the bill: (1) sentencing enhancements
are ineffective and disproportionately subject the “Black and Latino” communities to
longer periods of incarceration; (2) ending double punishment for prior convictions;
(3) reallocating “wasteful” spending from imprisonment to community-based services.
(Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as
amended January 15, 2019, pp. 1-5.)
The legislative history of Senate Bill 483 is also instructive regarding the
motivation for its enactment. Senate Bill 483 intended to provide relief for “[p]eople in
California jails and prison who were convicted prior to the RISE acts [and] are still
burdened by mandatory enhancements.” (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of
Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended March 3, 2021, at p. 3.) “S[enate
Bill] 483 would ensure the retroactive repeal of these sentence enhancements, ensuring
that no one is serving time based on rulings that California has already deemed unfair and
ineffective.” (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021-2022
Reg. Sess.) as amended March 3, 2021, at p. 5.) Senate Bill 483 is intended to provide
11
relief for “[t]hose who were convicted prior to their enactment [and] continue to be
separated from their families and communities.” (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of
Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended March 3, 2021, at p. 5.) In
discussing the financial benefits of retroactive application, the legislature found,
“[s]entencing enhancements . . . put significant financial burdens on taxpayers and
families statewide—each additional year in prison costs over $112,600 per person.”
(Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as
amended March 3, 2021, at p. 5.)
The legislative histories of both Senate Bill 136 and 483 contain a clear
presupposition by the Legislature of an imposed and executed sentence. Senate Bill 136
intended to ameliorate the disproportionate impact sentencing enhancements have on the
“Black and Latino” communities. The Legislature found that sentencing enhancements
subject the members of these communities to longer periods of incarceration. (Sen. Com.
on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended
January 15, 2019, p. 2.) This intent presupposes that the sentencing enhancements are, in
fact, creating longer periods of incarceration. That is not so if the sentencing
enhancement is stayed. Senate Bill 136 is also intended to reallocate spending necessary
for incarceration to fund community-based services. (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety,
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended January 15, 2019,
p. 4.) The freeing of funds through the repeal of sentencing enhancements presupposes
the affected inmates will spend less time incarcerated. This is not the case in situations
12
where a defendant’s enhancement added no additional period of incarceration. Senate
Bill 136 also sought to end double punishment for prior convictions. The primary
punishment for section 667.5(b) enhancements is one additional year of incarceration. A
defendant whose sentence was imposed and stayed does not suffer the same “double
punishment” anticipated by the Legislature. As such, the Legislature’s intent in enacting
Senate Bill 136 would not be served in situations where a defendant’s sentence was
imposed and stayed.
Senate Bill 483’s legislative history cites similar motivations and concerns. (Sen.
Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended
March 3, 2021, pp. 1-5.) Senate Bill 483 intended to provide relief to inmates who had
been convicted and sentenced prior to the enactment of Senate Bill 136 and are “serving
time based on rulings that California has already deemed unfair and ineffective.” (Sen.
Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended
March 3, 2021, p. 5.) Senate Bill 483 expressed concern about those convicted prior to
Senate Bill 136’s enactment continuing to be separated from their families and
communities because Senate Bill 136 had not been applied retroactively. (Sen. Com. on
Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended March 3,
2021, p. 5.) These concerns presuppose a defendant is serving time specifically based on
the imposition of additional incarceration as a result of a section 667.5(b) prior. An
inmate whose sentence was imposed and stayed is not actually serving any time based on
a repealed statute, nor are they separated from their families because Senate Bill 136 has
13
not been applied retroactively. Senate Bill 483’s reference to each additional year of
imprisonment costing $112,600 per person also contemplates the execution of the
sentence. This cost to taxpayers would be irrelevant for defendants whose sentence was
imposed and stayed. Funding would not be saved and available for reallocation because
a defendant’s sentence would not be reduced as a result of the retroactive application of
Senate Bill 136.
Defendant argues that section 1172.75’s purpose is to reduce as many sentences as
possible and suggests the proper outcome is to allow every defendant with a prison prior
to have a full resentencing hearing. Defendant also argues the implementation of
section 1172.75 was designed to fix the racial disparities in charging, bail availability,
and plea bargaining. However, notably, in arguing the purpose of section 1172.75,
defendant cites Assembly Bill Nos. 2542 and 256, neither of which are directly related to
the enactment of section 1172.75.
The purpose of Assembly Bill No. 2542 (Assembly Bill 2542) was “to prohibit the
state from seeking or upholding a conviction or sentence that is discriminatory based on
race, ethnicity, or national origin as specified.” (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of
Assem. Bill No. 2542 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 1, 2020, p. 2, italics
omitted.) Assembly Bill 2542 amended sections 1473 and 1473.7 and added section 745.
(Stats. 2020, ch. 317.) The purpose of Assembly Bill No. 256 (Assembly Bill 256) was
to “make the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (CRJA), which prohibits the state
from seeking or obtaining a conviction or sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or
14
national origin, apply retroactively and to make other clarifying changes.” (Sen. Com. on
Pub. Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 256 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended
May 24, 2021, p. 2, italics omitted.) Assembly Bill 256 acted to amend sections 745 and
1473. While Assembly Bill 2542 and Assembly Bill 256 have certain overall policies in
common with Senate Bill 483, the purpose and goals of these bills is separate and apart
from the specific legislative intent in enacting Senate Bill 483. To attribute the intent of
other bills to Senate Bill 483 based on their common policy views is misplaced.
The findings, costs, and ramifications of Senate Bill 136 and Senate Bill 483 cited
during the legislative sessions presuppose inmates who are serving additional time as a
result of the sentencing enhancement under section 667.5(b). The references to financial
and familial burdens do not logically follow if a defendant is not actually serving
additional time as the result of an imposed and executed sentence associated with a
section 667.5(b) prior. As such, to interpret the statute to include enhancements that were
imposed and stayed would be contrary to the legislative intent and the plain language of
the statute.
15
DISPOSITION
We affirm.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION McKINSTER Acting P. J. We concur:
MILLER J.
CODRINGTON J.
16
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. Penal Code section 1172.75, which provides for the recall and resentencing of defendants with prison priors under section 667.5, subdivision (b), applies only to enhancements that were imposed and executed, not those that were imposed and stayed.
Issues
Whether a defendant whose section 667.5(b) prison priors were imposed and stayed is entitled to a full resentencing hearing under Penal Code section 1172.75.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“the term “imposed” as used in section 1172.75, applies only to sentences that are “imposed and executed.””
“If the repealed enhancement was imposed and stayed, the sentence would not have been increased, as was the case here.”
“In order to harmonize subdivision (d)(1)’s requirement with subdivision (a), the meaning of “impose” must be interpreted to mean “imposed and executed.””