California Court of Appeal Oct 19, 2023 No. E080473Unpublished
Filed 10/19/23 In re W.T. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re W.T., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, E080473 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. J290557) v. OPINION W.T.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Tony Raphael,
Judge. Affirmed.
Melanie L. Skehar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel and Elana
Miller, Deputy Attorney Generals, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Defendant and appellant W.T. (Minor) appeals from the juvenile court’s
postjudgment order denying Minor’s motion to dismiss his petition under Welfare and
Institutions Code1 section 782. For the reasons set forth post, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 14, 2021, a juvenile wardship petition under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 602(a) charged Minor with robbery under Penal Code section
211, a felony (count 1), and violation of civil rights under Penal Code section 422.6,
subdivision (a), a misdemeanor (count 2).
On October 8, 2021, two additional felony counts were added to the petition:
(1) count 3—grand theft person under Penal Code section 487, subdivision (c); and
(2) count 4—assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury under Penal Code
section 245, subdivision (a)(4). Minor admitted to counts 3 and 4 and the court dismissed
counts 1 and 2. The juvenile court found Minor came within section 602 of the Welfare
and Institutions Code, and declared Minor a ward of the court. The court then placed
Minor in the custody of his mother with 19 days credit for time served. The court also
placed Minor on formal probation.
On October 11, 2022, the probation department filed a report stating that Minor
had satisfactorily completed probation. Minor moved for the juvenile court to reduce his
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
2
felonies to misdemeanors under Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b). The People
objected.
On November 15, 2022, Minor filed a motion requesting the court reduce his
adjudications for grand theft person under Penal Code section 487, subdivision (c) (count
3), and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury under Penal Code section
245, subdivision (a)(4) (count 4), from felonies to misdemeanors under Penal Code
section 17, subdivision (b)(3). The People filed a response in opposition to Minor’s
motion.
On November 30, 2022, the juvenile court stated that it had “read and considered
probation non appearance review packet dated 10/11/2022. Defense motion for PC 17(B)
and People’s response.” Thereafter, the court found that Minor had satisfactorily
completed probation and continued the matter to January.
At a hearing on January 4, 2023, the juvenile court ordered Minor’s formal
probation terminated. At the same hearing, the court heard Minor’s (1) Penal Code
section 17 motion to reduce his felonies to misdemeanors; and (2) Welfare and
Institutions Code section 782 motion to dismiss Minor’s petition that Minor’s counsel
filed on the day of the hearing. The juvenile court denied both motions.
Minor filed a timely notice of appeal from the “[d]enial of defense motion under
. . . Section 782 to dismiss and seal record. Motion took place on January 4, 2023.”
B. FACTUAL HISTORY
On September 11, 2021, the victim was walking from his car to visit a friend when
he noticed three male suspects. The suspects attempted to intimidate the victim and
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prevented him from getting back into his car. One of the suspects was later identified as
Minor. The victim “begged” the suspects to let him go, and told them that he was
“underage.” As the victim tried to run, Minor punched the victim in the face from
behind. Another suspect caught the victim and pushed him into a tree. While Minor and
the other males continuously punched and kicked the victim in the face and torso, to the
point that he almost lost consciousness, they yelled derogatory terms including “faggot”
and “you’re fucking gay.” The victim was, in fact, homosexual. One of the other males
then grabbed the victim’s phone from his pocket, and they all ran away.
DISCUSSION
A. THE JUVENILE COURT PROPERLY DENIED MINOR’S MOTION TO
DISMISS UNDER SECTION 782
Minor contends that the juvenile court erred by denying his section 782 petition.
For the reasons set forth post, we find that the court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Minor’s motion.
1. RELEVANT LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
In relevant part, section 782 provides: “A judge of the juvenile court in which a
petition was filed or that has taken jurisdiction of a case pursuant to Section 750 may
dismiss the petition, or may set aside the findings and dismiss the petition, if the court
finds that the interests of justice and the welfare of the person who is the subject of the
petition require that dismissal, or if it finds that they are not in need of treatment or
rehabilitation.” (§ 782, subd. (a)(1).)
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Welfare and Institutions Code section 782 “is a general dismissal statute that is
similar in its operation to Penal Code section 1385. (People v. Haro (2013) 221
Cal.App.4th 718, 721; see In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 416 similar to [Welf. &
Inst. Code] section 782, Penal Code section 1385 grants trial courts the power to dismiss
a criminal action in furtherance of justice].) Indeed, the two statutes are so closely
analogous that [i]n determining whether a [Welfare and institutions Code] section 782
dismissal is in the interests of justice [citation], some courts have looked to Penal Code
section 1385 for guidance.” (In re J.P. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 74, 78, internal citations
omitted.)
Effective January 2023, subdivision (a)(2)(A) was added to section 782: “When
exercising its discretion under paragraph (1) at the time the court terminates jurisdiction
or at any time thereafter, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence
offered by a person to prove mitigating circumstances are present, including, but not
limited to, satisfactory completion of a term of probation, that rehabilitation has been
attained to the satisfaction of the court, that dismissal of the petition would not endanger
public safety, or that the underlying offense is connected to mental illness, prior
victimization, or childhood trauma. Proof of the presence of one or more mitigating
circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the petition.”
A determination under section 782 is reviewed under the abuse of discretion
standard of review. (In re Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 417.) “ ‘ “To show abuse of
discretion, the appellant must demonstrate the juvenile court exercised its discretion in an
arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”
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[Citation.] Throughout our analysis, we will not lightly substitute our decision for that
rendered by the juvenile court. Rather, we must indulge all reasonable inferences to
support the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings where there is
substantial evidence to support them.’ ” (In re S.O. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 781, 786-
787.)
2. THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING MINOR’S MOTION
In this case, Minor argues that “the juvenile court incorrectly premised its decision
on a circumstance of the offense, specifically an offense the Minor did not admit.”
At the hearing on Minor’s Penal Code section 17 and Welfare and Institutions
Code section 782 motions, on January 4, 2023, the juvenile court asked Minor’s counsel
whether he was “asking to—on [the] one hand, in a motion under [Penal Code section]
17(b)(3), you are asking the Court to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor. [¶] And now
pursuant to [Welfare and Institutions Code section] 782, essentially, you’re inviting the
Court to dismiss the petition and seal the record based on the criteria and standard in
[Welfare and Institutions Code section] 782.” Defense counsel responded: “Correct.”
The prosecutor opposed both motions. She informed the court that “minor
actually never provided a negative drug test during his period of probation,” and Minor
“was failing two of five of his classes.”
After further argument by both the prosecutor and defense counsel, the court noted
that Minor admitted to both felony grand theft under Penal Code section 487 (count 3),
and felony assault by force likely to cause great bodily injury under Penal Code section
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245 (count 4). In exchange for Minor’s admissions, counts 1 and 2 were dismissed:
(1) second degree robbery under Penal Code section 211 (count 1); and (2) count 2 for
misdemeanor violation of civil rights under Penal Code section 422.6. Thereafter,
the juvenile court went on to explain its reasons for denying Minor’s motion under Penal
Code section 17, which is not at issue on appeal.
The court then addressed Minor’s petition under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 783. The court first noted his decision was “subject to the court’s discretion if the
court finds that the interest of justice and welfare of the person who is the subject of the
petition require the dismissal or it finds that they are not in need of treatment and
rehabilitation.” The court recognized that the court should “give great weight in favor of
dismissing the petition when a person has satisfactorily completed the term of probation
and rehabilitation has been attained to the satisfaction of the court.”
The court then found that Minor had “satisfactorily completed a term of
probation.” However, “taking into account the circumstances of the offense, I’m not
finding that rehabilitation has been attained to the satisfaction of the Court. And I don’t
find that, at this time, that the interest of justice and the welfare of the person, of the
Minor in this case, require the dismissal.”
As for the “circumstances of the offense,” when the court made its decision on the
Penal Code section 17 petition, the court noted that “the offense in this case, which was
essentially a hate crime.” The court acknowledged that the “nature of the crime in this
case, even though it was dismissed, it was dismissed and discussed,” and the factual
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circumstances were “summarized in the JD report, along with [Minor’s] performance on
probation.”
On appeal, Minor contends that the juvenile court erred in making its ruling on the
Welfare and Institutions Code section 782 motion because “the statute does not require a
juvenile court to consider the circumstances of the offense when deciding a [Welfare and
Institutions Code] section 782 motion.” Because “minor did not admit a violation to
Penal Code section 422.6, subdivision (a) (hate crime) . . . those facts should not have
been considered in the juvenile court’s determination.” We disagree.
We agree with Minor that the hate crime charge was dismissed when Minor pled
guilty to the newly added counts 3 and 4. We, however, disagree with Minor that the
facts pertaining to the hate crime charge should not be considered when ruling on a
section 782 motion. In this case, the same facts formed the basis for all four counts pled
in the petition. Therefore, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it
considered the facts that gave rise to counts 3 and 4. In fact, had the court failed to
consider these facts when ruling on Minor’s section 782 petition, such a failure could be
determined to be an abuse of discretion.
Minor also argues that “assuming arguendo that the hate crime was allowed to be
considered, Penal Code section 422.6, subdivision (a) is not a [Welfare and Institutions
Code] section 707, subdivision (b) offense and is not considered a serious or violent
felony under Penal Code sections 667.5, subdivision (c) or 1192.8, subdivision (c).
Therefore, under [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 782, subdivision (E), the ‘great
weight’ to be afforded to the minor’s mitigating factors would not be affected by the facts
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of the hate crime or any of the crimes he pled to since none of those were a violent or
serious felony.” (Fn. omitted.)
We again find Minor’s argument to be without merit. Here, we find that the
juvenile court did give “great weight” to Minor’s mitigating factors, as required under
section 782, subdivision (a)(2)(A). As provided in detail ante, the court not only
considered Minor’s actions and involvement in the crime against the victim, the court
recognized that it should “give great weight in favor of dismissing the petition when a
person has satisfactorily completed the term of probation and rehabilitation has been
attained to the satisfaction of the court.”
The court then found that although Minor had “satisfactorily completed a term of
probation . . . taking into account the circumstances of the offense, I’m not finding that
rehabilitation has been attained to the satisfaction of the Court. And I don’t find that, at
this time, that the interest of justice and the welfare of the person, of the minor in this
case, requires the dismissal.” The record clearly reveals that the court reviewed the facts
of this case and all the documents filed regarding the case and motion. The court
displayed genuine concern for Minor and demonstrated careful consideration at the
hearing.
The court, after denying the motion, addressed Minor directly giving him
encouragement. The court told Minor that his ruling was “without prejudice,” and the
court wanted to see Minor “continue to do well. I’m not saying you’re not going to earn
a dismissal and sealing. I am just saying because of the nature, I want to see a longer
track record.” Minor responded, “Yes, your Honor.”
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When reviewing a ruling on a section 782 motion, the abuse of discretion standard
of review applies. In a recent decision, this court stated: “ ‘The statutory scheme
governing juvenile delinquency is designed to give the court “ maximum flexibility to
craft suitable orders aimed at rehabilitating the particular ward before it.” [Citation.]
Flexibility is the hallmark of juvenile court law, in both delinquency and dependency
interventions. [Citation.] As noted, the juvenile court has long enjoyed great discretion
in the disposition of juvenile matters [citation], and that discretion is codified in [Welfare
and Institutions] section 782.’ ” (J.P., supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 80.)
Based on the broad powers afforded to the juvenile court and the court’s careful
consideration of Minor’s motion, we cannot say that the court “ ‘exercised its discretion
in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a miscarriage of
justice.’ ” (In re S.O., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 786-787.) We therefore affirm the
juvenile court’s ruling.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order denying Minor’s section 782 motion is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER J.
We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
CODRINGTON J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying the minor's motion to dismiss his juvenile petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 782, as the court properly considered the circumstances of the offense alongside the minor's probation performance.
Issues
Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying a motion to dismiss a juvenile petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 782.
Whether the juvenile court erred by considering the factual circumstances of dismissed charges when evaluating a motion to dismiss the remaining petition under section 782.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it considered the facts that gave rise to counts 3 and 4.”
“the court not only considered Minor’s actions and involvement in the crime against the victim, the court recognized that it should “give great weight in favor of dismissing the petition”