Santa Rita Union School District v. City of Salinas (2023) · DecisionDepot

Santa Rita Union School District v. City of Salinas

Name: California Superior Court Tentative Rulings
Creator: DecisionDepot
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California Court of Appeal Sep 7, 2023 No. H049854MPublished

Filed 9/7/23 (unmodified opn. attached) CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

SANTA RITA UNION SCHOOL H049854 DISTRICT et al., (Monterey County Super. Ct. No. 20CV000242) Plaintiffs and Respondents, ORDER MODIFYING OPINION v. AND DENYING REHEARING

CITY OF SALINAS, NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT

Defendant;

REXFORD TITLE, INC., et al.,

Real Parties in Interest and Appellants.

BY THE COURT: It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on August 10, 2023, be modified as follows: 1. On page 7, starting on line 11, the phrase beginning with “citing section” and ending on line 12 with “section 15186,” is deleted so the sentence reads: The EIR also noted that future site-specific environmental review would be required for each new school from the responsible school

district as lead agency before approval of as yet unknown designs for each facility.

There is no change in judgment.

Respondent’s petition for rehearing is denied.

____________________________ WILLIAMS, J. ∗

WE CONCUR:

____________________________ DANNER, ACTING P.J.

_____________________________ WILSON, J.

Santa Rita Union School District, et al., v. City of Salinas, et al. H049854

∗ Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

Filed 8/10/23 (unmodified opinion) CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Related research

open space, and—as relevant here—schools, to address projected increases in student population resulting from the new residential housing units. As noted in the Draft EIR, “the Specific Plan provides a very high level of design detail for certain components of the project. To the extent that sufficient detail is available in the Specific Plan, a full project-level analysis is provided in this EIR. Examples of a full project level analysis would include topics that are related to the physical acreage affected (i.e., the project footprint), as opposed to the number of units, land uses/zoning, or other design parameters. . . . Additionally, the Specific Plan includes a substantial level of detailed information that allows for a project-level analysis of topics such as Air Quality, Greenhouse Gases and Climate Change, Noise, Population and Housing, Transportation and Circulation, and Utilities. The analysis for these topics is driven by the number of units and square footage of development, which is detailed in the land use and design projections. In some cases, there may be specific commercial uses that have design details developed at a later date that cannot reasonably be analyzed at a project-level at this time. Additionally, the design of school facilities and other public facilities are not known at this time, so they are not able to be analyzed at a project-level. [¶] . . . Subsequent individual development that requires further discretionary approvals will be examined in light of this EIR to determine whether additional environmental documentation must be prepared.” (Italics added.) B. Schools Within the Specific Plan At the outset, the Specific Plan included three elementary schools, one already operational, and one middle school, all located within the SRUSD, along with one high school, already planned and under construction, within the SUHSD. The Specific Plan notes that the “[r]esponsibility for development of public schools lies with the [Districts]” and that school facilities within the

resources (Section 3.3), greenhouse gas emissions and climate change (Section 3.4), hazards and hazardous materials (Section 3.5), hydrology and water quality (Section 3.6), noise (Section 3.7), population (Section 3.8), public services (Section 3.9), transportation (Section 3.10), and utilities (Section 3.11). The Draft EIR adopted mitigation measures for all these categories. Along with addressing related impacts for new schools among these various categories of impacts, the specific mitigation measures included for public schools the implementation of a requirement for payment of development impact fees by the applicant of a residential building permit before a permit could be issued. The Draft EIR further noted that such developer impact fees are considered as full and complete mitigation under CEQA for the construction of new schools, and that public schools within the Specific Plan “will be constructed based on projections of the need for these facilities” with the Districts determining “the appropriate phasing of [their] facilities” as driven by increased demand and enrollment. The Project was “designed such that each current institutional or individual owner may develop their property independent of development by other property owners.” The Draft EIR further noted that future site-specific environmental review would be required for each new school by the responsible school district before approval of a design for a specific facility, and this review would consider environmental impacts not known when the Project EIR was prepared. And each future school, if constructed, would be subject to the relevant mitigation measures in the EIR. The City received comment letters from the Districts, as well as from Alisal Union School District, during the comment period for the Draft EIR. These letters all raised the same concerns, some in verbatim language. They asserted that as a result of “the realities of school facilities funding,” sufficient funding “may not be available” for the construction of new school sites, yet the

Draft EIR did not consider this “possibility” and contained no environmental evaluation of impacts related to the alternative of the Districts having to accommodate the new students at existing sites or by other means. The alternatives identified in the letters, with no further specification, included “any or all of” the following: installing portable classrooms at existing sites, expansion of or new facilities at existing sites, altering attendance boundaries, bussing, and inter-district transfers. The indirect and off-site environmental impacts flowing from these alternatives to accommodate new students were generally identified by the Districts, in conclusory terms, as including “increased traffic, air quality, noise, and other reasonably foreseeable impacts.” The Districts both expressed that financing new schools with developer fees was “woefully optimistic,” because that source of funds alone would still leave large shortfalls, even if additional efforts by the Districts to obtain more state- facilities school funding—an item in a “perpetual state of flux” and not certain to occur—were successful. The City addressed these comments and letters from the Districts, along with the one from Alisal Union School District, in the Final EIR. As the comments had all been similar, if not exact, the responses were likewise repetitive. The City asserted that for several reasons, inadequate funding to school districts for the construction of new schools was not a matter required to be addressed in an EIR under CEQA, and that any need to expand existing facilities as a result of funding shortfalls for any new construction amounted to “economic or social effects” from a project that likewise did not require CEQA analysis. The City further contended that it could do no more under the law to mitigate school impacts because developer fees, which are set not by the City but by the school districts, “are deemed to be ‘full and complete school facilities mitigation’ for impacts caused by new development.” The City further observed

that “[u]ltimately, the Education Code tasks the [s]chool [d]istrict with the responsibility for design and construction of their own schools” and it pledged support to the Districts “with the provision of infrastructure and land to facilitate school facility development, as well as the collection of school impact fees to fund new school development.” The City ultimately rested in the Final EIR on its inability to respond further to the Districts’ expressed concerns and the potential environmental impacts they claimed to be related to their identified alternatives for accommodating new students at existing sites, because the City viewed the information as too speculative, uncertain, and vague. The City responded that “[t]he potential [alternative] scenarios . . . are too speculative to give rise to meaningful environmental assessment, particularly since, if they occur, they will occur over an extended period of time (perhaps 20 to 30 years), consistent with buildout of the Specific Plan area. Just as the number of students living in the Specific Plan Area will gradually ramp up over time, so too will the District have the ability to make decisions as to where such students will attend schools, if no on-site school facilities are yet in place. The specific decisions the District will have to make cannot be predicted with any level of certainty at present, and, in any event, are beyond the City’s control. In particular, the City has no way at present to predict boundary changes the District might impose in future years. Although such decisions could affect traffic and other environmental resources, any details of such impacts cannot be predicted at present. The same is true of options such as student transfers, the construction of other . . . currently unplanned schools at other sites, or changes in patterns of school bussing. To the extent that the District contemplates the installation of additional portable classrooms at existing school facilities, the City notes that CEQA provides a categorical exemption (Class 14) for ‘minor additions’ to

“the unsupported assumption that all environmental impacts associated with schools will come from the construction of new schools on new sites” and “did not evaluate what the Specific Plan’s impact on the environment will be when existing sites inevitably have to house the new students [as contemplated by the Project], including construction and traffic[-]related impacts.” The cause of action further alleged that “there is nothing in the record demonstrating there will be enough funding from enough sources to construct new schools”; “developer fees most often do not cover impacts caused by [school] development”; “it is undisputed in the record that [the Districts] cannot meet the demands for new school construction caused by the anticipated influx of students” as a result of the Specific Plan; state funding, developer fees, and local bond funds, each for separate reasons, are likely to be insufficient for the Districts to build the new schools contemplated by the Specific Plan and the Final EIR fails to acknowledge the inadequacies of these funding sources; and “there are foreseeable environmental impacts connected with adding or modifying school facilities at existing school sites” to alternatively accommodate the new students brought by development under the Specific Plan but the Final EIR “does not evaluate” them. The second component of the Districts’ alleged CEQA violations was the assertion that the City as lead agency did not comply with Guidelines section 15088, subdivision (c), in that it “failed to provide adequate responses to [the Districts’] contentions” made before certification of the Final EIR about the “lack of adequate funding for new schools and unanalyzed environmental impacts on existing facilities.” Instead of providing responsive “good faith, reasoned analysis,” the City first responded that Government Code section 65996, subdivision (a) “ ‘obviated the need to analyze and mitigate a development’s direct impacts on existing school facilities in an EIR because

to the alleged CEQA violations likewise argued, as they maintain on appeal, that the Draft and Final EIRs evaluated environmental impacts related to schools only on the erroneous assumption that new schools would be constructed and failed to “adequately inform the public that due to the high probability of a lack of sufficient funding to build new schools, there will be significant environmental impacts, including impacts related to traffic, utilities, and public services, due to the inevitable need to modify the Districts’ [existing] facilities to accommodate the influx of new students.” The Districts’ briefing further emphasized that in responding to comments on the Draft EIR, the City had failed to provide a justification for not analyzing significant environmental impacts relating to existing school facilities or a good faith, reasoned analysis for not doing so. In pressing their arguments, the Districts urged that their claims were predominantly those of “ ‘improper procedure’ ” under CEQA by the City having omitted essential information from the EIR or having failed to address a necessary issue, warranting de novo judicial review under Banning Ranch Conservancy v. City of Newport Beach (2017) 2 Cal.5th 918, 935 (Banning Ranch) and Vineyard Area Citizens for responsible Growth v. City of Rancho Cordova (2007) 40 Cal.4th 412, 435 (Vineyard). For their part, the real parties’ briefing below, filed jointly with the City, framed the CEQA issues before the court as factual conclusions and quasi- legislative decisions by the City as lead agency subject to deferential substantial evidence review specific to CEQA (§ 21080, subd. (d); Guidelines, § 15384), and as distinct from administrative mandamus review of a quasi-adjudicative decision under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. The issue as so framed was argued to be whether the EIR’s discussion of the potentially significant school impacts was adequate, generally a mixed question of law and fact, but

here urged to be predominating with factual questions, such as which methodologies the City chose to employ for analyzing school-related environmental impacts. (See, e.g., South of Market Community Action Network v. City and County of San Francisco (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 321, 331, citing Sierra Club v. County of Fresno (2018) 6 Cal.5th 502, 516 (Sierra Club).) At core, real parties’ arguments were, and remain, premised on the characterization of the Districts’ assertions about future insufficient funding for new-school construction as contemplated by the Specific Plan, and related off- site impacts because of asserted necessary alternative accommodations at existing facilities over a 20-30-year span, as purely speculative and uncertain and not reasonably foreseeable under CEQA. According to real parties, such speculation and uncertainty did not give rise to a legal duty for the City to either evaluate these vague and generalized impacts or to provide further response to such comments. (See e.g., Guidelines, § 15145.) Real parties further contended that the Final EIR, a program-level document in certain aspects (see Guidelines, § 15168), was adequate under CEQA, and for several reasons, the City was not required to provide analysis on uncertain and only generalized alternatives based on speculation about insufficient funding for new school construction well into the future. These reasons included that analysis of and mitigation for impacts to schools is limited by CEQA and other law (see Gov. Code, § 65996, subd. (a) [exclusive methods of considering and mitigating impacts on school facilities resulting from planning or development project]; Ed. Code, § 17620 [development of school impact fees by district levy]). And because the Districts had provided no specificity or plans as to which alternative accommodations as to which existing school sites might be made, and any such plans were solely within the Districts’ control, generalized environmental review by the City of those impacts based on the vague information the

least in general terms the potential environmental impacts of a scenario in which existing school facilities would have to accommodate new students due to the lack of funding or any other foreseeable problems to construct[ing]” new schools. And “does the record sufficiently explain why the City chose to analyze the impacts of constructing new schools and not the impacts of existing facilities absorbing new students when it seem[s] there is arguably evidence in the record to suggest that the latter was possible and more likely than the former?” As to the applicable standard of judicial review, the court questioned the existence of any relevant factual determinations by the City that might lead to deferential review for substantial evidence. The court asked whether the “City [had] made a factual determination, such as an agency’s decision to use a particular methodology,” in omitting discussion of the Districts’ alternative scenarios as opposed to constructing the new school facilities as contemplated by the Specific Plan. In the end, the trial court concluded from the administrative record that “it was reasonably foreseeable that existing school facilities would need to be expanded or adjusted in some way to accommodate the influx of new students from the” Specific Plan and that the EIR failed to fulfill its informational “purpose because it did not disclose all potential school-related environmental impacts that could result.” This was because the Final EIR “only addressed impacts from the construction of new schools and failed to include potential impacts arising from the expansion of existing school facilities, and those impacts are external to the facility, not on the facility.” The court also concluded that the EIR “failed to adequately respond to [the Districts’] comments.” The court was careful to delineate the indirect, off-site impacts that, in its view, required further environmental review and comment, recognizing the distinction drawn by Chawanakee Unified School District v. County of Madera

(2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1016, 1026–1028 (Chawanakee) between indirect impacts more broadly related to modification of existing school facilities and impacts on those facilities, with only the latter considered fully mitigated under Government Code sections 65995 and 65996. The court indicated it would grant the writ as to the CEQA cause of action because the City had failed to proceed in the manner required by law, and would order that “no further entitlements be granted until the City complies with the writ of mandate.” (Capitalization omitted.) The court directed the Districts’ counsel to prepare a proposed order after hearing. On June 23, 2021, the court entered its written order ruling on the merits of the various causes of action alleged in the Districts’ petition, including the third and fourth as to which the court had previously granted judgment on the pleadings against the Districts. The order granted the petition on the CEQA cause of action, concluding that the Final EIR “was insufficient because [it] failed to include discussion of potential off-site environmental impacts resulting from the [Specific Plan] due to [the Districts’] presented concerns that [they] will lack sufficient funding to build the proposed new school sites identified within the [Specific Plan]. The [Final EIR] also failed to adequately respond to comments made by [the Districts] with regard to potential off-site impacts. As such, [the City] failed to proceed in accordance with the law under CEQA.” The order also generally granted related injunctive relief as pleaded by the fifth cause of action, “enjoining [the City] from approving any further development entitlements within the [Specific Plan] until such time that [the City] complies with the peremptory writ of mandate to be issued by the Court” (capitalization omitted) in relation to the CEQA cause of action. The order denied relief on the second cause of action and finally directed the Districts’ counsel to prepare a

of appeal, while timely filed from the later “judgment,” was not timely filed from the prior order denying the petition. (Id. at pp. 50–51.) Relying on Dhillon v. John Muir Health (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1109, 1113 (Dhillon), the court in Meinhardt reiterated that “ ‘ “ ‘[a]s a general test, which must be adapted to the particular circumstances of the individual case, . . . where no issue is left for future consideration except the fact of compliance or noncompliance with the terms of the first decree, that decree is final, but where anything further in the nature of judicial action . . . is essential to a final determination of the rights of the parties, the decree is interlocutory.’ ” ’ ” (Meinhardt, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 49, review granted, quoting Dhillon, at p. 1115.) Applying this test, as stated, the court in Meinhardt concluded that the initial order there was a final judgment subject to appeal regardless of its title or form and notwithstanding entry of a later “judgment,” because the order effectively denied the mandate petition in its entirety and did not contemplate any further action in the case. (Meinhardt, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 63; see also Public Defenders’ Organization v. County of Riverside (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1409; City of Calexico v. Bergeson (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 180, 190 [order denying mandate petition disposing of all claims between the parties is an immediately appealable final judgment]; Laraway v. Pasadena Unified School Dist. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 579, 583 [same]; Valero Refining Co.-California v. California Bay Area Quality Management Dist. Hearing Bd. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 618, 633, fn. 10 [“the appealable judgment was the court’s order granting writ of mandate, not a ‘judgment’ it subsequently entered”].) The denial order in Meinhardt disposed of all issues between the parties and did not address further action, including the preparation of another order or judgment; it was therefore treated as a final and appealable judgment and the period to appeal was not restarted by the later entry of a document styled a

“judgment” that simply reiterated the rulings in the prior order. (Meinhardt, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 63, review granted; Dhillon, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1115 [order granting or denying petition for writ of mandate in its entirety, when such order contemplates no further action in the case, concludes the special proceeding of a civil nature].) As stated in Natomas Unified School District (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1013, 1027 (Natomas), what the Supreme Court precisely said in Dhillon (2 Cal.5th at pp. 1113–1114, with italics added) was that a “ ‘trial court’s judgment granting administrative mandamus, and ordering the substantive relief sought by the petitioner, is a final judgment.’ ” Applying these principles here to confirm our appellate jurisdiction, we conclude that the trial court’s order ruling on the merits of the petition in June 2021 was not the appealable determination, and that the real parties’ notice of appeal from the later judgment was timely filed. First, the earlier merits order itself contemplates and directs the later preparation of a judgment and a separate writ document. But more than that, and as real parties point out, in the merits order, the trial court did not articulate the specific and narrow statutory CEQA remedies it would direct as a consequence of its rulings granting the mandate petition, and the court noticed and held a hearing before judgment was entered to clarify and address the specific remedies to be included in the judgment. Thus, the prior order did not finally determine the rights of the parties by specifying the statutory relief the Districts would receive, which led to disputes over the appropriate terms of the judgment and writ that were resolved by the court at later hearing. (See Natomas, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1026–1027 [post-order disputes about terms of judgment that required a hearing on scope and terms of relief to be granted support appealability of later judgment].) And while the judgment here simply restates the prior order’s merits rulings on the various causes of action, it substantively

mitigation measures when the governmental agency finds the changes to be feasible. [¶] (4) Disclose to the public the reasons why a governmental agency approved the project in the manner the agency chose if significant environmental effects are involved.’ ” (Tomlinson v. County of Alameda (2012) 54 Cal.4th 281, 285–286 (Tomlinson), quoting Guidelines, § 15002.) “To achieve these goals, CEQA and the implementing regulations provide for a three-step process. In the first step, the public agency must determine whether the proposed development is a ‘project,’ that is, ‘an activity which may cause either a direct physical change in the environment’ undertaken, supported, or approved by a public agency. (§ 21065.)” (Tomlinson, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 286.) If the proposed activity is a “ ‘project,’ ” the second step requires the public agency to decide whether it is exempt from compliance with CEQA under narrow circumstances. (Ibid., citing §§ 21080, 21084, subd. (a); Guidelines, § 15300.) “If a project does not fall within a CEQA exemption, the lead agency conducts an initial study to determine whether the project may have a significant impact on the environment. (Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Com. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 372, 380 [(Muzzy Ranch)]; [Guidelines, §§ 15063, subd. (a), 15002, subd. (k)(2).]” (Ocean Street Extension Neighborhood Assn. v. City of Santa Cruz (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 985, 1002.) “If the administrative record before the agency contains substantial evidence that the project may have a significant effect on the environment … it must go to the third stage of the CEQA process: preparation and certification of an EIR. (§§ 21100, 21151; Guidelines, §§ 15002, subd. (k)(3), 15063, subd. (b)(1), 15064, subds. (a)(1), (g)(1), 15362.)” (Gentry v. City of Murrieta (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1372.) “As a general proposition, CEQA depends on the EIR. ‘An environmental impact report is an informational document,’ the purpose of which ‘is to provide

public agencies and the public in general with detailed information about the effect which a proposed project is likely to have on the environment; to list the ways in which the significant effects of such a project might be minimized; and to indicate alternatives to such a project.’ (. . . § 21061.) According to our Supreme Court: ‘The purpose of an EIR is to give the public and government agencies the information needed to make informed decisions, thus protecting “ ‘not only the environment but also informed self-government.’ ” [Citation.] The EIR is the heart of CEQA, . . .’ [Citation.]” (Tiburon Open Space Committee v. County of Marin (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 700, 724–725, fn. omitted (Tiburon).) “ ‘A public agency must prepare an EIR or cause an EIR to be prepared for any project that it proposes to carry out or approve that may have a significant effect on the environment. (. . . §§ 21100, subd. (a), 21151, subd. (a); Guidelines, § 15064, subd. (a)(1).) The EIR must describe the proposed project and its environmental setting, state the objectives sought to be achieved, identify and analyze the significant effects on the environment, state how those impacts can be mitigated or avoided, and identify alternatives to the project, among other requirements. (. . . §§ 21100, subd. (b), 21151; Guidelines, §§ 15124, 15125.)’ ” (Tiburon, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 725.) The relevant geographic area for CEQA evaluation of a project’s environmental impacts is not limited to the project boundaries and is “ ‘the area which will be affected by a proposed project.’ ” (Muzzy Ranch, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 387, citing § 21060.5.) “ ‘The agency must notify the public of the draft EIR, make the draft EIR and all documents referenced in it available for public review, and respond to comments that raise significant environmental issues. (. . . §§ 21091, subds. (a), (d), 21092; Guidelines, §§ 15087, 15088.) The agency must also consult with and obtain comments from other agencies affected by the project and respond to

environmental consequences of its actions, mitigate adverse environmental effects if feasible, explain the reasons for its actions, and afford the public and other affected agencies an opportunity to participate meaningfully in the environmental review process. The purpose of these requirements is to ensure that public officials and the public are aware of the environmental consequences of decisions before they are made.’ [Citation.]” (Tiburon, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 726.) At the same time, “[t]oo much should not be expected of an EIR. It is not to have the exhaustive scope of scientific textbook. ‘An EIR should be prepared with a sufficient degree of analysis to provide decisionmakers with information which enables them to make a decision which intelligently takes account of environmental consequences. An evaluation of the environmental effects of a proposed project need not be exhaustive, but the sufficiency of an EIR is to be reviewed in the light of what is reasonably feasible. Disagreement among experts does not make an EIR inadequate, but the EIR should summarize the main points of disagreement among the experts. The courts have looked not for perfection but for adequacy, completeness, and a good faith effort at full disclosure.’ (Guidelines, § 15151.)” (Tiburon, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 726.) “Much of what goes into an EIR is left to the discretion of the agency preparing it. The leading treatise summarizes: ‘The lead agency has discretion to design the EIR and need not conduct every recommended test or perform all required research. [Citations.] An EIR is not required to address all of the variations of the issues presented. [Citations.] An analysis of every permutation of the data is not required.’ (1 Kostka & Zischke, Practice Under the California Environmental Quality Act (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed. 2022) § 11.28, pp. 11-19–11-20 [(Kostka & Zischke)]; see Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 415 (Laurel Heights) [‘A project

opponent . . . can always imagine some additional study or analysis that might provide helpful information. It is not for them to design the EIR. That further study . . . might be helpful does not make it necessary’].) [¶] . . . ‘Drafting an EIR or preparing a negative declaration necessarily involves some degree of forecasting. While foreseeing the unforeseeable is not possible, an agency must use its best efforts to find out and disclose all that it reasonably can.’ (Guidelines, § 15144.)” (Tiburon, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at pp. 726–727.) Thus, “ ‘[t]he fact that precision may not be possible … does not mean that no analysis is required.’ ” (Banning Ranch, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 938, citing Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 399.) Still, an “EIR is not required to engage in speculative analysis. (Guidelines, § 15145.) Indeed, this core principal is well[-]established in the Guidelines and case law. While a lead agency must use its ‘best efforts’ to evaluate environmental effects, including the use of reasonable forecasting, ‘foreseeing the unforeseeable’ is not required, nor is predicting the unpredictable or quantifying the unquantifiable. (Guidelines, § 15964, subd. (d)(3) [‘A change which is speculative or unlikely to occur is not reasonably foreseeable’]; Cadiz Land Co. v. Rail Cycle (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 74, 108 [‘ “agency is required to forecast only to the extent that an activity could be reasonably expected under the circumstances” ’].) [¶] This rule rests on both economic and practical considerations. It has long been recognized that premature attempts to evaluate effects that are uncertain to occur or whose severity cannot reliably be measured is ‘a needlessly wasteful drain of the public fisc. [Citation.]’ ([Citation]; see, e.g., Save Round Valley Alliance v. County of Inyo (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1450–1451 [an EIR for a subdivision of single-family residences was not deficient in failing to consider the possibility that the future lot owners might build a second dwelling on their lot pursuant to a local ordinance allowing such dwellings, because possibility

(South of Market); see Neighbors for Smart Rail v. Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority (2013) 57 Cal.4th 439, 463.) “In evaluating the adequacy of an EIR, the appellate court reviews the agency’s actions, not the trial court’s decision. [Citations.] ‘The standard of review in a CEQA case, as provided in sections 21168.5 and 21005, is abuse of discretion.’ (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 512.) ‘Abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in a manner required by law or if the determination or decision is not supported by substantial evidence.’ (§ 21168.5.)” (Preservation Action Council v. City of San Jose (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 517, 532 (Preservation).) “ ‘ “A prejudicial abuse of discretion occurs if the failure to include relevant information precludes informed decisionmaking and informed public participation, thereby thwarting the statutory goals of the EIR process.” ’ ” (South of Market, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 331; see also Vineyard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 428 [absence of information in an EIR may be a failure to proceed in a manner required by law under § 21061].) “But, failing to include information ‘normally will rise to the level of a failure to proceed in the manner required by law only if the analysis in the EIR is clearly inadequate or unsupported. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Treasure Island, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1046.) “A challenger . . . asserting inadequacies in an EIR must show the omitted information ‘is both required by CEQA and necessary to informed discussion. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 1046–1047.) “ ‘Only if the manner in which an agency failed to follow the law is shown to be prejudicial, or is presumptively prejudicial, as when the [lead agency] fails to comply with mandatory procedures, must the decision be set aside . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Environmental Protection Information Center v. California Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (2008) 44 Cal.4th 459, 485 (Environmental

Protection).) The failure to comply with mandatory procedures gives rise to presumptive prejudice when the result is a subversion of CEQA’s purposes; for example, if the absence of information frustrated public comment or made meaningful assessment of potentially significant environmental impacts impossible. (Id. at pp. 485–486.) Judicial review for a claimed failure to proceed in the manner required by CEQA, on the one hand, or for reaching factual conclusions unsupported by substantial evidence, on the other hand, “differs significantly: [w]hile we determine de novo whether the agency has employed the correct procedures, ‘scrupulously enforc[ing] all legislatively mandated CEQA requirements’ [citation], we accord greater deference to the agency’s substantive factual conclusions.” (Vineyard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 435.) “These differences require the ‘reviewing court [to] adjust its scrutiny to the nature of the alleged defect, depending on whether the claim is predominantly one of improper procedure or a dispute over the facts.’ (Ibid.; accord, Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 512 [recognizing ‘a procedural issues/factual issues dichotomy’ with respect to the CEQA standard of review].) Consistent[ly] with the differentiated standards stated above, we independently review the administrative record for ‘ “any legal error” by the agency and deferentially consider[] whether the record “contains substantial evidence to support [the agency’s] factual determinations.” ’ (Protecting Our Water [& Environmental Resources v. County of Stanislaus (2020) 10 Cal.5th 479,] 495; see Sierra Club, [supra, 6 Cal.5th] at p. 512.)” (Preservation, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 532.) Under CEQA, “[s]substantial evidence shall include facts, reasonable assumptions predicated on facts, and expert opinion supported by facts.” (§ 21082.2, subd. (c); see also Guidelines, § 15064, subd. (f)(5).) It does not include “argument, speculation, unsubstantiated opinion or narrative, evidence which is clearly inaccurate or erroneous, or

evidence of social or economic impacts which do not contribute to, or are not caused by, physical impacts on the environment.” (Ibid.) But “the distinction between de novo and substantial evidence review ‘is not always so clear.’ [Citation.] The Supreme Court acknowledged this difficulty in Sierra Club. It explained that while ‘there are instances where the agency’s discussion of significant project impacts may implicate a factual question that makes substantial evidence review appropriate’ ([Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th] at p. 514), courts ‘have consistently recognized that adequacy of discussion claims are not typically amenable to substantial evidence review.’ (Id. at p. 15.) That is, ‘[t]he determination whether a discussion is sufficient is not solely a matter of discerning whether there is substantial evidence to support the agency’s factual conclusions.’ (Id. at p. 516.) Rather, ‘[t]he ultimate inquiry . . .is whether the EIR includes enough detail “to enable those who did not participate in its preparation to understand and to consider meaningfully the issues raised by the proposed project.” ’ (Ibid.) That inquiry, which presents a mixed question of law and fact, ‘is generally subject to independent review.’ (Ibid.)” (Preservation, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 532–533, citing Sierra Club, at p. 516.) Still, “underlying factual determinations—including, for example, an agency’s decision as to which methodologies to employ for analyzing an environmental effect—may warrant deference. [Citations.] Thus, to the extent a mixed question requires a determination whether statutory criteria were satisfied, de novo review is appropriate; but to the extent factual questions predominate, a more deferential standard is warranted. [Citation.]” (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 516.) Here, the central issue is whether the Final EIR for the Specific Plan was adequate under CEQA notwithstanding that it did not discuss the possibility that sufficient funding would never become available to build the contemplated

new schools within the Site and, in that event, the Districts might be required to absorb increased student enrollment through alternatives. These included modifications to existing school facilities, some located outside the Project Site. And some of the possible alternatives potentially would present off-site and indirect environmental impacts. The parties dispute the standard of review to be applied, the Districts urging independent review and the real parties emphasizing the factual nature of the City’s determination of the Districts’ information as speculative. We view the question presented ultimately as whether the Final EIR complied with CEQA, that is whether it fulfilled statutory and regulatory mandates and whether the identified omission impaired the EIR’s “purpose as an informational document” (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 516), which purpose, as noted, is “ ‘to enable those who did not participate in its preparation to understand and to consider meaningfully the issues raised by the proposed project.’ ” (Id. at p. 516; see Guidelines, § 15151 [EIR should be prepared with a sufficient degree of analysis to provide decisionmakers with information that enables them to make a decision which intelligently takes account of environmental consequences].) The question of the EIR’s sufficiency here does not necessarily turn on underlying factual determinations, although the City’s assessment of the information provided by the Districts as uncertain and speculative is a factual question. (Anderson First Coalition v. City of Anderson (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1173, 1186 (Anderson) [substantial evidence supported agency’s factual conclusion that asserted environmental impact of urban decay was speculative and not reasonably foreseeable].) Review here is thus not solely a matter of discerning whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support such factual conclusions. (See Sierra Club, 6 Cal.5th at p. 516.) It is rather a “mixed question [of law and fact] requir[ing] a determination whether

We first observe that before the legislative changes on school-facilities funding addressed in Chawanakee, the court of appeal in Goleta Union School District v. Regents of University of California (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1025 (Goleta) held that the UC Regents, as lead agency for a long-range development plan for university projects that would increase enrollment in a local elementary school district, had no obligation to propose or commit funds for methods to alleviate overcrowding in local public schools expected to result from the project. (Id. at pp. 1028, 1033–1034.) The basis for the court’s holding was that CEQA requires consideration only of “physical change[s]” in the environment (§ 21065; cf. § 21060.5), and that the “[e]conomic or social effects of a project shall not be treated as significant effects on the environment” (Guidelines, § 15131, subd. (a)). (Goleta, at pp. 1030–1033.) The supplemental EIR in Goleta, ordered after the trial court had found a CEQA violation and granted a writ of mandate, described impacts of the proposed development plan, and proposed various options for schools that included building classrooms to accommodate additional students, redistributing students to other facilities, starting year-round schools, adding portable classrooms, and building new classrooms. (Goleta, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 1029.) The supplemental EIR noted that mitigation of the physical environmental impacts associated with these options was the responsibility of the school district, but the Regents offered to contribute “a fair share.” (Ibid.) The court recognized that in some cases, “socio-economic effects may cause physical changes that significantly affect the environment under . . . CEQA” (id. at p. 1032) but that “classroom overcrowding, per se, does not constitute a significant effect on the environment.” (Ibid.) Still, a project ultimately requiring physical changes in the environment “such as construction of new school facilities, new bus schedules and changed traffic patterns” would

In Chawanakee, as relevant here, the court specifically considered some of the changes in language to Government Code section 65996, subdivision (a) brought by Sen. Bill 50. First, the court concluded that the provision’s change in phrase from “ ‘exclusive methods of mitigating’ ” to “ ‘exclusive methods of considering and mitigating’ ” limits not only the mitigation that may be required for school impacts but also the scope of impact review and the findings for those impacts. (Chawanakee, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1026–1027.) Because of Sen. Bill 50, the provision now “obviates the need for an EIR to contain a description and analysis of a development’s impacts on school facilities,” including “any analysis of the environmental consequences for the existing school facilities that will be forced to accommodate” increased student enrollment resulting from a project. (Id. at pp. 1027–1028.) As for Sen. Bill 50’s change from “related to school facilities” to “on school facilities” in Government Code section 65996, subdivision (a) when describing the impacts that might occur as a result of project approval, the court viewed this amendment as a “narrowing of the statute” in its protective effect. The “phrase ‘impacts on school facilities’ . . . does not cover all possible environmental impacts that have any type of connection or relationship to schools. . . . [T]he prepositional phrase ‘on school facilities’ limits the type of impacts that are excused from discussion or mitigation to the adverse physical changes to the school grounds and school buildings, and ‘any school-related consideration relating to a school district’s ability to accommodate enrollment.’ (Govt. Code, § 65996, subd. (c).) Therefore, the project’s indirect impacts on parts of the physical environment that are not school facilities are not excused from being considered and mitigated.” (Chawanakee, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1028, italics added.)

conditions. But there is no authority requiring an EIR to phase a decades-long project such as a land-use plan and CEQA does not require analysis of individual phases of projects, instead requiring analysis of the whole, including with less detail when the sequence and pace of construction are largely unknown at the time the EIR is prepared. (Sierra Watch v. County of Placer (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 86, 105 (Sierra Watch) [lead agency need not speculate about as yet unknown details of project impacts and may discuss potential impacts at a level of specificity determined by the nature of the project and the rule of reason]; see Guidelines, § 15146 [degree of specificity required in EIR].) Further, the Districts did not offer or cite to substantial evidence in the record that build-out of the entire Project over the estimated 20 to 30 years would not occur gradually or would not naturally ramp up over time based on market or other conditions affecting development prospects. Further, as argued by real parties, the required analysis of a proposed development’s impacts on increased demand for public services such as schools is limited. If a proposed development would create an increased demand for public services, as the City acknowledged may happen here with respect to schools, then an EIR must inquire as to whether new or expanded physical facilities may be required to provide such service and address them if so. The impacts that must be addressed under CEQA are the physical effects of providing the increased service, not any possible failure to provide adequate service under applicable standards because of insufficient public funding for which the lead agency is not even responsible. (See City of Hayward v. Board of Trustees of the California State University (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 833, 843 [lead agency not required to address need for additional fire-protection services, which itself is not an environmental impact that CEQA requires a project proponent to mitigate]; Guidelines, § 15382 [an economic or social change by

one or more existing school sites, either within or beyond the Project area, leading to vaguely described environmental impacts on the non-school environment, whether somewhere inside or outside the Project Site. “When the environmental impact from a particular project feature cannot be reliably ascertained and estimated, it is properly characterized as speculative.” (East Oakland Stadium Alliance v. City of Oakland (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1226, 1250 (East Oakland).) For example, the court in East Oakland rejected a challenge to an EIR to the extent it had found the impacts of truck-parking relocation from a project (but outside of it) were speculative, given the difficulty of predicting how current users of a terminal that would be eliminated would respond to their displacement. The EIR found that the lack of specific and reliable information as to where relocation would occur necessarily made any assumptions about relocation speculative. The EIR thus disregarded air quality or emissions impacts beyond the project site, finding that without specific and reliable information on relocation, such analysis would likewise be speculative. (East Oakland, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1249–1250.) The project challengers disputed the agency finding of speculation and contended that the EIR should have addressed emissions impacts of parking relocation because “longer distances traveled by relocated truckers might generate greater emissions.” (Id. at p. 1250.) The trial and appellate courts both rejected the challenge, concluding that the EIR’s finding of speculation—because “the extent and character of relocation could not be reliably determined at this time and any attempt to estimate the extent of relocation was, therefore, speculative”— supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record. (Id. at p. 1251.) The East Oakland court cited Rodeo Citizens Assn. v. County of Contra Costa (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 214 (Rodeo Citizens) in support of its conclusion

about the EIR’s finding of speculation and consequent lack of need for further analysis of the air quality or emissions impacts. (East Oakland, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1250–1251.) In Rodeo Citizens, as explained by the East Oakland court, “a refinery sought approval to install equipment that would permit the refinery to capture and sell butane and propane as a byproduct of its operations. ([Rodeo Citizens] at pp. 217–218.) The petitioner contended that the EIR prepared in connection with the permit approval was inadequate because it failed ‘to quantify the greenhouse gas emissions from the downstream uses of the recovered propane and butane.’ (Id. at p. 226.) The court held that the agency properly declined to analyze these emissions as speculative. (Id. at pp. 226–227.) As the [Rodeo Citizens] court explained, it could not be assumed that the propane and butane would be burned because these chemicals have significant nonfuel uses. (Id. at p. 227.) Further, because of changing market conditions, ‘ “historical market data would be an unreliable predictor of the future” ’ regarding the manner in which the butane and propane would be used. (Ibid.) As a result, the court held, ‘the lead agency responsibly determined that further analysis of the potential impacts was impractical and not required.’ (Id. at p. 228.)” (East Oakland, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1250–1251.) In Sierra Watch, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th 86, 105–106, the court of appeal declined to find the EIR inadequate for its failure to estimate the duration of construction noise at a location involving most of the project. “The EIR sufficiently demonstrated why specific detail about the duration of construction noise at each specific location . . . was not possible. The project would be constructed over 25 years. It included no specific plan on where buildings would be located . . . . It included no ‘specific construction schedule’ because the ‘sequence and pace for constructing various land uses and facilities would be market driven.’ And it emphasized the potentially sporadic pace of

development, noting that some years may have no construction and other years, in contrast, may involve simultaneous construction of several ‘elements’ of the project. For these types of reasons, the EIR explained, ‘it would not be practical, and would require a great deal of speculation, to identify specific noise levels for every single receptor.” (Id. at p. 105.) The Sierra Watch court noted that the lead agency there “could have speculated how long construction noise would occur over the next 25 years at each specific location” and “could have presumed where buildings would ultimately be located” and then “assumed that all buildings in any [particular location] would be constructed at the same time—resulting in a shorter period of construction noise. Or perhaps it could have assumed something else altogether. But any estimate . . . would entail a fair bit of speculation. . . . So while [the petitioner] may have preferred detailed estimates about construction duration in each specific location . . . , the EIR was not required to supply speculative estimates. A lead agency, after all, need not speculate about project impacts (see CEQA Guidelines, § 15145) and instead may discuss potential project impacts at a ‘level of specificity . . . determined by the nature of the project and the rule of reason [citations].” (Sierra Watch, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 105; see also Muzzy Ranch, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 388 [level of detail required in EIR in any particular case necessarily depends on multitude of factors, including the nature of the project, the directness or indirectness of the contemplated impact, the ability to forecast the actual effects the project will have on the physical environment, whether future effects will themselves require CEQA analysis, and that the effects will be felt outside the project area; less detail is required where effects are more indirect than effects felt within project area or where it would be difficult to predict them with any accuracy]; Wal-Mart, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at pp. 291–294 [petitioner’s assertions about

the inevitability of development of a multitenant shopping center at particular location as a result of project approval were vague, uncertain, and contingent and thus amounted to speculation]; Marin Municipal Water Dist. v. Kg Land Cal. Corp (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1652, 1662–1663 (Marin) [when nature of future development is nonspecific and uncertain, EIR need not engage in “sheer speculation” as to future environmental consequences]; Save the El Dorado Canal v. El Dorado Irrigation District (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 239, 263 [possibility that a property owner might deliberately fill a ditch at some point in future rather than maintain their property to minimize flood risk is not a reasonably foreseeable indirect impact of project, which included abandonment of the ditch]; Citizens’ Committee to Complete the Refuge v. City of Newark (2021) 74 Cal.App.5th 460, 479 (Newark) [city did not need to evaluate its potential responses to rising sea levels 50 to 80 years into the future, in part because “the range of projections for sea levels by that time are wide and sea levels at different ends of those projections could warrant significantly different responses”]; No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 13 Cal.3d 68, 77, fn. 5 [“an impact statement prepared before reliable information is available would ‘tend toward uninformative generalities’ ”].) In the City’s responses to the Districts’ comments contained in the Final EIR, the City included the comment letters and responded to each. The City noted that impacts associated with schools were analyzed in the EIR with Public Services, among other general topics of impacts, and that the City’s policies were to work with local districts to identify and set aside new school sites and consider impacts to ensure public services and maintain public- facilities standards. The City identified the five new school sites within the Project, and noted that the Education Code tasks the Districts with the responsibility for constructing their own schools. The City also noted that the

Specific Plan imposed developer impact fees to fund new school development in full mitigation under Government Code section 65996, set according to law by the Districts, and that the City would aid in collecting those fees. The City expressed its belief that it had sufficiently addressed, “at least in general terms,” the physical impacts of constructing new schools within the Specific Plan area, and that the “footprint-related impacts of the schools are subsumed within the analysis of the footprint of the entire Specific Plan,” including mitigation. The City also noted its perception of legal limitations on analyzing impacts from new or expanded facilities involving the provision of public services and that the social and economic effects of a project—like increased enrollment—are not themselves treated as significant effects on the environment. The City further noted that with the construction of new schools, there would be site-specific environmental review conducted by the responsible school district for impacts not yet known, as the City did not have specific designs from the Districts for the three as yet undesigned new schools. Thus, the EIR “does not speculate beyond the material facts that are available for each site” at the time the Specific Plan was being considered. The City also noted the holding of Chawanakee, and that it “obviated the need to analyze and mitigate a development’s direct impacts on existing school facilities.” (Italics added.) The City acknowledged the Districts’ concerns about accommodating increased student enrollment and raised the estimate of new students from the Specific Plan based on information on current enrollment provided by the Districts. The City further observed that the Specific Plan and EIR maximized the developer fees that could be collected for schools and that the City could not legally impose greater fees for new-school facilities, with the Districts as lead agencies responsible for construction of their own new schools.

As to the District’s proffered range of alternative options for accommodating new students at existing sites—by using portables, expanding or modifying existing sites, adjusting attendance boundaries, and allowing inter-district transfers—with the vaguely identified and non-site-specific impacts on “noise-levels, air quality, loss of greenspace or other play areas” (italics omitted), the City specifically responded that the “potential scenarios” offered by the Districts “are too speculative to give rise to meaningful environmental assessment.” In support of this conclusion, the City noted that if the cited scenarios were to occur, that would only happen over 20 to 30 years as number of students living in the site gradually increased. The Districts would have the ability over that time “to make decisions as to where such students should attend schools, if no on-site facilities are yet in place. The specific decisions the District will have to make cannot be predicted with any level of certainty at present, and, in any event, are beyond the City’s control. In particular, the City has no way at present to try to predict boundary changes the District might impose in future years. Although such decisions could affect traffic and other environmental resources, any details of such impacts cannot be predicted at present. The same is true of options such as student transfers, the construction of other, currently unplanned schools at other sites, or changes in current patterns of school bussing. To the extent that the District contemplates the installation of portable classrooms at existing school facilities, the City notes that CEQA provides a categorical exemption (Class 14) for ‘minor additions to existing schools within existing school grounds where the addition does not increase original student capacity by more than 25% or ten classrooms, whichever is less.’ ” The City’s determination of the Districts’ proffered information as speculation not capable of leading to meaningful analysis or requiring further

response in the EIR is a factual conclusion entitled to deference. (Anderson, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 1186 [substantial evidence supported agency’s factual conclusion that asserted environmental impact of urban decay was speculative and not reasonably foreseeable]; County of Butte v. Department of Water Resources (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 147, 164 (Butte); see id. at p. 161, [treating lead agency’s “finding of uncertainty” about impacts of climate change as factually supported in the record]; Tiburon, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 728 [legal error in failing to comply with CEQA is reviewed independently but all factual determinations are reviewed for substantial evidence, including the methodology used for studying an impact, the scope of an EIR’s analysis of a topic, and the reliability or accuracy of the data upon which EIR relied]; Ebbetts Pass Forest Watch v. California Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (2008) 43 Cal.4th 936, 955 [determination of future uncertainties and unpredictability as leading to less detailed and specific analysis was predominantly factual question].) Beyond that, we conclude that based on the non-specific, uncertain, and vague nature and quality of the information provided by the Districts, in the context of a land-use and long-range planning document like the Specific Plan, the Final EIR for the Specific Plan and the City’s responses to the Districts’ comments were adequate under CEQA. This is especially true when the generally identified potential indirect and off-site impacts related to existing school facilities were impacts that might flow and could be identified only from later decisions by the Districts themselves, which impacts may call for later project-level environmental review by the Districts, not the City. The City was not required to “dimly guess” about potential impacts based on uncertain and non-specific information and many unknowns. (Newark, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 479.) To the extent the City reached the conclusion that the Districts’

comments were speculative, noted the conclusion, and terminated the discussion, the City complied with Guidelines section 15145 concerning speculation and section 15088 on responses to comments. (See, Guidelines, § 15088, subds. (a) & (c) [lead agency must respond to comments on “significant environmental issues” in good faith, giving detailed reasons why specific comments and suggestions were not accepted but level of detail may correspond with level of detail provided in comment; responses to general comments may be general].) Given the non-specificity of the comments and the extent to which information about decisions the Districts might make in the future to accommodate additional students if new schools were not built, and any related environmental impacts resulting from those future decisions, was not yet known, additional discussion, analysis, or response by the City could not possibly be meaningful in the sense CEQA intends and requires to serve its informational and decision-making purposes. On this record, and based on our independent review while deferring to the City’s factual determination of speculation in the Districts’ comments, “we are satisfied that the EIR ‘ “include[d] detail sufficient to enable those who did not participate in its preparation to understand and to consider meaningfully the issues raised by the [Specific Plan]” ’ [Citation.] That was enough.” (Butte, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 164; Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 520–521; Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 405.) As an informational document, the Final EIR was required to study and analyze only the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the Specific Plan. (See High Sierra Rural Alliance v. County of Plumas (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 102, 125–126.) It was not required to engage in “ ‘sheer speculation’ ” based on non-specific and uncertain information about events or development that might occur in the future. (Marin, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 1662.) Further, the Districts’ comments and the City’s

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

CITY OF SALINAS, NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

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