California Court of Appeal Sep 7, 2023 No. E079612Unpublished
Filed 9/7/23 P. v. Corrales CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E079612
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF107511)
JOSE LEDEZMA CORRALES, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. William S. Lebov, Judge.
(Retired judge of the Yolo Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI,
§ 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, and A. Natasha Cortina, Lynne
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G. McGinnis, and Alan L. Amann, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Jose Ledezma Corrales is serving a sentence of seven
years to life, along with a 20-year enhancement, after a jury convicted him of
premeditated attempted murder (Pen. Code1, §§ 187, 664, 12022.53, subd. (c)). In this
appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his section 1172.6 petition2 to
vacate his conviction. As explained post, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition
because defendant failed to demonstrate he was convicted under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine and was thus ineligible for relief.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2006, defendant appealed his conviction in the underlying criminal matter,
which this Court affirmed. (People v. Ramirez (Aug. 10, 2006, E037613) [nonpub.
opn.].) The opinion in Ramirez established the following relevant facts.
In 2002, defendant was a member of the “Cuatro Flats” street gang. While
defendant and other Cuatro Flats members were congregated on a street in the Mira Loma
area, a rival gang member drove by the group playing loud music and laughing in their
direction. The group took offense to this and, in a car driven by defendant, pursued the
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
2 As relevant, effective January 2019, section 1172.6 (formerly § 1170.95), permitted persons previously “convicted of . . . attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine” to petition the sentencing court to vacate their attempted murder conviction, where certain conditions have been met. (Former § 1170.95.) (Stats. 2022, ch. 551, § 2.)
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rival gang member. The resulting chase culminated with one Cuatro Flats member
shooting into the rival gang member’s car, narrowly missing the car’s occupants.
(Ramirez, supra, E037613 at [3]-6.)
At trial, the jury was instructed that defendant, was “accused [] of having
committed the crime of attempted murder”; and that to find him guilty, it needed to
determine “[a] direct but ineffectual act was done by one person towards killing another
human being; and [¶] [] [t]he person committing the act harbored express malice
aforethought, namely, a specific intent to kill unlawfully another human being.” The jury
was further instructed that, for the attempted murder to be “willful, deliberate, and
premeditated,” it must have been “preceded and accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent
to kill, which was the result of deliberation and premeditation, so that it must have been
formed upon pre-existing reflection.” Instructions concerning the “natural and probable
consequences” doctrine were withdrawn and not given to the jury.
In 2022, defendant filed the instant section 1172.6 petition, asserting that his
conviction was eligible for relief. For support, he alleged (1) the criminal complaint
brought against him “allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of . . . attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine”; (2) he was “convicted of
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter following a trial or [he] accepted a plea offer
in lieu of a trial”; and (3) he could not presently be convicted of such crime due to
“changes made to [sections] 188 and 189.”
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Thereafter, the trial court held a hearing to determine whether defendant stated a
prima facie case for relief. At the hearing, defendant, through counsel, asserted that the
petition demonstrated he was convicted of attempted murder under the requisite natural
and probable consequences doctrine, because the facts in the underlying criminal
proceedings indicated he was merely “the driver” during the 2002 car chase, not the
actual “shooter.” The People argued that the conviction could not be vacated because the
“jury was not instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine,” and because
“[a]iding and abetting d[id] not necessarily require [defendant] to be a shooter.” The trial
court subsequently entered an order denying defendant’s petition, and defendant timely
appealed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his petition because he
made a prima facie showing under section 1172.6. Specifically, he asserts the
instructions the jury was given concerning the definition of attempted murder “permit
[an] inference” he was convicted under an “invalid theory of liability”; and that the
absence of instructions concerning the natural and probable consequences doctrine was
not dispositive. In response, the People assert that the trial court properly denied
defendant’s petition, because the absence of jury instructions concerning the natural and
probable consequences doctrine conclusively foreclosed any possibility the conviction
was eligible for section 1172.6 relief.
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We review de novo the trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6 petition at the prima
facie stage. (People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251 (Williams).) To make
a prima facie showing, the petitioner must offer facts that, if assumed true, demonstrate
an entitlement to relief. (People v. Maldonado (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1257, 1261
[explaining prima facie standard in relation to § 1172.6 petition].) While a petitioner is
not required to definitively prove his case at the prima facie stage, vaguely phrased legal
conclusions do not suffice. (People v. Patton (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 649, 657-658
(Patton) [affirming denial of § 1172.6 petition where, inter alia, petitioner failed to offer
explicit evidence he was convicted under requisite theory of culpability].)
To be entitled to relief under section 1172.6, a petitioner must demonstrate that
their conviction was based upon an enumerated theory of culpability. (People v. Coley
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548 (Coley).) Indeed, by its terms, section 1172.6 permits a
trial court to vacate murder convictions that were based “under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person.”3
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) In contrast, relief for attempted murder is only permitted where the
conviction is based “under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (Ibid.;
accord Coley, at p. 548.) Thus, petitioners seeking to vacate their attempted murder
convictions must allege facts that, if accepted as true, demonstrate they were convicted
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); People v.
3 The natural and probable consequences doctrine is a theory of culpability that applies when a defendant’s confederate commits an offense other than the target crime. (People v. Mejia (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 586, 628.)
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Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985, 993.) In determining whether a petitioner has
demonstrated a prima facie case, a court need not adopt the petitioner’s allegations as true
where “ ‘readily ascertainable facts,’ ” including, as relevant, those found in jury