Saenz v. Superior Court CA4/2 (2023) · DecisionDepot
Saenz v. Superior Court CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Aug 18, 2023 No. E081098Unpublished
Filed 8/18/23 Saenz v. Superior Court CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
JAMES SAENZ,
Petitioner, E081098
v. (Super.Ct.No. CIVSB2200579)
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF OPINION SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY,
Respondent;
CITRUS NURSING CENTER et al.
Real Parties in Interest.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ. Wilfred J.
Schneider, Jr., Judge. Petition granted.
Law Offices of James E. Yee and James E. Yee for petitioner.
Beach Law Group, Thomas E. Beach, David W. Loy and Rachel K. Mandelberg
for Real Parties in Interest.
No appearance for Respondent.
1
This case arises from the death of nonagenarian Alice Saenz, who was admitted to
a residential care facility owned and operated by defendants and real parties in interest
Citrus Nursing Center and Sun Mar Management Services. As part of the admissions
process, she executed an arbitration agreement (the agreement). Plaintiff and petitioner
to bind their heirs in wrongful death actions.]; and Ruiz v. Podolsky (2010) 50 Cal.4th
838, 841 [same] (Ruiz). These cases are distinguishable because they involved arbitration
agreements entered into pursuant to section 1295.2
In Ruiz, the California Supreme Court held that section 1295 permitted patients
who consented to arbitration to bind their heirs in actions for wrongful death. (Ruiz,
supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 841.) It concluded that “all wrongful death claimants are bound
2 Section 1295, subdivision (a), states: “Any contract for medical services which contains a provision for arbitration of any dispute as to professional negligence of a health care provider shall have such provision as the first article of the contract and shall be expressed in the following language: ‘It is understood that any dispute as to medical malpractice, that is as to whether any medical services rendered under this contract were unnecessary or unauthorized or were improperly, negligently or incompetently rendered, will be determined by submission to arbitration as provided by California law, and not by a lawsuit or resort to court process except as California law provides for judicial review of arbitration proceedings. Both parties to this contract, by entering into it, are giving up their constitutional right to have any such dispute decided in a court of law before a jury, and instead are accepting the use of arbitration.’”
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by arbitration agreements entered into pursuant to section 1295, at least when . . . the
language of the agreement manifests an intent to bind these claimants.” (Ibid.) However,
the Court of Appeal in Avila held that this exception to the general rule that one who has
not consented cannot be compelled to arbitrate applies only when the wrongful death
claim is a result of professional negligence as defined under the Medical Injury
Compensation Reform Act (MICRA; § 1295). (Avila, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at pp. 841-
842.)
In Avila, the decedent was admitted to defendants’ long-term acute care hospital.
His son signed an arbitration agreement as his agent under California’s statutory power of
attorney form. Five days later, the decedent died because of defendants’ neglect, and the
son initiated an action for negligence/willful misconduct, elder abuse, neglect, and
wrongful death. (Avila, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at pp. 838-839.) Defendants
unsuccessfully petitioned to compel arbitration. (Id. at p. 839.) The issue before the
Court of Appeal was whether the Ruiz exception to the general rule, that arbitration
agreements must be the subject of consent rather than compulsion, was controlling when
the action was best characterized as being one for elder abuse, not medical negligence.
(Avila, at p. 842.) In deciding that the Ruiz exception did not apply, the Avila court
stated: “What matters is . . . the basis of the claims as pleaded in the complaint. If the
primary basis for the wrongful death claim sounds in professional negligence as defined
by MICRA, then section 1295 applies. If, [however], the primary basis is under the Elder
Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15600 et seq.)
. . . , then section 1295 does not apply and neither does Ruiz’s exception to the general
10
rule that one who has not consented cannot be compelled to arbitrate.” (Avila, at p. 842;
accord, Daniels, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 682.) Thus, the determining factor is
whether the wrongful death claim is primarily based on professional negligence or
physical elder abuse. (Ibid.)
Here, petitioner’s wrongful death claim is not based on professional negligence as
defined by MICRA. Instead, the complaint was pleaded as one for negligence/willful
misconduct, elder abuse, and neglect under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil
Protection Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15600 et seq.). “Neglect includes the failure to
assist in personal hygiene, or in the provision of food, clothing, or shelter; the failure to
provide medical care for physical and mental health needs; the failure to protect from
health and safety hazards; and the failure to prevent malnutrition or dehydration.”
(Sababin v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 81, 88.) “Under the [Elder Abuse
and Dependent Adult Civil Protection] Act, neglect ‘“refers not to the substandard
performance of medical services but, rather, to the ‘failure of those responsible for
attending to the basic needs and comforts of elderly or dependent adults, regardless of
their professional standing, to carry out their custodial obligations.’ [Citation.] Thus, the
statutory definition of ‘neglect’ speaks not of the undertaking of medical services, but of
the failure to provide medical care.”’” (Avila, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 843.)
For these reasons, we conclude the superior court erred by granting the petition to
compel arbitration as to petitioner’s wrongful death cause of action.
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C. Ms. Saenz’s Causes of Action Are Arbitrable
Petitioner contends the superior court must decide whether Ms. Saenz’s claims
should be compelled into arbitration or remain in superior court to be adjudicated
contemporaneously with his wrongful death claim. (§ 1281.2.) We disagree.
“In accordance with choice-of-law principles, the parties may limit the trial court’s
authority to stay or deny arbitration under the [California Arbitration Act] by adopting
the more restrictive procedural provisions of the FAA.” (Valencia v. Smyth (2010)
185 Cal.App.4th 153, 157 (Valencia).) “Generally, the FAA obligates federal courts to
apply state law when interpreting an arbitration clause. [Citations.] Thus, a federal court
would apply California law when determining the validity of an arbitration clause in a
case involving California residents or employees. [Citations.] [¶] . . . ‘Under California
law, ordinary rules of contract interpretation apply to arbitration agreements. . . . “‘The
fundamental goal of contractual interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of
the parties. . . . If contractual language is clear and explicit, it governs.’”’” (Id. at
p. 177.)
“[T]he FAA’s procedural provisions [(9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4, 10, 11)] do not apply in
state court unless the parties expressly adopt them. . . . [T]he question is not whether the
parties adopted the CAA’s procedural provisions: The state’s procedural statutes
([Code Civ. Proc.,] §§ 1281.2, 1290.2) apply by default because Congress intended the
comparable FAA sections (9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4, 10, 11) to apply in federal court. The
question, therefore, is whether the parties expressly incorporated the FAA’s procedural
provisions into their agreements,” thus eliminating the superior court’s authority under
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section 1281.2, subdivision (c). (Valencia, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 177.) This
question “‘is a question of law involving interpretation of statutes and the contract (with
no extrinsic evidence). We therefore apply a de novo standard of review.’” (Id. at
pp. 161-162.)
“A state’s procedural statutes automatically apply in state court unless the parties
expressly agree otherwise.” (Valencia, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 179; see Volt
Information Sciences, Inc. v. Leland Stanford Junior University (1989) 489 U.S. 468,
476, 479 [“Arbitration under the [FAA] is a matter of consent, not coercion, and parties
are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit. Just as they
may limit by contract the issues which they will arbitrate, . . . so too may they specify by
contract the rules under which that arbitration will be conducted.”]; Cronus Investments,
Inc. v. Concierge Services (2005) 35 Cal.4th 376, 394 [“[T]he language of the arbitration
clause . . . calling for the application of the FAA ‘if it would be applicable,’ should not be
read to preclude the application of section 1281.2[, subdivision] (c), because it does not
conflict with the applicable provisions of the FAA and does not undermine or frustrate
the FAA’s substantive policy favoring arbitration.” However, parties may expressly
designate that any arbitration proceeding is governed under the FAA’s procedural
provisions rather than state procedural law.]; Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc.
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 1334, 1352 [“Arbitration under the [FAA] is a matter of consent, not
coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they
see fit. Just as they may limit by contract the issues which they will arbitrate [citation],
so too may they specify by contract the rules under which that arbitration will be
13
conducted.”].) Here, article I, section 1.8, of the agreement states: “This agreement shall
be construed and enforced in accordance with and governed by the Federal Arbitration
Act and the procedures set forth in the Federal Arbitration Act.” (Italics added.)
Because the agreement expressly adopts the FAA’s procedural provisions, California’s
procedural statutes do not apply. Consequently, the superior court lacks authority under
section 1281.2.3
Having concluded that petitioner’s claim is arbitrable, but Ms. Saenz’s claims are
not, we are aware that the parties may be required to participate in duplicative
proceedings. However, we are constrained by the express language in the agreement. As
the California Supreme Court has acknowledged: “[T]he FAA itself contains no
provision designed to deal with the special practical problems that arise in multiparty
contractual disputes when some or all of the contracts at issue include agreements to
arbitrate. California has taken the lead in fashioning a legislative response to this
problem, by giving courts authority to consolidate or stay arbitration proceedings in these
situations in order to minimize the potential for contradictory judgments.” (Cronus
Investments, Inc. v. Concierge Services, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 392.) But that authority—
section 1281.2, subdivision (c)—is inapplicable here because the parties expressly
decided that the agreement “shall be construed and enforced in accordance with and
governed by the Federal Arbitration Act and the procedures set forth in the Federal
Arbitration Act.” (Italics added.) “While we may question the wisdom of the parties’
3 Since section 1281.2 does not apply, the issue of whether real parties in interest waived their right to arbitrate (§ 1281.2, subd. (a)) is moot.
14
choice, and decry the potential for inefficiency, delay, and conflicting rulings, the parties
were free to choose their arbitration rules. The court will not rewrite their contract.”
(Rodriguez v. American Technologies, Inc. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1122.)
III. DISPOSITION
The petition for writ of mandate is granted.
Let a writ of mandate issue directing the superior court to (1) vacate its order
granting real party in interest’s motion to compel arbitration, and (2) enter a new order
denying the motion as to petitioner’s claim only.
Each party shall bear their own costs in this writ proceeding.
In the interest of justice, the clerk of this court is directed to issue the remittitur
immediately upon filing of this opinion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER Acting P. J. We concur:
CODRINGTON J.
MENETREZ J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that a nonsignatory heir cannot be compelled to arbitrate a wrongful death claim that is based on elder abuse rather than professional negligence, and that the parties' express adoption of the Federal Arbitration Act's procedural rules precludes the application of California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2.
Issues
Whether a nonsignatory heir is bound to arbitrate a wrongful death claim arising from elder abuse.
Whether the trial court or an arbitrator decides if an arbitration agreement is enforceable against a nonsignatory.
Whether the parties' express adoption of the Federal Arbitration Act's procedural rules precludes the application of California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2.
Disposition. granted
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We conclude the agreement is not enforceable against petitioner’s claim for wrongful death, and section 1281.2 does not apply.”
“The question of whether a nonsignatory is a party to an arbitration agreement is one for the trial court in the first instance.”
“Because the agreement expressly adopts the FAA’s procedural provisions, California’s procedural statutes do not apply.”