People v. Parker CA5

Filed 8/2/23 P. v. Parker CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, F085642 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SUF23393B) v.

DAVID DUANE PARKER, OPINION Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT* APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Merced County. David Moranda, Judge. Aaron J. Schecter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Michael A. Canzoneri and Clifford E. Zall, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. -ooOoo-

* Before Peña, Acting P. J., Meehan, J. and Snauffer, J.

In this appeal, defendant David Duane Parker challenges the trial court’s denial of his request for a hearing he believes was available under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin). The court denied the Franklin motion because defendant was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP), making him ineligible for a parole hearing. Defendant believes the denial of his request for a Franklin hearing based on his LWOP sentence constituted a violation of his right to equal protection of the law. The People disagree. We affirm the court’s denial of the motion. PROCEDURAL SUMMARY In 2000, a jury found appellant guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a); count 1), kidnapping for robbery (§ 209, subd. (b); count 2), carjacking (§ 215; count 3), and robbery (§ 211; count 4). As to the murder, the jury found true the following three special circumstances: robbery-murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)), kidnapping-murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(B)), and carjacking-murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(L)). The trial court then sentenced appellant to LWOP for the first degree murder, and stayed the remaining sentences pursuant to section 654. At the time the crimes were committed, defendant was 22 years old. In November 2022, defendant made a motion requesting a Franklin hearing to create a record showing how his youth at the time the crimes were committed contributed to the commission of his offense—information that might be useful during a possible youth offender parole hearing. When denying that request, the court stated: