People v. Ruben E. CA4/1

Filed 7/26/23 P. v. Ruben E. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D080870

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. J244351)

RUBEN E.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order and judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Robert J. Trentacosta and Rohanee Zapanta, Judges. Affirmed. William G. Holzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel and Adrian R. Contreras, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

In this seemingly simple case, the juvenile court found that 14-year-old Ruben E., accompanied by two youthful companions, committed an assault with a deadly weapon (ADW) by stabbing John M. during an early morning

altercation at a trolley station.1 It also found that in the course of committing the felony, Ruben personally inflicted great bodily injury (GBI) on the victim, who was not an accomplice, making it a “serious felony” within

the meaning of Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8).2 In a complicated argument made for the first time on appeal, Ruben contends that the GBI finding was not supported by substantial evidence because John was Ruben’s accomplice to an underlying target crime of disturbing the peace by participating in a public fight. (§ 415, subd. (1).) Ruben claims this is crucial because the crime of public fighting, although uncharged, might have provided a basis for his ADW conviction on the theory that the stabbing was a “natural and probable consequence” of the public fight. We reject Ruben’s argument because the court made no finding that the participants agreed to a public fight. Nor was it required to reach such a conclusion. Although John may have been yelling as he approached the boys, the juvenile court believed the three young men confronted John looking for a fight, negating the inference that John accepted an invitation to brawl. There is, accordingly, more than substantial evidence to support the adjudication order and judgment, which we affirm.