unprecedented measures, including periodically suspending all jury trials and various
deadlines, closing courtrooms, and continuing countless matters for extensive periods of
time, through no fault of its own. 1 Penal Code section 1382 imposes a presumptive 60-day deadline to bring a felony
case to trial after a defendant is arraigned. In 2010, our Supreme Court upheld the
Superior Court’s dismissal of a felony case under section 1382 because there was no
available judge or courtroom. (People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131 (Engram).)
The Court held, without qualification, that “the state’s failure, over a considerable period
of time, to provide a number of judges sufficient to meet the needs of Riverside County’s
rapidly growing population and caseload” did not provide good cause to extend section
1382’s deadline. (Engram, supra, at p. 1138.) More recently, Courts of Appeal in other
parts of California have held that delay and docket congestion caused by the COVID-19
pandemic constitutes good cause to extend section 1382’s deadline. (See e.g., Stanley v.
Superior Court of Contra Costa County (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 164, 167-168 (Stanley);
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Hernandez-Valenzuela v. Superior Court (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 1108 (Hernandez-
Valenzuela); Elias v. Superior Court (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 926 (Elias).)
In October 2022, about two years and seven months after the pandemic began, the
Superior Court granted Jose Tapia’s motion to dismiss his felony case because there was
no available judge or courtroom to try the case by the time the section 1382 deadline
expired. In doing so, the Superior Court found that there was no good cause to extend
section 1382’s deadline. The Riverside District Attorney seeks writ review of that
decision.
This case requires us to decide whether the Superior Court properly found that
there was no good cause to extend section 1382’s deadline because the unavailability of a
judge and courtroom to try Tapia’s case, although “related to COVID,” was caused
mainly by the court’s chronic backlog predating the pandemic. We conclude the Superior
Court did not abuse its broad discretion under section 1382 in finding that good cause did
not exist to grant a continuance. Based on the foregoing, we deny the District Attorney’s
writ petition.
3
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In March 2020, Governor Gavin Newsom declared a state of emergency in 2 California in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. A few weeks later, now-retired
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye issued a statewide emergency order that suspended all jury 3 trials and continued them for 60 days and extended section 1382’s deadline by 60 days.
Shortly afterward, the Chief Justice issued another statewide emergency order that 4 authorized trial courts to issue orders extending section 1382’s deadline. The Chief
Justice issued another statewide emergency order in April 2020, which again extended 5 section 1382’s deadline.
Between March 2020 and August 2022, the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court
2 See Executive Department State of California, Proclamation of a State of Emergency (Mar. 4, 2020), <https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp- content/uploads/2020/03/3.4.20-Coronavirus-SOE-Proclamation.pdf> [as of July 10, 2023] 3 See Statewide Order by Hon. Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye, Chief Justice of California and Chair of the Judicial Council (Mar. 23, 2020), <https://newsroom.courts.ca.gov/sites/default/files/newsroom/2020-09/Statewide% 20Order% 20by% 20the% 20Chief% 20Justice-Chair% 20of% 20the% 20Judicial% 20Council% XXX-XX-XXXX.pdf> [as of July 10, 2023] 4 See Statewide Order by Hon. Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye, Chief Justice of California and Chair of the Judicial Council (Mar. 30, 2020), <https://newsroom.courts.ca.gov/sites/default/files/newsroom/document/Statewide% 2520Order% 2520by% 2520the% 2520Chief% 2520Justice-hair% 2520of% 2520the% 2520Judicial% 2520Council% 25203-30-2020.pdf> [as of July 10, 2023]
[footnote continued on next page]
4
received authorization from the Chief Justice to issue 42 orders extending various
statutory deadlines, including section 1382’s 60-day deadline to bring criminal cases to 6 trial. The last order extending that deadline issued on September 6, 2022, and expired
on October 7, 2022.
The Superior Court periodically suspended all jury trials during this time. From
March until June 18, 2020, during the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, the 7 Superior Court did not hold criminal trials. After resuming trials and other criminal
proceedings for about six months, the court suspended jury trials for about seven or eight
5 See Statewide Order by Hon. Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye, Chief Justice of California and Chair of the Judicial Council (Apr. 29, 2020), <https://newsroom.courts.ca.gov/sites/default/files/newsroom/document/Chief_Justice_St atewide_Emergency-Order_04292020S.pdf> [as of July 10, 2023] 6 See GENERAL ORDER NO.: 2022-30 FORTY-SECOND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY RELIEF AUTHORIZED PURSUANT TO GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION 68115, https://www.riverside.courts.ca.gov/PublicNotices/CourtOrders/2022- 30%2042nd%20Implementation%20Order%2009.06.2022.pdf 7 https://www.riverside.courts.ca.gov/GeneralInfo/MediaInfo/Notices/Master- Plan-Restoring-Court-Services.pdf?rev=6-8-20 at p. 8; https://www.riverside.courts.ca.gov/GeneralInfo/MediaInfo/NewsReleases/Benchmark- Criminal-Jury-Trials.pdf at p. 1
5
weeks in the winters of 2020-2021 and 2021-2022 during spikes in COVID-19 8 9 infections. The last suspension of jury trials ended on February 25, 2022.
In September 2020, the District Attorney filed charges against Tapia for felony
assault with a deadly weapon. At the District Attorney’s request, the charges were
dismissed at the preliminary hearing.
In February 2021, the District Attorney refiled a complaint against Tapia charging
him with assault with a machete (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) and alleging that he personally used
a deadly and dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and personally inflicted great
bodily injury on the victim (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). Tapia was arraigned in March 2021.
After four continuances at the parties’ request, Tapia’s trial was set for January 12,
2022. But because of emergency orders then in place, jury trials had been suspended, so
Tapia’s trial was continued for 30 days. That order suspending jury trials—the last one 10 the Superior Court issued—expired on February 25, 2022.
After jury trials resumed, Tapia’s case was trailed multiple times in 30-day
increments under the emergency order then in effect. On February 23, 2022, and again in
March, April, and June 2022, Tapia’s trial was continued “due to courtroom
unavailability.” The trial court granted the District Attorney’s continuance request in
June 2022 and granted Tapia’s request for a continuance in July 2022. The parties
stipulated to another continuance in September 2022. In total, there were 12
continuances.
October 26, 2022, was the last day for Tapia’s trial under section 1382, but there
were no available courtrooms. The trial court therefore set a hearing on Tapia’s opposed
motion to dismiss under section 1382 for the next day.
At the hearing, the Hon. John M. Monterosso, the Presiding Judge of the Superior
Court, explained in extensive detail why he was granting Tapia’s motion to dismiss.
Judge Monterosso prefaced his ruling by noting that there is “no doubt that there is a
backlog” of criminal cases in the Superior Court, “but the question is whether or not we
have a chronic backlog or whether this is the backlog that is more acute based on
exceptional circumstances” created by the COVID-19 pandemic.
Judge Monterosso noted that the Superior Court “slowed down considerably” but
did not “shut down” between mid-March 2020, and mid-June 2020, when “criminal
departments opened up in full.” He explained that the criminal departments had been
“running full speed” since then, except for the two winter closures during COVID-19
7
spikes. The criminal departments continued “doing jury trials non-stop” and “full-time”
after the second and last winter shutdown ended on February 25, 2022.
In Judge Monterosso’s view, the Superior Court’s resources and caseload are “not
much different today” than when our Supreme Court decided Engram in 2010. He noted
that the court’s “workload has increased, maybe not based on pure filings,” but because
“there are so many other things that aren’t counted as filings that are being dropped into
our lap.”
Judge Monterosso then found that the three cases the District Attorney relied on,
Hernandez-Valenzuela, Stanley, and Elias, are distinguishable. As for Hernandez-
Valenzuela, the superior court in San Francisco shut down its criminal departments from
mid-March 2020 until June 28, 2021—one year and three months—because it operated
under “different local orders” than the Superior Court. Judge Monterosso found Stanley
“completely off base” because it concerned jury trials during the beginning of the
COVID-19 pandemic when a statewide emergency order “basically shut everybody
down.” Finally, Judge Monterosso found that Elias was not applicable because the San
Diego Superior Court continued the defendant’s trial based on that court’s “general
orders” to allow continuances because of the COVID-19 pandemic, but the Superior
Court’s similar orders had expired.
Judge Monterosso then explained why there was no good cause to continue
Tapia’s trial. He found that although there were exceptional circumstances justifying a
continuance in “acute” phases “early on in the pandemic,” the Superior Court had
8
“moved into a period” where Tapia’s case (and the dozens dismissed after his) could not
be timely tried because of the court’s “chronic” backlog that has existed since long before
the pandemic. Judge Monterosso acknowledged that “[e]veryone had a backlog from
COVID” and that the Superior Court’s “chronic backlog . . . is related to COVID,” but
found that the backlog was “not caused by COVID to the extent that this becomes an
exceptional set of circumstances” justifying a continuance under section 1382.
Judge Monterosso then granted Tapia’s motion to dismiss his case under section
1382. On the same day, Judge Monterosso called and dismissed 44 cases for the same
reasons that he dismissed Tapia’s case.
The District Attorney timely petitioned for a writ of mandate, prohibition, or other
appropriate relief. At our request, Tapia and the Superior Court submitted an informal
response to the petition. We then issued an order to show cause why the petition should
not be granted. The Superior Court elected to stand on its informal response while Tapia
filed a return, followed by a traverse from the District Attorney.
III.
DISCUSSION
The District Attorney’s petition requires us to decide whether the Superior Court
erroneously dismissed Tapia’s case because there was no good cause to extend section
1382’s deadline. We conclude the Superior Court did not err.
9
A. Writ Review
We first address and reject the Superior Court and Tapia’s argument that the writ
should be summarily denied because writ review is inappropriate. The Superior Court
and Tapia argue the District Attorney has an adequate remedy at law because the
dismissal order is appealable (§ 1238, subd. (a)(8)) and the District Attorney has appealed
the order.
“Generally, a judgment that is immediately appealable is not subject to review by
mandate or other extraordinary writ. [Citations.] Mandate is available to review an
appealable judgment only when the remedy by appeal would be inadequate or the issues
presented are of great public importance and must be resolved promptly.” (Powers v.
City of Richmond (1995) 10 Cal.4th 85, 112-113.) This case is about the Superior
Court’s decision to dismiss dozens of criminal cases because they could not be timely
tried due to courtroom unavailability. In declining to continue Tapia’s case, Judge
Monterosso noted that he anticipated “probably another 50” cases would be ready for
trial the next day, and “another 50” the day after, which suggests the Superior Court may
keep dismissing criminal cases because there is no courtroom available. The writ petition
therefore presents an issue of great public importance that must be resolved promptly.
(Ibid.)
B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Under section 1382, subdivision (a)(2), “[t]he presumptive time period established
by state law for bringing a felony case to trial is 60 days from the date a defendant is
10
arraigned on an information or indictment.” (Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1136.) If a
felony case is not brought to trial within that deadline, the trial court “shall order the
action to be dismissed” unless there is good cause for the delay. (§ 1382, subd. (a)(2).)
Good cause does not exist “when the lack of a judge or courtroom available to
timely bring a criminal defendant to trial is fairly and reasonably attributable to the fault
or neglect of the state.” (Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1138.) Court congestion
therefore does not constitute good cause unless it is caused by “‘exceptional
circumstances.’” (Id. at p. 1145.)
The trial court has “broad discretion to determine whether good cause exists to
grant a continuance of the trial.” (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1037.) We
therefore review a trial court’s good-cause determination for an abuse of discretion.
(Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1163.) The trial court abuses its discretion only when its
decision “‘exceeds the bounds of reason.’” (Elias, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 938.)
C. Analysis
We first note some undisputed facts. First, no one disputes that the COVID-19
pandemic severely disrupted the Superior Court’s operations to a varying degree between
the onset of the pandemic in March 2020 until Tapia’s case was dismissed in October
2022. Second, it is undisputed that the pandemic qualifies as an “exceptional
circumstance” under section 1382 that could justify a continuance in some cases. Third,
there is no dispute that the Superior Court has had a chronic backlog because of a lack of
sufficient judges which persists to this day. Fourth, the Superior Court’s backlog is not
11
attributable to the court’s mismanagement.
The question, then, is whether Judge Monterosso reasonably found that the lack of
an available judge and courtroom to try Tapia’s case (and the other ones dismissed after
his) was “fairly attributable” to the Legislature’s failure to provide the Superior Court
with sufficient judicial resources and its resulting chronic backlog, even though the
“exceptional circumstances” of the COVID-19 pandemic had contributed to the backlog.
This is a fact-intensive question that is generally left to the Superior Court’s broad
discretion. (See People v. Sutton (2010) 48 Cal.4th 533, 546, fn. 8.) Judge Monterosso
reasonably found that, although the COVID-19 pandemic had contributed to the Superior
Court’s backlog, the court’s chronic backlog predating the pandemic was the main reason
why Tapia’s case (and dozens of other cases) could not be tried by section 1382’s
deadline. As a result, Judge Monterosso’s decision to dismiss Tapia’s case did not
“exceed the bounds of reason” and was not an abuse of his broad discretion.
In Engram, decided in 2010, our Supreme Court observed that “[t]he lack of a
number of judges sufficient to handle the matters pending in the Riverside Superior Court
is a long-known and well-documented problem.” (Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1164,
fn. 13) The court also outlined the various reports prepared between 2004 and 2008
documenting how the Superior Court was “chronically underfunded and understaffed.”
(Id. at p. 1165; id. at pp. 1136-1137, 1164, fn. 13.) Our Supreme Court affirmed the
Superior Court’s dismissal of 18 criminal cases because there was no available courtroom
when the section 1382 deadline expired, even though the Superior Court had “devoted
12
virtually all of its resources” to criminal cases. (Engram, supra, at p. 1137.) In doing so,
Engram held that “when the lack of a judge or courtroom available to timely bring a
criminal defendant to trial is fairly and reasonably attributable to the fault or neglect of
the state, that circumstance does not constitute good cause to delay the defendant’s trial
for purposes of section 1382.” (Id. at p. 1138, italics added.) Thus, the “critical inquiry
is whether the congestion or backlog is attributable to chronic conditions as opposed to
exceptional circumstances considering all of the relevant circumstances.” (Hernandez-
Valenzuela, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1127.)
As Judge Monterosso emphasized, the Superior Court has remained severely
underfunded and understaffed since Engram. The Superior Court has 3.7 judicial officers
per 100,000 residents of Riverside County while the statewide average is 11.4 judicial 11 officers per 100,000 residents. Since at least 2012, the number of criminal filings has
always outpaced the Superior Court’s dispositions despite the court’s best efforts. In
November 2020, the Judicial Council found that the Superior Court remained seriously 12 understaffed as of September 2019. According to the Judicial Council, the Superior
Court had 85 authorized and funded judicial positions as of 2019, but needed 30 (35%)
https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2020_Update_of_the_Judicial_Needs_Assessment. pdf
13
13 more. This placed the Superior Court as the trial court with the second-highest need for 14 new judges after San Bernardino Superior Court.
The Judicial Council issued another report about a week after Judge Monterosso 15 dismissed Tapia’s case. This report, issued on October 31, 2022, analyzed the 16 California trial courts’ judicial officer needs based on filings from fiscal years 2018-
2019 and 2020-2021, with 2019-2020 data omitted because of the pandemic’s effects on 17 filings. The report shows that although the Superior Court’s circumstances have
improved in recent years, it remains severely understaffed. Depending on the metric, the 18 Superior Court remains the second or third most-underfunded trial court in California.
13
https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2020_Update_of_the_Judicial_Needs_Assessment. pdf at p. 6. 14
https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2020_Update_of_the_Judicial_Needs_Assessment. pdf at p. 8 15 Although this report was not introduced in the trial court and we rarely consider new evidence on appeal, we may consider the report to affirm the Superior Court. (See Philippine Export & Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp. v. Chuidian (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1058, 1090.) 16 The California courts’ fiscal year begins on July 1 and ends on June 30 the following year. https://www.courts.ca.gov/24153.htm 17 https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/Report-to-the-Legislature_2022-Update- of-the-Judicial-Needs-Assessment.pdf at p. 4 18 https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/Report-to-the-Legislature_2022-Update- of-the-Judicial-Needs-Assessment.pdf at p. 6 Table 2 and at pp. 8-9 Table A1.
14
When considering the difference between the Superior Court’s 89 funded judicial
positions and its “judicial need” of 111.7, rounded down to 111, the Superior Court
currently needs 22 (25%) more judges, making it the trial court with the second-highest 19 need for new judges. But if the judicial need is not rounded down to the nearest whole
number, then the Superior Court has the third-highest need for new judges (26% more),
after Tehama County Superior Court, which has four judicial officers but needs 1.2 more
judgeships (29%) and San Bernardino County Superior Court, which has 100 judicial
officers but needs 30 more judgeships (30%). If rounded down, however, the Superior
Court still has the second-highest need for new judges.
This data from the Judicial Council’s reports shows that the Superior Court was
significantly underfunded and understaffed before the COVID-19 pandemic and remains
significantly underfunded and understaffed to this day. Judge Monterosso thus could
reasonably find that the unavailability of a courtroom to timely try Tapia’s case was fairly
attributable to the Superior Court’s chronic shortage of judges, even though the COVID-
19 pandemic may have exacerbated the shortage.
The District Attorney argues other data from the Judicial Council’s Court Statistic 20 Reports supports his position. The District Attorney points to data showing that the
19 https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/Report-to-the-Legislature_2022-Update- of-the-Judicial-Needs-Assessment.pdf at p. 6 Table 2 20 The Court Statistic Reports, which are issued on an annual and 10-year basis, “survey the condition and business of the California courts” and compile data on many variables, including criminal filings and dispositions for each superior court.
15
Superior Court completed 580 criminal trials in 2019, 372 in 2020, and 127 in 2021, with
criminal dispositions similarly falling from 251,639 in 2019, to 190,552 in 2020, and then 21 168,589 in 2021. In the District Attorney’s view, this data compels the conclusion the
COVID-19 pandemic caused the Superior Court’s “productivity to plummet,” thereby
causing the delay in bringing Tapia’s case to trial. We disagree.
First and most importantly, as the District Attorney noted in his opposition
below—but not in his petition or traverse—the data on felony dispositions and jury trials
from 2021 is incomplete. It therefore does not accurately capture the Superior Court’s 22 criminal productivity in 2021, and there is no data from 2022 yet.
Second, the data from 2020 and 2019 does not prove the District Attorney’s
argument that the COVID-19 pandemic caused a significant drop in the Superior Court’s
productivity that persisted through October 2022, when the Superior Court dismissed
Tapia’s case. The District Attorney focuses on the raw number of jury trials and
dispositions in fiscal years 2019 and 2020, noting that both decreased from fiscal year
2019 to 2020. But, again, the data from 2021 is incomplete and we have no data on 2022.
21 The District Attorney extracted this data from the Court Statistics Report issued in November 2021, which compiled data from 2010 through 2020, and organized it into a concise table. No one has challenged the accuracy of the table’s figures. https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2021-Court-Statistics-Report.pdf 22 The data from fiscal year 2021 remains incomplete. See https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2022-Court-Statistics-Report.pdf at pp. 138, 140
16
Criminal filings have outpaced dispositions every year between fiscal years 2012
and 2021 despite an overall decrease of 29 percent in filings, and the delta between 23 criminal filings and dispositions fluctuates each year. For instance, in fiscal year 2017,
there were 47,519 criminal filings with 44,290 dispositions, a filing-to-disposition ratio of
93.3 percent. But that ratio plummeted the next year. In fiscal year 2018, there were
52,066 criminal filings with 41,329 dispositions, a filing-to-disposition ratio of 79.3
percent. In fiscal 2019, however, there were 44,268 criminal filings with 39,715
dispositions, a filing-to-disposition rate of 88.6 percent—nearly 10 percent higher than
fiscal year 2018 but still about 5 percent lower than fiscal year 2017.
What’s more, the percentage of criminal cases resolved by jury trial fluctuated
during these years. In fiscal year 2017, 441 cases of the 44,290 dispositions (.0099%)
were resolved by a jury trial. In fiscal year 2018, 509 cases of the 41,329 dispositions
(.012%) were resolved by a jury trial. And in fiscal year 2019, 580 cases of the 39,238
dispositions (.014%) were resolved by a jury trial.
In short, the one-year comparison of filings, dispositions, and jury trials in fiscal
years 2019 and 2020, that District Attorney advances cannot and does not show that the
pandemic caused the delay in trying Tapia’s case, which was filed in February 2021 and
dismissed 18 months later. That data, which stops in mid-2020, also does not undermine
Judge Monterosso’s finding that any COVID-related backlog had been resolved by the
23 https://www.courts.ca.gov/dashboard.htm (Felony, Misdemeanor-NonTraffic, and Misdemeanor-Traffic).
17
time Tapia’s case was dismissed such that the Superior Court had “moved into a period”
of chronic, pre-COVID congestion and delay caused by only a lack of available judges.
Judge Monterosso also correctly found that Stanley, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th 164,
Hernandez-Valenzuela, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th 1108, and Elias, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th
926, are distinguishable. Stanley arose from the Contra Costa Superior Court and was
decided in June 2020, during the height of the pandemic when state and local emergency
orders suspending jury trials and allowing trial courts to extend section 1382’s deadline
were in place. (Stanley, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) Tapia’s case, on the other
hand, was dismissed in October 2022, more than two years after the Superior Court
resumed jury trials and long after the court began running at full capacity in February
2022.
Hernandez-Valenzuela arose from the San Francisco Superior Court, which could
not “operate at its usual capacity for approximately 15 months” with several periods of
not holding any jury trials and sometimes operating with only four out of 10 criminal
departments open. (Hernandez-Valenzuela, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1127.) The
superior court fully reopened on June 28, 2021, about three months before the defendants
moved to dismiss their cases under section 1382. (Hernandez-Valenzuela, supra, at p.
1123.)
Here, however, the Superior Court had been holding jury trials since June 2020
and its criminal departments had been “running full speed” since then (except for the two
winter shutdowns). While the defendants in Hernandez-Valenzuela moved to dismiss
18
between seven to 12 weeks after the San Francisco trial court had fully reopened, Tapia
moved to dismiss eight months after the Superior Court fully reopened.
In Elias, the San Diego Superior Court continued the defendant’s trial over his
objection on July 6, 2021, based on that court’s general pandemic-related orders allowing
continuances under section 1382. (Elias, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 931.) About two
weeks after the superior court fully reopened near the end of July 2021, the superior court
denied the defendant’s request to dismiss the case under section 1382 and continued trial
again. (Elias, supra, at p. 926.) The Elias court held that neither continuance was an
abuse of discretion because both were indisputably attributable to a backlog caused by
the pandemic, which remained when the defendant moved to dismiss weeks after the
superior court fully reopened, and both continuances were permissible under the court’s
general orders still in effect. (Id. at pp. 941-942.) Again, Tapia did not move to dismiss
within weeks of the Superior Court fully reopening. He did so eight months after the
Superior Court fully reopened and after the court’s general orders had lapsed.
Not only are Stanley, Hernandez-Valenzuela, and Elias distinguishable due to their
procedural postures, they are also distinguishable because they arose from superior courts
with no history of chronic backlogs. In fact, the Judicial Council has found that all three
19
24 superior courts have had more judges than they need since at least 2019. That remains 25 true today.
We may grant the District Attorney’s petition only if Judge Monterosso’s order
dismissing Tapia’s case “‘exceeds the bounds of reason.’” (Elias, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th
at p. 938.) Given the Superior Court’s chronic congestion that has existed for nearly two
decades and remains unresolved to this day, Judge Monterosso reasonably could find that
Tapia’s case could not timely be brought to trial because there was no available judge
was “fairly attributable to the state’s failure, over a considerable period of time, to
provide a number of judges sufficient to meet the needs of Riverside County’s rapidly
growing population and caseload—a circumstance fairly attributable to the fault or
neglect of the state.” (Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1138.) We therefore deny the
District Attorney’s petition.
As the District Attorney acknowledges, the Superior Court has done everything
within its means to bring criminal cases to trial within section 1382’s deadline. Despite
its best efforts, the Superior Court simply does not have enough judges to adequately 26 tackle its chronic congestion, which persists to this day. This is a problem only the
24
https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2019_Update_of_the_Judicial_Needs_Assessment. pdf at pp. 7-8 25 https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/Report-to-the-Legislature_2022-Update- of-the-Judicial-Needs-Assessment.pdf at pp. 8-9 26 See https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/Report-to-the-Legislature_2022- Update-of-the-Judicial-Needs-Assessment.pdf
20
Legislature can correct. (See Gov. Code § 69592 [providing for 53 judges for Riverside
County]; see also Senate Bill No. 75 [proposed legislation to add 26 new superior court
judgeships in San Bernardino and Riverside counties to address the region’s “explosive
growth” since 2000], https://legiscan.com/CA/text/SB75/2023.)
The concurrence fears that our opinion “could be read to suggest that all that is
needed to support the trial court’s finding here is that the county’s courts are severely
underfunded” and “could be read to indicate the courts can do nothing but advocate for
sufficient funding assistance.” (Conc. opn., post, at p. 9.) Our opinion should not be
construed in either way.
We hold only that, on this record, this Superior Court permissibly found that its
inability to timely bring the dismissed cases to trial was “fairly attributable to the state’s
failure, over a considerable period of time, to provide a number of judges sufficient to
meet the needs of Riverside County’s rapidly growing population and caseload—a
circumstance fairly attributable to the fault or neglect of the state.” (Engram, supra, 50
Cal.4th at p. 1138.) Although a severely, chronically underfunded superior court could
conceivably meet all of the demands of its criminal docket within section 1382’s
deadlines, that is not the case here, and has not been for over a decade. (See id. at pp.
1136-1337.) We therefore cannot and do not decide whether underfunding alone could
justify the dismissals at issue here.
We agree with the concurrence that “[i]f the trial court can do more, it should.”
(Id. at p. 10.) There may be things the Superior Court (and other courts) could do to meet
21
section 1382’s requirements beyond advocating for more funding. But this Superior
Court has been unable to meet the demands of its criminal docket for years, and nothing
in the record suggests it could have done more with the resources the Legislature has
provided.
Judge Monterosso, then the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court, reasonably
found that Tapia’s case (and the other dismissed cases) could not be tried within section
1382’s deadlines simply because there are “[n]ot enough judges.” For that reason, we
hold only that Judge Monterosso did not abuse his discretion in determining that there
was no good cause under section 1382 to continue the trial over Tapia’s objection.
Whether there may be good cause on a different record before a different judge is not
before us.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The District Attorney’s petition for a writ of mandate is denied.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
CODRINGTON J.
I concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
22
See Concurring Opinion
[People v. Tapia, E080076]
RAPHAEL, J., Concurring.
I join in holding that the Riverside County Superior Court presiding judge did not
abuse his discretion in finding no good cause for a continuance under Penal Code section
1382 to bring this criminal case to jury trial, requiring its dismissal. The court found that
the inability to hold a trial for this case (and 44 others dismissed on the same day)
resulted from the chronic problem that the state had not funded enough judicial officers in
the county, rather than from the transitory occurrence of the Covid pandemic. I write to
explain that I am deferring to the judgment of a presiding judge who grounded his ruling
in knowledge of the court’s operations. I respectfully wish to emphasize that our reason
for affirming should not be solely that the court is severely underfunded. That alone is
not enough to dismiss criminal cases.
I
Thirteen years ago, our Supreme Court held that the “fault or neglect of the state”
in failing to provide “a number of judges sufficient to meet the needs of Riverside
County’s rapidly growing population and caseload” supported the court’s finding that
there was no good cause for a Penal Code section 1382 continuance of a criminal case.
(People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131, 1138 (Engram).)
Even then, in 2010, the lack of judges funded for Riverside County was “a long-
known and well-documented problem.” (Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1164, fn. 13.)
The problem is still well-known and well-documented, and it is not disputed. The state’s
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funding for Riverside County’s judicial offices lags below a subsistence level, as our
judiciary’s most recent assessment determined that the county needs about 25 percent
more judges to meet its assessed need. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 15.)
That statistical showing is necessary to establish that the court faces a “chronic
condition” that cannot justify a continuance of a case, rather than an “‘exceptional
circumstance’” that can. (Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1165.) But it is not alone
sufficient to explain or analyze whether the court is able to try all its felony cases. The
Riverside County courts have been chronically underfunded for a generation, but the
court has not needed to constantly dismiss felony cases due to a lack of courtrooms.
The difficult question as to why there are not enough judges to preside over this
trial (and others) is this: why now? And why in this precise number of cases?
A
Speaking at some length at the October 27, 2022, hearing, Presiding Judge John
M. Monterosso explained his determination that the lack of a judge to try this case was
attributed to the court’s chronic lack of funding and not to the Covid-19 pandemic. In
doing so, he did not rely on statistics about case dispositions. Rather, he relied on
information that came from his experience presiding over court operations.
First, he explained chronologically the effect of the pandemic. The court was
“slowed down considerably” at the pandemic’s outset on March 16, 2020. The criminal
departments then re-opened on June 15, 2020, and began “running full speed.” While for
two years the state’s Chief Justice issued emergency orders allowing for good cause
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extensions, “trial courts were shutting down on a regular basis due to acute infections”
sustained by court staff, jurors, and lawyers. As well, two waves of Covid shut the court
down for seven or eight weeks during each of the two pandemic winters. The criminal
courts, though, had been holding jury trials “full-time since the last criminal trial
shutdown ended on February 25, 2022.”
Judge Monterosso indicated that the court since had reached a point of “chronic
backlog” rather than one based on “exceptional circumstances.” As to the case before us,
“[n]othing is going to open up” to get it tried, and the next day there will be more cases
waiting, and more the day after that.
Secondly, Judge Monterosso addressed some details of court operations — distinct
from Covid — that explained why the court cannot hold enough felony jury trials to meet
the need. Perhaps the largest factor as to how many felony cases can be tried is how the
presiding judge allocates judges to meet the many other needs of the court: juvenile
dependency, juvenile delinquency, misdemeanors, traffic violations, family law, probate,
large “unlimited” civil lawsuits, and smaller “limited” civil cases, unlawful detainer, and
small claims. Engram established that the Riverside superior court’s reasonable
decisions to designate and maintain different civil and criminal courtrooms does not
create good cause for a criminal case continuance where the state has underfunded the
county’s judiciary. (Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1156.)
3
In explaining his ruling, Judge Monterosso indicated he was allocating 18 or 19
judges to criminal trial departments, as well as judges to additional departments for
settlement conferences to try to resolve cases. This was out of about 71 authorized
judges. We are given no reason to question the presiding judge’s determination that this
was the most that could reasonably be allocated to felony criminal for the court “to fairly
and efficiently administer all of the judicial proceedings that are pending before it.”
(Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1146.) Nor do we have reason to doubt that the court
provides “considerable preference to the trial” of criminal cases, or to conclude that it
“shortchanges criminal matters and does not devote a reasonable proportion of its
resources to the trial of criminal cases.” (Engram, at pp. 1137-1138.)
Third, apart from allocating judges, the types of crimes charged and the plea
bargains offered can affect the cases left for trial. “[T]he backlog is created . . . when too
few cases are resolved prior to trial,” the presiding judge stated. “Mostly the District
Attorney will, per their prerogative, offer an attractive offer . . . each side is giving a little
something up. And when that process stops happening, cases pile up.”
Fourth, Judge Monterosso stated that “there are so many other things that aren’t
counted as filings that are being dropped in our lap.” He did not explain more
specifically. We have, though, been given no reason to doubt that there are more burdens
on the court recently than in the past.
Finally, the presiding judge indicated that Covid-19 was “[n]ot gone wholly” as a
factor, but rather was “not any different than a normal cold and flu season as it relates to
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people being out with illnesses.” That effect differed from the pandemic when Covid
caused a “direct impact on trial court operations” with courts regularly shutting down.
The current absence of courtrooms is “fairly and reasonably attributable to the fault or
neglect of the state” if the court lacks the judges to deal with occasional absences caused
by endemic illnesses, as those “represent[] a chronic condition rather than an exceptional
circumstance” (Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1164).
B
In this writ proceeding, we are reviewing the presiding judge’s determination that
the chronic congestion of an underfunded court, rather than the Covid-19 pandemic, is
the cause of the court’s inability to try this case. We ordinarily presume a trial court’s
judgment is correct and do not “set aside on appeal absent an affirmative showing of
reversible error.” (Samara v. Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 335.) In cases alleging
violations of section 1382, we review a trial court’s determination under a deferential
abuse of discretion standard. (Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 1162-1163.) We have no
argument advanced, nor reason in the record, to conclude that the presiding judge’s
reasons for the determination were outside his discretion. I would therefore deny the
petition, deferring to the presiding judge’s reasoning and determination.
II
In the trial court and here, the District Attorney’s argument did not engage directly
with Judge Monterosso’s reasoning. The argument relies entirely on statistics showing a
reduction in the county’s disposition of criminal cases.
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The District Attorney’s writ petition observes that court statistics reports from our
state’s judicial council show that before the pandemic the court “was able to achieve
many more dispositions in criminal cases.” The District Attorney’s conclusion is this
(italics added): “the pandemic caused this productivity to plummet.” Thus, the District
Attorney argues that the trial court was wrong to conclude that the chronic lack of
funding caused there to be no judge to try this case, so it should have found that Covid-19
did instead.
There are two problems with this approach.
The first problem is the period that District Attorney’s statistics cover. When the
District Attorney filed his petition and traverse, the most recent statistics available were
from the 2022 Court Statistics Report, which covered the fiscal year from July 1, 2020,
through June 30, 2021. During this period, even Judge Monterosso indicated there was
good cause for continuances of felony trials due to the Covid pandemic. As he stated, the
county courts were closed for about two months during the winter of that year and
individual courts were “shutting down on a regular basis” when persons got sick.
Statistics are not even necessary to show that court shutdowns caused the number of jury
trials to decrease during the two years beginning in March 2020.
Judge Monterosso’s view, in contrast, was that by October 2022, after regular
shutdowns stopped, the under-resourced court had been unable keep up with felony jury
trials; the cases keep coming and “[n]othing is going to open up.” Showing that
productivity dropped during the height of the pandemic does not address that. Indeed, the
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District Attorney states that case “filings were decreasing” during the pandemic, but the
most recent statistics show a sharp increase in felony filings as the pandemic waned. The
2023 court statistics report shows that in the fiscal year ending June 30, 2022, felony
filings in the county jumped to 14,178, the highest level since 2016, and notably higher
than the most recent years. Indeed, that year’s number of felony filings is about 20
percent higher than the number (11,302) in the year that ended in mid-2019, the last full 1 year before the pandemic. That statistic lends support to Judge Monterosso’s ruling.
The second problem with the District Attorney’s argument is that — even if the
statistics were current — a decrease in the trial court’s capacity to try felony cases does
not engage with Judge Monterosso’s reasoning as to causation. Case-disposition
statistics could show that the trial court is adjudicating fewer cases. But they cannot
alone establish the cause of the drop.
The District Attorney’s statistics show fluctuating numbers of felony jury trials in
Riverside County from year to year — even before the pandemic. In the fiscal years that
ended in 2016 and 2017, there were 502 jury trials followed by 305. That was about a 40
percent drop in trials in one year, and it was before Covid-19 existed. Factors other than
Covid affect that number.
1 https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2023-Court-Statistics-Report.pdf [table 7a, page 135]. The annual felony filings, as the District Attorney lists them, were 12,568 (2017), 13,004 (2018), 11,653 (2019), 11,302 (2020), and 11,307 (2021).
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Judge Monterosso identified factors other than Covid that were affecting case
dispositions in October 2022. For instance, he stated that things “that aren’t counted as
filings . . . are being dropped in our lap.” On the court of appeal, we are aware that the
Superior Court has recently been spending much time on postjudgment petitions; in
calendar year 2022 about 40 percent of our criminal appeals from Riverside County were
taken from such rulings. If the time spent on such petitions constitutes a shift in the
Superior Court’s caseload from a few years ago, it may mean that a judge or judges who
would otherwise have been able to handle felony trials is instead handling petitions. That
could cause a dip in the number of jury trials. But the cause would not be Covid.
Likewise, the most recent statistics show the Riverside Superior Court handled
about 150 more mental health hearings in the fiscal year that ended June 30, 2022, than in 2 the fiscal year that ended in 2019, before the pandemic. If this represents a burden on
the court that takes judicial time that would otherwise be allocated to try felony jury
trials, that might lead to a dip in that number, without Covid as a cause.
These are illustrations of why the case disposition statistics that are the sole
foundation for the District Attorney’s argument do not demonstrate that Covid, rather
than something else, caused the inability to try the case before us. There is, in fact, no
2 The 2022 statistics show Riverside county judges held 766 mental health hearings while adjudicating 1071 mental health filings. (https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2023-Court-Statistics-Report.pdf [table 12e, page 183]) The 2019 statistics show 616 hearings while adjudicating 873 mental health filings. (https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2020-Court-Statistics-Report.pdf [table 11e, page 160])
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single cause of the court’s inability to try a case. The question must be what counts as
the proximate (or legal) cause, regardless of whether that is defined as a major,
predominant, or substantial cause. A statistic that shows that the county is adjudicating
fewer felony cases does not reveal the proximate cause of that drop, though the presiding
judge’s knowledge of court operations might.
To better evaluate Judge Monterosso’s reasoning, we would need different
information than merely case disposition statistics. For instance, if there are fewer judges
now handling felony trials in Riverside County than in the past (and our record does not
show that there are) it would be fair to require an explanation as to why that is so.
Likewise, if the judges who are handling criminal trials are handling fewer of them (and
our record does not show that they are) it would be fair to ask why that is. Simply
showing in the aggregate that Riverside County is disposing of fewer cases, or holding
fewer jury trials, does not fully address Judge Monterosso’s reasoning.
III
The majority opinion cogently refutes the District Attorney’s statistics in
important ways. Notably, it explains that the District Attorney’s numbers are not recent
enough to be meaningful. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 16-17.) That is enough to reject the
argument before us.
In the big picture, the majority opinion may be correct that Riverside County’s
chronic court congestion is a problem that “only the Legislature can correct.” (Maj. opn.,
ante, at pp. 20-21.) But I fear the opinion could be read to suggest that all that is needed
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to support the trial court’s finding here is that the county’s courts are severely
underfunded. (See Maj. opn, ante, at pp. 15-16, 21-22.) Citing to pending legislation (id.
at p. 21) that is not relevant to our record-based decision could be read to indicate the 3 courts can do nothing but advocate for sufficient funding assistance.
A fix has not emerged in decades, and, as we await one, the consequence of
dismissing criminal cases is dire. The basketball coach John Wooden advised “do not let 4 what you cannot do interfere with what you can do.” Underfunded or not, the superior
court has a continuous duty to grant “considerable preference” to criminal cases.
(Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1138; see Penal Code section 1050.) It must “organize”
itself so as not to “shortchange the court’s criminal caseload.” (Id. at p. 1156.)
A fair reading of Engram requires the courts to ensure that even if underfunded,
they are granting considerable priority (but not absolute priority) to criminal cases. We
have no reason to doubt that the court is doing this. We should, however, emphasize that
continual effort is required, even if handling all criminal cases is impossible. If the trial
3 The final four paragraphs of the majority opinion contain an important (and appreciated) disavowal of these interpretations. This concurrence nevertheless is meant to identify the reasons—apart from statistics that show that the court is underfunded— that bore on whether the court had good cause for dismissing this criminal case for lack of a courtroom, where those non-statistical reasons were the more precise basis for the Presiding Judge’s ruling. While Judge Monterosso stated that what sets Riverside County apart from other counties is the widely recognized fact of “not enough judges,” that statement identified a decades-old problem and came after a particularized, and essential, explanation of the reasons why the lack of judges required dismissing—at that time—this criminal case, and the others dismissed with it. 4 Wooden, They Call Me Coach (1972) p. 56.
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court can do more, it should. If this issue persists, the court should continue to explain its
reasoning; if anything, it would be helpful to do so in yet greater detail.
RAPHAEL J.
11
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a felony case under Penal Code section 1382, finding that the lack of a courtroom was attributable to a chronic, pre-existing judicial shortage rather than exceptional circumstances caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.
Issues
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding no good cause to extend the Penal Code section 1382 trial deadline.
Whether the unavailability of a courtroom due to chronic judicial understaffing constitutes good cause for delay under section 1382.
Disposition. denied
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“the Superior Court did not abuse its broad discretion under section 1382 in finding that good cause did not exist to grant a continuance.”
“the backlog was “not caused by COVID to the extent that this becomes an exceptional set of circumstances” justifying a continuance under section 1382.”
“the “critical inquiry is whether the congestion or backlog is attributable to chronic conditions as opposed to exceptional circumstances considering all of the relevant circumstances.””