Marriage of Richards CA4/3

Filed 5/31/23 Marriage of Richards CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re Marriage of RYAL W. and ALICIA MARIE RICHARDS.

RYAL W. RICHARDS, G060576 Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 15D009634) v. OPINION ALICIA MARIE RICHARDS,

Appellant.

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Michael J. Naughton, Judge. (Retired judge of the Orange County Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Dismissed. All pending motions dismissed. Alicia Marie Richards, in pro. per., for Appellant. Law Offices of Kevin E. Robinson and Kevin E. Robinson for Respondent.

In October 2020, after years of postjudgment litigation in this marriage dissolution case between Alicia Marie Richards and Ryal W. Richards, the trial court (Judge Andre De La Cruz) deemed Alicia a vexatious litigant under Code of Civil 1 Procedure section 391, subdivision (b)(3). Pursuant to section 391.7, the court ordered her to obtain prior approval from the presiding judge before filing any new documents in propria persona. Several months later, the court (Judge Michael J. Naughton) dismissed four motions Alicia had filed before she was declared a vexatious litigant because she had not obtained the presiding judge’s approval to file them. On appeal, Alicia challenges the dismissal of her motions, contending, inter alia, that she was not required to comply with prefiling requirements for these motions because she filed them before she was declared a vexatious litigant. On March 2, 2023, during the pendency of this appeal, Alicia filed a substitution of attorney in the superior court, reflecting that she was now represented by counsel. This court issued an order (1) informing the parties of its intent to take judicial notice of this document, (2) affording them time to file an opposition, and (3) instructing them to submit letter briefs addressing whether this appeal should be dismissed as moot because Alicia was no longer self-represented below. In her response, Alicia objects to judicial notice on the ground that the substitution of attorney is irrelevant to this appeal. She further contends the appeal is not moot because this court could provide effective relief by vacating the trial court’s order 2 dismissing her motions. Having considered Alicia’s response, we take judicial notice of the substitution of attorney reflecting that Alicia is no longer self-represented before the