People v. Rogers CA2/1

Filed 5/22/23 P. v. Rogers CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B321234

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. A383323)

v.

MORRIS ROGERS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Henry J. Hall, Judge. Affirmed. Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Stephanie A. Miyoshi and Kathy S. Pomerantz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Morris Rogers appeals from an order resentencing him following a successful petition under Penal Code section 1172.6,1 to the extent the order imposed a term of parole following his release from prison. Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(1) provides that after a resentencing court has vacated a conviction for murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter under that section, the court shall “recall the sentence and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts in the same manner as if the petitioner had not previously been sentenced, provided that the new sentence, if any, is not greater than the initial sentence.” Section 1172.6, subdivision (h) further mandates that “[a] person who is resentenced pursuant to this section shall be given credit for time served. The judge may order the petitioner to be subject to parole supervision for up to two years following the completion of the sentence.” Here, the resentencing court vacated Rogers’s murder conviction and resentenced him to a total of five years on the remaining counts of conviction, credited him with over 39 years of custody confinement, and placed him on parole for two years. Rogers argues that section 1172.6 does not authorize placing him on supervised parole for any amount of time after his release from custody, because “if [he] had been resentenced ‘as if [he] had