applied the preponderance of the evidence standard. (See Kevin P., supra, 57
Cal.App.5th at p. 186.) “The standard of proof known as clear and convincing evidence
demands a degree of certainty greater than that involved with the preponderance
standard, but less than what is required by the standard of proof beyond a reasonable
5
doubt. This intermediate standard ‘requires a finding of high probability.’”
(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 998.)
We must determine whether the juvenile court’s application of a lesser burden of 1 proof than is now required constitutes harmless error. Where federal constitutional
rights are implicated, the People must show that a fact finder’s application of an incorrect
and lesser burden of proof was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt per Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman). (See, e.g., People v. Hurtado (2002) 28
Cal.4th 1179, 1193-1194 [failure to instruct jury on burden of proof in commitment
proceedings under Sexually Violent Predatory Act].) Constitutional rights are not
implicated, however, by the purely statutory requirement that the juvenile court apply the
clear and convincing standard to transfer motions under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 707. Thus, the appropriate harmlessness standard is that of People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836-837 (Watson). (See People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186,
195 (Gonzalez) [“We evaluate nonstructural state law error under the harmlessness
standard set forth in Watson . . . .”]; Conservatorship of Maria B. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th
514, 533 [in a different context, applying Watson to erroneous use of the preponderance
of the evidence standard instead of clear and convincing evidence, where the higher
standard was required by state law].) “[The Watson] standard requires us to evaluate
whether the defendant has demonstrated that it is ‘“reasonably probable that a result more
1 Of course, our use of the term “error” here does not imply that the trial court did anything improper, as it applied the legally correct standard at the time. Its analysis became erroneous due to Assembly Bill 2361’s retroactive change in the law.
6
favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.”’”
(Gonzalez, at p. 195, quoting Watson, at p. 837.)
T.A. proposes that instead we should apply the harmless error analysis articulated
in People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354 (Gutierrez). In that case, our Supreme
Court considered whether a retroactive change in the trial court’s sentencing discretion
required remand for resentencing. (Id. at p. 1360} The court concluded that “the
appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record ‘clearly indicate[s]’
that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion ‘even if it had been aware
that it had such discretion.’” (Id. at p. 1391.)
We are not persuaded that the Gutierrez clear indication standard applies here.
When a change in the law bestows new sentencing discretion on a trial court, the
appellate court may have no relevant record to review, as the trial court would not yet
have exercised its discretion. The clear indication standard consequently requires an
affirmance to be grounded in record evidence, rather than in speculation.
Here, in contrast, the trial court decided the People’s transfer motion based on
record evidence. Our question is whether the trial court would make the same decision,
based on the same evidence, but under the higher standard of proof required by Assembly
Bill 2361. In such a circumstance, the clear indication standard does not apply. (See
People v. McDaniels (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 420, 426 [clear indication standard
inapplicable to deciding whether a court “is likely to repeat a choice it already made”].)
Like most harmlessness inquiries, review of whether the court would make the same
7
decision, based on the same evidence but under a new standard, “involves some degree of
conjecture.” (Ibid.) But it is not so speculative as deciding in the first instance how the
trial court would have exercised its discretion if it had known it had the authority to make
a discretionary choice. (Ibid.) As such, the Watson standard is appropriate.
Applying Watson, we do not find it reasonably probable that the juvenile court
would have reached a different decision under the clear and convincing standard of proof.
The juvenile court’s detailed discussion of its reasoning acknowledged that a few factors
weighed to some extent in T.A.’s favor. T.A. had no previous criminal or delinquent
history, and thus there had also been no previous attempts to rehabilitate him. (See Welf.
& Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3)(C), (D).) There was also evidence of “several mental
health issues as a child that progressed into [T.A.’s] adulthood,” which the juvenile court
found “must have impacted his overall cognitive functioning” and tended to suggest he
might be less criminally sophisticated. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3)(A).)
Nevertheless, the juvenile court also found that other evidence weighed heavily
against a finding that T.A. was amenable to rehabilitation under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court. The circumstances of the crime itself suggested that T.A. “possessed a
high level of criminal sophistication at the time of the shooting,” regardless of his
previously clean record and mental health issues. The murder had been committed by
T.A.’s codefendant using a stolen gun procured by T.A. and provided to the shooter, who
did not otherwise have access to a gun. Evidence that T.A. and his codefendants had
planned at least an assault, if not a murder, for days prior to the shooting, as well as their
8
efforts to avoid capture after the shooting, supported the conclusion that “the shooting
was not impromptu” and “evidence[d] [T.A.’s] callous and criminally advanced
mindset.” Moreover, there was some evidence that T.A.’s current behavior included
“malingering his mental health symptoms.” In sum, the juvenile court found it “clear that
despite his lack of criminal history and despite his mental health issues, [T.A.] possessed
a substantial degree of criminal sophistication,” so that factor supported a finding that he
“is not fit for the juvenile court and should be transferred to adult court.”
The juvenile court also found that the evidence weighed “heavily” in favor of the
conclusion that T.A. could not be rehabilitated prior to expiration of the juvenile court’s
over T.A. could be extended for no more than two years after commitment to a youth
facility, since he was 26 years old at the time of the transfer hearing. (See Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 607, subd. (c).) He had already been incarcerated for most of a decade.
Although he earned his GED in 2013, he had not participated in any educational services
or job training since then. He had, however, repeatedly engaged in violent behavior
towards both other inmates and prison staff, including a battery causing serious bodily
injury to a peace officer. In 2020, he had pleaded guilty of two counts of resisting a
peace officer, receiving a three-year prison term. The probation officer who supervises
the most restrictive available juvenile program opined that they “would not be able to
provide services that [T.A.] would need to rehabilitate as an adult,” and that she would
“fear for the safety of the youth [at the program] if [T.A.] was to be placed there, as well
9
as for the safety of the custody officers.” During the transfer hearing, T.A.’s behavior
was so disruptive and noncompliant that the court ordered he attend the hearing by video,
and even then, sometimes his microphone had to be muted. The juvenile court opined
that it “cannot conclude that he will miraculously begin to rehabilitate now if he remains
in the juvenile court.”
Finally, the juvenile court found the circumstances and gravity of the offense also
weighed “heavily in favor of a finding that [T.A.] is not suitable for the juvenile court.”
(See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3)(E).) T.A. and his codefendants had
“approached the victim en masse and confronted him,” and the victim was “alone and
unarmed.” The victim had responded to being confronted “in a defiant but non-violent
manner.” Although T.A. was not the actual killer, he provided a gun to the shooter, and
he “intended the result, took steps to insure it would transpire, and may have even
preplanned it.” After the shooting, T.A. and his codefendants took “calculated steps to
avoid capture” and “showed no regard or concern for the victim.” The juvenile court
commented that “[t]here is no graver circumstance than one involving a stolen life,” that
the victim “is dead and he shouldn’t be,” and that T.A. was “responsible for that loss.”
After weighing all the relevant factors, the juvenile court found “that on balance,
the statutory criteria weigh heavily in favor of the conclusion that the minor is not
amenable to juvenile court services and therefore should be transferred back to a court of
criminal jurisdiction.”
10
Given the juvenile court’s reasoning, we do not find it plausible, let alone
reasonably likely, that the court’s decision would have been any different had it applied
the clear and convincing evidence standard required by current law. Nothing in the
juvenile court’s comments suggests that it found this decision to be a close call, either in
terms of determining the facts or weighing the applicable factors against one another, so
that that the precise standard of review applied might have made a difference. As such,
even though Assembly Bill 2361 applies retroactively to T.A.’s case, he has not
demonstrated that remand for the juvenile court to reconsider its decision under the
amended law would be appropriate.
III. DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order granting the People’s transfer motion and reinstating the
judgment is affirmed.
RAPHAEL J.
We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
MILLER J.
11
Filed 4/11/23 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re T.A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, E079346 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. J286190) v. ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION T.A., FOR PUBLICATION
Defendant and Appellant.
Request having been made to this court pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1120(a) for publication of a nonpublished opinion heretofore filed in the above-entitled matter on April 7, 2023, and it appearing that the opinion meets the standard for publication as specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c),
IT IS ORDERED that said opinion be certified for publication pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(b). The opinion filed in this matter on March 23, 2023, is certified for publication.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION RAPHAEL J. We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
MILLER J.
1
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. Although Assembly Bill 2361's requirement that a juvenile transfer be supported by clear and convincing evidence applies retroactively to non-final cases, the failure to apply this standard is harmless error when it is not reasonably probable the court would have reached a different result.
Issues
Does Assembly Bill 2361 apply retroactively to a juvenile transfer hearing in a non-final case?
What is the appropriate harmless error standard for a juvenile court's failure to apply the clear and convincing evidence standard required by Assembly Bill 2361?
Is it reasonably probable that the juvenile court would have reached a different result under the clear and convincing evidence standard?
Disposition. affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Assembly Bill 2361, like Proposition 57, “reduces the possible punishment for a class of persons, namely juveniles.””
“The appropriate harmlessness standard is that of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836-837”
“we do not find it reasonably probable that the juvenile court would have reached a different decision under the clear and convincing standard of proof.”