California Court of Appeal Mar 3, 2023 No. E075271AUnpublished
Filed 3/3/23 P. v. Cyrus CA4/2 Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E075271
v. (Super.Ct.No. FWV18004411)
MAURICE CYRUS, JR., OPINION ON TRANSFER
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Bridgid M.
McCann, Judge. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with directions.
James R. Bostwick, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha
Cortina, Annie Featherman Fraser and Christine Levingston Bergman, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
A jury convicted Maurice Cyrus, Jr., of being a felon in possession of a firearm
and found true that the offense was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in
association with a criminal street gang. (Pen. Code, §§ 29800, subd. (a)(1), 186.22,
The record contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer
that Cyrus knowingly and constructively possessed the firearm. The gun was in a bag in
a closet next to the mattress where Cyrus was sleeping, and the bag was on top of a wallet
containing Cyrus’s health care card and a copy of his identification. The jury could
reasonably infer from the contents of the wallet that the wallet belonged to Cyrus. The
jury also could reasonably infer from the placement of the bag on top of the wallet and
next to the mattress where Cyrus was sleeping that the bag also belonged to Cyrus and
that Cyrus had placed the bag atop the wallet in order to keep his belongings together and
close by.
In addition to the proximity of the gun to Cyrus and his wallet, the gun was used
two months earlier by another member of C9 in a gang-related shooting. There was
further evidence that C9 treated the gun as a gang gun—another gang member had been
photographed with a Glock .40-caliber handgun with a large capacity magazine.
Moreover, in a recorded jailhouse telephone conversation, another member of the same
gang spoke about the gun (albeit in coded language) and indicated that yet another gang
14
member was supposed to pick up the gun from Cyrus before it was found by law
enforcement, which Cyrus did not deny or disavow. Cyrus was the only gang member in
the apartment when the gun was found. From all of this evidence, the jury could
reasonably infer that the gun was a C9 gang gun and that Cyrus, as a C9 member,
possessed the gun for the gang when the gun was found.
Cyrus argues that there was insufficient evidence that he knowingly possessed the
firearm because there was no evidence about who placed the gun in the closet, when the
gun was placed in the closet, what Marquis did with the gun after the shooting, that
Marquis and Cyrus communicated after the shooting, that Cyrus knew of the gun before
the search, or that all gang members are aware of the location of a gang gun at all times.
The absence of that hypothetical evidence is not relevant to our review of the sufficiency
of the evidence. We analyze “whether the evidence was sufficient, not whether
hypothetical evidence would have strengthened the prosecution’s case.” (Vargas, supra,
9 Cal.5th at p. 822.)
Cyrus also suggests various nonincriminating reasonable inferences that could
have been drawn from the evidence, such as that he was not currently using the wallet
because it did not contain money or his actual identification card, or that Marquis may
have placed the bag in the closet without telling Cyrus about it. But in conducting
substantial evidence review, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the
judgment, not against it. (Cardenas, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 119, fn. 11.) We are
only concerned with whether “‘the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s
15
finding.’” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1054.) It is therefore irrelevant
whether the evidence might also support a contrary finding.
We also reject Cyrus’s contention that the present case is factually
indistinguishable from People v. Sifuentes (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1410 (Sifuentes),
disapproved on another ground by People v. Farwell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 295, 304, fn. 6. In
Sifuentes, a firearm was discovered in the same room as the defendant, who was found to
constructively possess it. (Id. at pp. 1413-1414.) Unlike Cyrus, however, the defendant
in Sifuentes was one of two gang members in the room where the gun was found, and the
gun was found under the mattress near where the other gang member was located. (Id. at
p. 1414.) There also was expert testimony about gang guns in Sifuentes. (Id. at p. 1415.)
But in the present case the gun was found among Cyrus’s belongings, so the evidence
about gang guns was not the only evidence of Cyrus’s possession of the gun (cf. id. at
p. 1417 [“Even assuming the firearm [that the other person in the room] possessed fell
into the gang gun category, no evidence showed [that the defendant] had the right to
control the weapon”]).
For all of these reasons, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support
the firearm possession conviction.
C. Gang Enhancement—Sufficiency of the Evidence
Cyrus argues that under Renteria, supra, 13 Cal.5th 951, the evidence is
insufficient to sustain the jury’s true finding on the gang enhancement allegation under
the law as it existed when he was tried. We agree. “‘We review the sufficiency of the
16
evidence to support an enhancement using the same standard we apply to a conviction.’”
(People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 331.)
Subdivision (b)(1) of section 186.22 (section 186.22(b)(1)), as it existed when
Cyrus was tried in 2020, prescribed a sentence enhancement for “‘any person who is
convicted of a felony committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association
with any criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any
criminal conduct by gang members.’” (Renteria, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 962; former
§ 186.22(b)(1).) Effective January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill 333 amended the gang
enhancement statute in several important respects. (People v. E.H. (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 467, 477-478.) Those amendments are not relevant, however, to Cyrus’s
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the law as it existed when he was tried.
(Renteria, at p. 961, fn. 6.) Our discussion in this section consequently refers only to that
prior version of the statute.
When Cyrus was tried, section 186.22(b)(1) set forth a two-pronged requirement
that a felony must “be committed (1) for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in
association with [any] criminal street gang, and (2) with the specific intent to promote,
further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members.” (Renteria, supra, 13 Cal.5th
at p. 964.) In Renteria, our Supreme Court examined the showing needed to satisfy the
requirements in “a lone-actor case” (ibid.), which the court defined as a case involving
“the gang-related conduct of an individual who acts alone” (id. at p. 962) and not one
concerning “the conduct of individuals acting in concert with other gang members” (id. at
p. 963). As Renteria explained, the distinction is important because “the joint nature of
17
the alleged conduct frequently affects the type of evidentiary showing that is sufficient to
demonstrate the conduct was gang-related and committed to promote the criminal activity
of gang members, as section 186.22 requires.”1 (Ibid.) In cases in which “multiple gang
members were involved in the charged offense, the fact of their joint involvement in a
crime often provides sufficient evidence of association and benefit, as well as
circumstantial evidence of an intent to promote the criminal activity of other gang
members, in connection with the very same criminal offense.” (Ibid.) The same does not
hold true for lone-actor cases. (Id. at p. 964.)
To avoid the constitutional limitation on “the state’s power to criminalize
membership in particular groups” (Renteria, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 964), Renteria
emphasized that there must be “‘a nexus to gang activity sufficient to alleviate due
process concerns’” (id. at p. 965). In describing the means of proving that nexus,
Renteria discussed two aspects of section 186.22(b)(1)’s intent requirement that are
“particularly relevant in lone-actor prosecutions.” (Renteria, at p. 965.) The first is that
“the specific intent to aid the criminal activities of a gang’s members implies knowledge
of the nature of at least some of those activities.” (Ibid.) Renteria explained that this
aspect of the intent requirement is important because due process necessitates that “there
be a significant connection between the defendant’s ‘guilty knowledge and intent’ and the
criminal conduct of the defendant’s associates.” (Ibid.) “Reading the statute against this
backdrop,” Renteria inferred that in a lone-actor case a defendant “must at least be aware
1 Renteria, like this case, dealt with the gang enhancement statute before it was amended by Assembly Bill 333. (Renteria, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 961, fn. 6.)
18
of the type of criminal activity the gang members pursue; without such awareness, the
defendant cannot intend to aid in such activity.” (Ibid.)
Renteria noted that the second particularly relevant feature of the intent
requirement in lone-actor cases is that former section 186.22(b)(1) “refers to the intent to
promote ‘criminal conduct by gang members,’” which means “the promotion of criminal
conduct by more than one member of the gang.” (Renteria, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 965.)
Because a lone-actor case necessarily involves criminal conduct of an individual acting
alone, in a lone-actor case this requirement “necessarily means the promotion of conduct
other than the commission of the underlying felony.” (Id. at pp. 965-966.)
Renteria also disapproved of the prosecution’s practice of relying “on expert
opinion about the potential for a gang member’s crime to benefit the gang by, among
other things, enhancing a gang’s reputation for violence among rival gangs or in the
community more generally” to establish the requisite intent in a lone-actor case.
(Renteria, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 966.) The court explained: “Without more, evidence
that committing a violent crime can enhance the gang’s reputation for viciousness in the
community does not support an inference that the defendant committed a particular
violent crime for the benefit of the gang and with the intent to facilitate known criminal
activity by other gang members.” (Id. at p. 967.) Renteria nevertheless approved the use
of “expert opinion to connect the defendant’s crime with the conduct of the gang and its
members” so long as the opinion is “‘“rooted in facts shown by the evidence.”’” (Ibid.)
The court outlined the type of expert opinion that remains permissible. (Id. at pp. 967-
968.)
19
Turning to the facts before it, Renteria concluded that there was not sufficient
evidence to support either element of the gang enhancement statute for the two alleged
gang enhancements. (Renteria, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 973.) There, the defendant had
shot at two inhabited residences while he was with an unidentified person who was not
identified as a gang member. (Id. at pp. 958, 970.) The defendant had admitted to being
a gang members years earlier and also when he was arrested for the underlying offenses.
(Id. at pp. 958, 972.) “A ‘little while’” before the shooting a neighbor saw the defendant
with a group of men walking in a nearby field while yelling the name of the gang to
which the defendant admitted belonging. (Ibid.)
Renteria found that there was no substantial evidence from the circumstances of
the crime showing that the defendant “intended his actions to be attributed to his gang.”
(Renteria, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 971.) In particular, the court noted that “the description
of events” did “not support the inference that, by walking along with the group earlier in
the night, [the defendant] intended the later shootings to be attributed to the gang.”
(Ibid.) “There was no evidence that [the defendant] identified himself or his gang during
the shooting or took credit for it on behalf of his gang afterwards.” (Ibid.) The court also
concluded that there was no substantial evidence that (1) the defendant “could have
reasonably anticipated the community would perceive a gang connection,” given that
there was no evidence that anyone had perceived such a connection, or (2) the defendant
“intended the shooting to contribute to his gang’s rivalry with” another gang. (Ibid.)
Finally, as to the expert’s testimony that the defendant “may have engaged in the
shooting to maintain his own respect within the gang,” Renteria reasoned that “such
20
evidence fails to explain how enhancing his personal reputation within the gang would
facilitate the criminal activities of the gang and its members, as section 186.22(b)
requires.” (Id. at p. 972.) Renteria therefore concluded that there was no evidence “from
which the jury could infer that [the defendant] knew of and thus might have intended to
promote the criminal activities of his gang’s members.” (Ibid.)
It is undisputed that this is a lone-actor case. No other gang members were present
in the apartment where the gun was found. There was substantial evidence that Cyrus
was a member of C9 and that the gun he possessed was used in a gang-related shooting
two months earlier and was otherwise used as a gang gun, as described ante. The People
argue that this evidence “clearly showed [that Cyrus] possessed the weapon with the
specific intent to promote, further, or assist criminal conduct by gang members.” (Italics
added.) We do not agree, because the argument is foreclosed by Renteria. A reasonable
jury could not infer from Cyrus’s gang membership and the gun’s status as a gang gun
that Cyrus was aware “of the type of criminal activity [C9] gang members pursue”
(Renteria, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 965) or “that [Cyrus] knew of and thus might have
intended to promote the criminal activities of his gang’s members” (id. at p. 972). The
evidence shows that Cyrus was a gang member who committed the crime of possessing a
firearm that had been used in a prior gang-related shooting and was otherwise important
to the gang. Nothing in that evidence supports an inference that Cyrus had any awareness
“of the type of criminal activity [C9] gang members pursue,” as he must to satisfy the
specific intent requirement of section 186.22(b)(1) under Renteria. (Renteria, at p. 965.)
21
The People contend that there was evidence that Cyrus knew of the previous
shooting—and thus possessed the requisite knowledge of the criminal activities of C9
members—because in the jailhouse conversation he pointed out that police had come to
his residence and conducted a search because Marquis had sent them there. In the
recorded jailhouse conversation, Cyrus said that he was in jail for “felony possession of a
firearm” because his cousin, whom “they got . . . on that other shit,” had said something
to send law enforcement to his residence. That evidence does not support the inference
Cyrus knew that Marquis “had used the gun in the shooting and then directed the police
to the apartment where the gun was hidden,” as the People suggest. Instead, the evidence
supports the inference that Cyrus knew that law enforcement searched his residence as a
result of something Marquis had told them. It does not support any inference that Cyrus
was aware of the previous shooting or that it was gang related. And there was no other
evidence from which the jury could infer that Cyrus had an awareness of the criminal
activities of C9 members.
Given that there was no evidence that Cyrus was “at least” aware of the type of
criminal activities pursued by C9 members, he cannot have intended “to aid in such
activity” by possessing the firearm. (Renteria, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 965.) We therefore
conclude that there was not sufficient evidence that Cyrus possessed the requisite specific
intent to aid the criminal activities of C9’s members and that the evidence was therefore
insufficient to support the gang enhancement under the law as it existed when Cyrus was
tried. We accordingly vacate the true finding on the gang enhancement allegation.
22
D. Senate Bill 567
Being a felon in possession of a firearm is punishable by 16 months, two years, or
three years in state prison. (§§ 18, 29800, subd. (a)(1).) The trial court sentenced Cyrus
to the upper term of three years for the felon in possession conviction, doubled to six
years because of the prior strike conviction. (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).)
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill 567 amended section 1170 to impose limits
on a trial judge’s discretion in choosing between the low, middle, and upper terms of a
sentencing triad.2 (Stats. 2021, ch. 731.) Before the amendments, if a statute prescribed
a sentencing triad, the court had discretion to choose any one of the three terms. (Stats.
2021, ch. 731; former § 1170, subd. (b).) When presented with such a choice now, the
court must impose the low term if the defendant’s youth or another specified mitigating
circumstance was “a contributing factor in the commission of the offense,” “unless the
court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances that
imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice” (§ 1170, subd.
2 On October 8, 2021, the Governor signed into law three bills that amended section 1170: Assembly Bill No. 124 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 695, § 5), Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 719, § 2), and Senate Bill 567 (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3). Senate Bill 567 has the highest chapter number, so we presume that it was the last enacted of the bills. (Gov. Code, § 9510; People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1074, fn. 2 (Gerson).) Senate Bill 567 incorporates the changes made to section 1170 by the other bills if all three bills were enacted and became effective on or before January 1, 2022, and Senate Bill 567 was the last enacted bill. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, §3(c).) The conditions were satisfied. Because Senate Bill 567 was enacted after the other two statutes, Senate Bill 567 became the operative legislation. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, §§ 1.3, 3(c); Gov. Code, § 9605, subdivision (b).) We therefore refer to all of the changes made to section 1170 as deriving from Senate Bill 567.
23
(b)(6)(A)-(C)). A defendant is considered a youth for purposes of this provision if the
defendant was “under 26 years of age on the date the offense was committed.”
(§§ 1016.7, subd. (b), 1170, subd. (b)(6)(B).)
In addition, section 1170 now provides that the upper term shall not be imposed
unless the facts underlying the aggravating circumstances that would justify imposing the
upper term are (1) stipulated to by the defendant, (2) found true by the trier of fact
beyond a reasonable doubt, or (3) based on prior convictions evidenced by a certified
record of conviction. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2)-(3).) The People concede that Senate Bill 567
applies retroactively to this appeal under In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, and we
agree. (See, e.g., People v. Ross (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1346, 1352.) Cyrus and the
People do not agree about whether remand for resentencing is required.
Cyrus was 22 years old when the offense was committed. In sentencing Cyrus to
an aggregate sentence of 13 years, the trial court recognized Cyrus’s “youthfulness.” The
court had read and considered the report of the probation officer, who recommended a
14-year sentence. The probation officer found there to be no mitigating circumstances
affecting Cyrus’s sentence (former Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.423) but found the
following aggravating circumstances present: (1) Cyrus used a weapon in committing the
offense, (2) Cyrus’s prior convictions were “numerous and of increasing seriousness,” (3)
Cyrus had served two prior prison terms, (4) Cyrus was on parole when the offense was
committed, and (5) Cyrus’s conduct on parole and probation had been unsatisfactory.
(Former Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421.) The court expressed concern that Cyrus had
already been incarcerated and had not demonstrated any change in behavior as a result.
24
The court did not believe that Cyrus’s crimes demonstrated any escalation but noted that
he was “on parole or probation every time something happen[ed].”
Although the court considered Cyrus’s “youthfulness” when it sentenced him, it
did not otherwise explain how that consideration affected its sentencing decision. The
court was not constrained by Senate Bill 567’s amendments to section 1170 at
sentencing, because they did not yet exist. Thus, the court was not bound by the now-
governing presumption favoring imposition of the low term if Cyrus’s age contributed to
the commission of the offense (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(B)), and the court consequently did
not determine whether his age did contribute.
“When being sentenced, a defendant is entitled to decisions made by a court
court which is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more exercise that
“informed discretion” than one whose sentence is or may have been based on
misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s record.’” (People v.
Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391.) When postsentencing statutory amendments
would affect a trial court’s sentencing discretion, “the appropriate remedy is to remand
for resentencing unless the record ‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have
reached the same conclusion ‘even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.’”
(Ibid.; People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 431.)
We cannot say on this record whether the trial court would conclude that Cyrus’s
age contributed to his commission of the offense so as to trigger the low term
presumption in subdivision (b)(6) of section 1170. When Cyrus was sentenced, the trial
25
court had no statutory reason to make, and Cyrus had no reason to seek, a finding that his
age was a contributing factor to his commission of the offense. (Gerson, supra, 80
Cal.App.5th at p. 1096.) Moreover, at that time a defendant’s youth was not listed in the
court rules as a mitigating circumstance the court should consider in sentencing. (Former
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.423(b).) The probation department consequently did not list
Cyrus’s age as a mitigating circumstance. Moreover, if the trial court did conclude that
Cyrus’s age contributed to the commission of the offense, we cannot say with confidence
on this record whether the trial court would then conclude that “imposition of the lower
term would be contrary to the interests of justice.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).) Because the
record does not clearly indicate that the trial court would have imposed the same
sentence, we vacate Cyrus’s sentence on count 1.
Because we are vacating Cyrus’s sentence on count 1, Cyrus is entitled to a full
resentencing. (Gerson, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1096 [vacating sentence and
remanding for consideration of the new low-term presumption in § 1170, subd. (b)(6)];
People v. Flores (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1039 [same].) Under the full resentencing
rule, “when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing ‘a full
resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing
discretion in light of the changed circumstances.’” (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th
857, 893; People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424-425.) The sentence imposed
on resentencing may not exceed the original aggregate sentence. (People v. Jones (1994)
24 Cal.App.4th 1780, 1783-1784; People v. Hanson (2000) 23 Cal.4th 355, 357-358.)
26
E. Due Process
Cyrus argues that his federal due process rights were violated because the firearm
possession conviction and the true finding on the gang enhancement were not supported
by substantial evidence. Because we conclude that the firearm possession conviction was
supported by substantial evidence and vacate the true finding on the gang enhancement,
this argument fails.
DISPOSITION
We vacate Cyrus’s sentence on the firearm possession conviction and remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion. We vacate the true finding on the gang
enhancement because it is not supported by substantial evidence. In all other respects,
the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J. McKINSTER J.
27
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that there was insufficient evidence to support the gang enhancement under the law in effect at the time of trial, following the guidance in People v. Renteria. Consequently, the court vacated the gang enhancement findings and remanded the case for resentencing in light of Senate Bill 567.
Issues
Whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress evidence obtained during a parole search.
Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction for felon in possession of a firearm.
Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the gang enhancement under the law in effect at the time of trial.
Disposition. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We vacate Cyrus’s sentence and remand for further proceedings in light of Senate Bill 567. We vacate the true findings on the gang enhancement. We otherwise affirm the judgment.”