Bryant v. Dept. of Transportation CA4/2 (2023) · DecisionDepot
Bryant v. Dept. of Transportation CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Feb 16, 2023 No. E077978Unpublished
Filed 2/16/23 Bryant v. Dept. of Transportation CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
JESSE BRYANT, JR.,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E077978
v. (Super. Ct. No. RIC1903462)
DEPARTMENT OF OPINION TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Daniel A. Ottolia, Judge.
Affirmed.
Jesse Bryant, Jr., in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Department of Transportation, Erin E. Holbrook, Chief Counsel, Alan M.
superior court. The trial court found Bryant’s petition was untimely filed and entered
judgment for Caltrans. We affirm.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In November 2016, Caltrans issued a Request for Proposal to solicit proposals on a
government contract. Bryant dba FMC and two other companies submitted proposals.
FMC received the lowest score from the evaluation committee, so it was not awarded the
contract. Caltrans issued a notice of intent to award the contract to CH2M, which
received the highest score from the evaluation committee.
In February 2017, FMC filed a notice of intent to protest the award of the contract
to CH2M. A month later, FMC filed their Detailed Statement of Protest. The thrust of
their protest was that they should have received a higher score and thus should have been
awarded the contract. After a hearing by written submission, the Department of General
2
1 Services (DGS) rejected the protest in June 2017. CH2M was awarded the contract,
which expired in June 2018.
Bryant sued Caltrans in the superior court in December 2017. The trial court
sustained Caltrans’s two demurrers with leave to amend. The court then sustained
Caltrans’s demurrer to Bryant’s Second Complaint without leave to amend for failure to
state a claim and uncertainty.
In June 2019, two years after DGS rejected Bryant and FMC’s bid protest and
about a year after the contract ended, Bryant filed a petition for writ of mandate under
Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Caltrans successfully demurred to the petition,
and Bryant filed his operative amended petition in November 2019.
Caltrans eventually filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings (MJOP).
Caltrans argued, among other things, that Bryant’s petition was barred by the applicable
30-day statute of limitations (see Gov. Code, § 11523). The trial court agreed, granted
the motion, and entered judgment for Caltrans. Bryant timely appealed.
1 DGS has exclusive jurisdiction to review bid protests for consultant contracts. (See Pub. Contract Code, § 1034; Cal. Code regs, tit. 2, §§ 1195 to 1195.6.)
3
III.
DISCUSSION
Caltrans argues we should affirm the judgment because Bryant filed his petition 2 long after the 30-day statute of limitations expired. We agree.
Government Code section 11523’s 30-day statute of limitations “governs the time
for filing a petition for writ of administrative mandate [under Code of Civil Procedure
section 1094.5] to obtain judicial review of the decision of an administrative agency”
unless there are “more specific statutory provisions applicable to the agency.” (Ventura
Coastal, LLC v. Occupational Safety and Health Appeals Board (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 1,
30; Contractors’ State License Board v. Superior Court (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 771, 776.)
Bryant argued in the trial court that Code of Civil Procedure section 343 controls, not 3 Government Code section 11523, and raises the argument again on appeal. We disagree.
“Code of Civil Procedure section 343 states: ‘An action for relief not hereinbefore
provided for must be commenced within four years after the cause of action shall have
accrued.’ It is a catchall provision that provides a statute of limitations in situations
2 We note that Bryant filed a 47-page opening brief totaling nearly the maximum 14,000 words permitted under California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(c)(1). Like his trial court briefs, his opening brief is dense, replete with arguments and authority, and difficult to follow. We have considered all of Bryant’s arguments to the extent we can follow them, but we need only resolve the statute of limitations issue for the reasons discussed below. 3 Bryant forfeited the arguments concerning the statute of limitations that he raises for the first time on appeal by failing to assert them in the trial court. (Perez v. Grajales (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 580, 591-592 [arguments raised for the first time on appeal are forfeited].) We therefore decline to consider them.
4
where no specific limitations period applies.” (Geneva Towers Ltd. Partnership v. City of
San Francisco (2003) 29 Cal.4th 769, 773-774.) This provision does not apply here
because Government Code section 11523 imposes a 30-day deadline to file a petition for
writ of mandate to challenge the decision of an administrative agency like Caltrans. (See
Hansen v. Board of Registered Nursing (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 664, 669.) Bryant fails
to show that Code of Civil Procedure section 343 (or any other provision) is a “more
specific statutory provision[] applicable” to Caltrans that displaces Government Code
section 11523’s 30-day deadline as the applicable statute of limitations here.
DGS rejected FMC’s bid protest in June 2017, and its decision became final
immediately upon service. (See Saint Francis Memorial Hospital v. State Dept. of
Health (2020) 9 Cal.5th 710, 718-720; Millview County Water Dist. v State Water
Resources Control Bd. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 585, 594-596 [agency’s decision is final
when no further issues to decide]; see also Cal. Code regs., tit. 2, § 1195.2 [DGS may
make “final disposition of the protest” after written hearing].) Under Government Code
section 11532, Bryant had 30 days from then to file a petition for writ of mandate in the
superior court. (See ibid.) He did not do so until June 2019, so his petition was not
timely filed. Because his petition was untimely filed, the trial court correctly granted
Caltrans’s MJOP. (See Ponderosa Homes, Inc. v. City of San Ramon (1994) 23
Cal.App.4th 1761, 1772.) We therefore affirm the judgment and need not address the
parties’ remaining arguments. (See ibid.)
5
IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Caltrans may recover its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON J.
We concur:
MILLER Acting P. J.
MENETREZ J.
6
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the plaintiff's petition for a writ of mandate was time-barred because it was filed well after the 30-day statute of limitations prescribed by Government Code section 11523.
Issues
Whether the 30-day statute of limitations in Government Code section 11523 applies to a petition for writ of mandate challenging an administrative bid protest decision.
Whether Code of Civil Procedure section 343 acts as a catchall statute of limitations that displaces the 30-day deadline for this action.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Government Code section 11523’s 30-day statute of limitations “governs the time for filing a petition for writ of administrative mandate [under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5] to obtain judicial review of the decision of an administrative agency””
“Because his petition was untimely filed, the trial court correctly granted Caltrans’s MJOP.”