California Court of Appeal Dec 29, 2022 No. E078401Unpublished
Filed 12/29/22 P. v. Hill CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E078401
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF077884)
ANGELA HILL, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Matthew Perantoni,
Judge. Affirmed.
Robert F. Somers, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel and Adrian R.
Contreras, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Angela Hill appeals from the trial court’s denial of her petition for resentencing
under former section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6) of the Penal Code after an evidentiary
hearing.1 (Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.) Hill argues that the
trial court erred by considering statements she made at a parole suitability hearing in
determining her eligibility for resentencing. We find no error and affirm.
“[W]hen a person directly aids and abets a murder, the aider and abettor must possess
malice aforethought.” (Ibid.) “A person aids and abets the commission of a crime when
he or she, (i) with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, (ii) and with the
intent or purpose of committing, facilitating or encouraging commission of the crime, (iii)
by act or advice, aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.”
(People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1164.)
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) amended
section 188 to provide that, with the sole exception of first degree felony murder, a
defendant cannot be convicted of murder unless the defendant acted with malice.
(§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 846.) Senate Bill
No. 1437 also amended section 189 to impose additional requirements for first degree
felony murder liability. (§ 189, subds. (e), (f).) Because of the amendment to section
188, defendants can no longer be convicted of murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (Gentile, at p. 851.)
11
Senate Bill No. 1437 also created a procedural mechanism for retroactive
application of amended sections 188 and 189 to defendants who were convicted of
murder under prior law but could no longer be convicted because of those amendments.
(§ 1172.6.) If such a defendant makes a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief, then
the court must issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing, at which
the prosecution bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
guilty of murder under current law. (Id., subds. (c), (d).) The admission of evidence at
the hearing is generally governed by the Evidence Code, and the parties may “offer new
or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)2
Hill argues that the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section
352 by relying on the parole hearing transcript, because its probative value was
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.3 She argues that the “transcript was
prejudicial because [she] essentially admitted aider and abettor liability for [Reed’s]
murder at her parole hearing whereas no other evidence definitely proved her murder
2 Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) amended then section 1170.95 effective January 1, 2022. The hearing on Hill’s petition occurred before the amendments took effect. The prosecutor and the petitioner could admit new or additional evidence under the version of the statute effective when the trial court held the evidentiary hearing on Hill’s petition. (Former § 1170.95, subd. (d)(3).) Senate Bill No. 775 clarified the evidentiary rules applicable at the hearing. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, §§ 1(d), 2.) Hill does not contend that the statutory changes affected her evidentiary hearing.
3 Evidence Code section 352 provides that a “court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”
12
liability.” We review a trial court’s ruling under Evidence Code section 352 for abuse of
discretion (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 637), and we conclude that Hill’s
argument lacks merit.
Hill’s argument is that the parole hearing transcript was prejudicial because it was
highly probative of her liability as a direct aider and abettor. The argument fails because
it is based on a misunderstanding of what constitutes prejudice under Evidence Code
section 352. “Evidence is not ‘prejudicial’ merely because it is harmful to a criminal
That is because “essentially all relevant evidence introduced by the prosecution is likely
to be harmful to a defendant’s case. Evidence only creates ‘undue prejudice’ if the
evidence tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant, and the evidence has
relatively little importance based on the specific issues involved in the particular case.”
(Ibid.)
We agree with Hill that her admissions at the parole hearing were highly probative
of her liability for Reed’s murder as a direct aider and abettor. That, however, does not
render the evidence prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352. (Lapenias, supra, 67
Cal.App.5th at p. 174.) Hill does not contend that admission of the transcript was
prejudicial for any reason aside from its probative value, so we conclude that Hill did not
make the requisite showing of prejudice to demonstrate that the trial court abused its
discretion by admitting the evidence.
13
Hill also argues that the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code
section 352 because “the probative value of the transcript was minimal because it was
unreliable.” She contends that the “transcript was unreliable evidence to determine
murder liability because she was incentivized to inculpate herself in the offense.” The
argument fails for several reasons. First, the existence of an incentive to give inculpatory
or exculpatory testimony may affect the probative value of the testimony, but that relates
to the testimony’s weight, not its admissibility. (People v. Villa (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th
1042, 1051.) Hill had an incentive to exculpate herself when she testified at trial, but that
did not render the testimony inadmissible at trial or at the evidentiary hearing on her
resentencing petition. Second, to the extent the statements Hill made at the parole
suitability hearing were unreliable, the trial judge considering her eligibility for
resentencing relief was “ideally situated to determine whether the incentives at a specific
parole hearing mesh with the statute’s goal of aligning punishment with true culpability.
When there are valid reasons to doubt the probity of a parole hearing statement, the trial
judge can hear and appraise arguments in the case’s context and accord the statement due
weight. Trial judges are expert at evaluating—word by word—whom and what to
believe in individual situations.” (People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 590
(Mitchell).) Third, even if the probative value of the transcript was diminished by Hill’s
incentive to inculpate herself at the parole hearing, Hill has still failed to show that
admission of the transcript carried any risk of undue prejudice within the meaning of
14
Evidence Code section 352. The trial court consequently did not abuse its discretion by
admitting the parole hearing transcript.
Hill next argues that the trial court erred by admitting the parole hearing transcript
because Hill’s statements at the parole hearing were entitled to use immunity under
Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d at page 889. We follow the decisions of the Courts of Appeal
that have addressed this issue and conclude that Coleman use immunity does not apply in
this context. (People v. Myles (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 688, 704-706 (Myles); People v.
Anderson (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 81, 93; Mitchell, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 588-590;
People v. Duran (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 920, 930-932 (Duran).)
In Coleman, the Supreme Court held that “as a judicial rule of evidence” a
probationer’s testimony at a probation revocation hearing held before the disposition of
criminal charges based on the same underlying conduct is inadmissible in the
prosecution’s case-in-chief during the subsequent criminal trial. (Coleman, supra, 13
Cal.3d at pp. 889, 892.) In creating that exclusionary rule, Coleman balanced the
probationer’s due process right to be heard at the revocation hearing (id. at pp. 873-874)
against the defendant’s right against self-incrimination at trial (id. at pp. 875-878).
Coleman explained that the purpose of the newly created exclusionary rule was “to
encourage the fullest possible truthful disclosure of relevant facts and circumstances at
the revocation hearing by allowing a probationer who does testify at [the] revocation
hearing nonetheless to enjoy unimpaired the full protection of the privilege against self-
incrimination at [the] subsequent trial.” (Id. at p. 892.)
15
The petitioner in Myles argued that under Coleman the statements she made in her
parole suitability hearing should be inadmissible to determine her eligibility for
resentencing under then section 1170.95. (Myles, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 704.) The
Court of Appeal disagreed. (Id. at pp. 705-706.) Myles explained: “The Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination protects persons from being compelled
by ‘“governmental coercion”’ to serve as witnesses against themselves in ‘“any criminal
case.”’ [Citation.] A section 1170.95 hearing, however, ‘“is not a trial de novo on all the
original charges.” [Citation.] Rather, it is a postconviction proceeding “due to the
Legislature’s inclusion of section 1170.95 in Senate Bill No. 1437 . . . , [as] an ‘act of
lenity’ [citation], allowing for the retroactive application of the new law governing
accomplice liability for . . . defendants already serving valid sentences for murder.”’
[Citations.] Because a sentence modification under section 1170.95 [now section 1172.6]
is an act of lenity and not a criminal trial, the wrongful admission of evidence does not
implicate defendant’s constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment.” (Ibid.; Duran,
supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 930.)
We agree with and adopt the reasoning in Myles, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at pages
705-706. We therefore conclude that Hill’s statements at the parole suitability hearing
were not entitled to use immunity under Coleman and thus were admissible to determine
whether she was eligible for resentencing relief.
For all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err by admitting
the parole hearing transcript at the evidentiary hearing on Hill’s resentencing petition.
16
DISPOSITION
The order denying Hill’s petition for resentencing is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ J.
We concur:
SLOUGH Acting P. J. FIELDS J.
17
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The trial court did not err in admitting a defendant's parole suitability hearing transcript during a section 1172.6 resentencing evidentiary hearing, as such statements are not protected by Coleman use immunity and are admissible to determine culpability.
Issues
Whether a parole suitability hearing transcript is inadmissible under Evidence Code section 352 in a section 1172.6 resentencing proceeding.
Whether statements made at a parole suitability hearing are entitled to use immunity under People v. Coleman in a section 1172.6 proceeding.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Evidence is not ‘prejudicial’ merely because it is harmful to a criminal defendant’s case.”