California Court of Appeal Dec 28, 2022 No. B316538Unpublished
Filed 12/28/22 P. v. Cummings CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B316538
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. TA148874) v.
CARL CORNELIUS CUMMINGS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Tammy Chung Ryu, Judge. Affirmed. Alex Coolman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and David A. Voet, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Defendant and appellant Carl Cornelius Cummings kidnapped and committed a violent assault on his longtime girlfriend which included chasing her in his car and hitting her. He was convicted by jury of kidnapping, assault with a deadly weapon and several other felonies, and sentenced to 14 years four months in prison. He contends on appeal the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument, his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the misconduct, and the upper term sentence on the kidnapping count should be reduced to a middle term sentence in light of the passage of Senate Bill 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) which took effect while this appeal was pending. We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Defendant began dating A.H. in 2013 when they were in high school. They had a relationship for about six years, broken up by intermittent periods of separation when A.H. tried to stay away from defendant. They have two children together, a daughter (A.C.) and a son (C.C.). We refer to the victim and her two minor children by their initials to protect their privacy. A.H. described the relationship as “fun” in the beginning but eventually defendant began to hit and abuse her. She became fearful of him and regulated her behavior to the point she felt like a “robot” who did what defendant wanted in order to keep him from getting angry and hitting her. Defendant often threatened to kill her or take her children from her. The hitting escalated into more violent assaults. At their daughter’s third birthday party, defendant got angry about something and choked A.H. until she began to feel weak and almost blacked out. Later, when A.H. was pregnant with their
son, she tried to leave the house to buy a Halloween costume for their daughter, and defendant beat her repeatedly, accusing her of wanting to meet up with another man. Defendant kicked her stomach and told her he hoped the baby died. Most of the time, A.H. did not report the abuse to law enforcement because she was scared of defendant and afraid she would lose her children if the authorities got involved. However, in 2017, she reported two incidents, one in March and one in May. The first incident resulted in an investigation by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services because the abuse occurred while the children were present. The incident in May 2017 occurred in the presence of A.H.’s mother. Defendant hit and kicked A.H. repeatedly and broke numerous windows in the home. Defendant was arrested, convicted of injuring A.H. in violation of Penal Code section 273.5, and spent a few months in jail. Upon his release, A.H. agreed to get back together with him because she believed he was going to change. However, within a short period of time, defendant resumed his abusive behavior. By the fall of 2018, defendant and A.H. were no longer living together but A.H. would meet him sometimes with the children. On one such occasion, A.H. drove to meet defendant and took their infant son with her. Defendant demanded A.H. have sex with him in the car. When she said no, defendant struck her repeatedly in the face and torso and forced himself on her, with their son still seated in his car seat. The next day, defendant came to her home and demanded she come down to the car. After she agreed to talk with him, defendant raped her again. A.H., at the urging of her mother, eventually reported the rapes. She admitted she made inconsistent and incomplete
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statements to the police about the rapes because she feared her children might be taken away since she had agreed both times to see defendant. In April 2019, A.H. was living in Long Beach but still seeing defendant in public places away from her home. For several months, A.H. had been trying to talk to defendant about their relationship and her belief that they should only be friends. On April 25, defendant called A.H. and demanded she come see him. A.H. agreed to meet defendant at a Jack in the Box restaurant in Los Angeles. She was scared but did not want him coming to her home. A.H. arrived at the restaurant with their five-year-old daughter and two-year-old son in the car with her. Defendant got into the front passenger seat of A.H.’s car. Defendant is six feet five inches tall and A.H. is just five feet tall. A.H. went inside the Jack in the Box to get food for the children and made other excuses to go inside several times, like taking the children to the restroom, because she was fearful of defendant. After looking at A.H.’s phone, defendant got angry. He accused A.H. of having a man’s phone number noted on her phone. Multiple videos from nearby security cameras captured the assault that ensued and were shown to the jury. A.H. tried to escape defendant several times, at first running back inside the Jack in the Box. Defendant followed A.H. inside, hit her, picked her up and threw her to the ground. He grabbed her again and carried her back to the car. A.H.’s top was pulled off in the struggle. She escaped the car again and ran, half naked out into the street, trying to get help from passing cars and people inside a liquor store. Defendant then used A.H.’s car, with the children still in the back seat, to chase down A.H. He drove across traffic
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to the wrong side of the street and struck A.H. with the car. She sustained numerous injuries and was taken to the hospital. Defendant was charged, by amended information, with eight felonies, six related to the April 2019 incident and two related to the 2018 rape: kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 207, subd. (a); count 1); two counts of injuring a spouse/girlfriend with a prior conviction (§ 273.5, subd. (f)(1); counts 2 & 9); two counts of child abuse (§ 273a, subd. (a); counts 3 & 4); assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 6); attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 7); and forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); count 8). It was alleged as to counts 1, 2, 6 and 7 that defendant personally used a car as a deadly weapon in the commission of the offenses. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) (Count 5 was dismissed for insufficient evidence at the preliminary hearing.) At the close of the prosecution’s case, defendant stipulated to his 2017 conviction for a violation of Penal Code section 273.5 where A.H. was the victim. Defendant did not present any witnesses in his defense. The jury found defendant guilty on all counts except attempted murder and found true the special allegations. The court sentenced defendant to 14 years four months in prison, calculated as follows: an eight-year upper term on count 1 (kidnapping), the base term; a consecutive 20-month term on count 2 (injury to girlfriend with prior conviction), one-third the midterm plus four months for the deadly weapon enhancement; a consecutive 16-month term on each of counts 3 and 4 (child abuse), one-third the midterm; and a consecutive two-year term on count 8 (rape), one-third the midterm. The court imposed and stayed sentence on counts 6 and 9 pursuant to Penal Code section
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654. The court imposed a 10-year protective order and awarded defendant 1,076 days of presentence custody credits. Defendant timely appealed. DISCUSSION 1. Prosecutorial Misconduct Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument by improperly vouching for the credibility of the victim by arguing that law enforcement and the district attorney’s office “failed” her when she previously reported domestic abuse in 2017. Defendant says because no evidence was put on about the handling and investigation of the prior incidents, the jury was left to believe the prosecutor had some insight or private knowledge about what had occurred that resulted in the system purportedly failing A.H. Defendant says the prosecutor’s vouching was particularly prejudicial because the prosecutor exhorted the jury to find defendant guilty and not allow the system to fail A.H. again. It is undisputed defendant did not object to the statements he now contends constitute improper vouching. Defendant has therefore forfeited the contention on appeal. “It is well settled that making a timely and specific objection at trial, and requesting the jury be admonished . . . , is a necessary prerequisite to preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for appeal.” (People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1328; accord, People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 205 (Huggins).) In any event, no improper vouching occurred. Improper vouching by a prosecutor about the strength of the prosecution’s case generally “ ‘ “involves an attempt to bolster a witness by reference to facts outside the record.” ’ ” (Huggins, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 206.) Misconduct during argument is judged by
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considering the argument as a whole and in light of the entire evidentiary record. (People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 47.) Here, defense counsel, during his argument, said A.H. had lied or at least changed her story about the 2018 rapes and also suggested she likely embellished how many times defendant hit her in the face given the lack of significant injuries to her face. During rebuttal, the prosecutor responded to this argument by conceding that A.H. had not been entirely truthful with law enforcement because when she had previously reported abuse in 2017, the system failed her. The prosecutor then argued reasonable inferences from the record that could account for A.H. changing her story or being less than truthful on different occasions. This was permissible argument based directly on A.H.’s testimony in which she admitted she had not always been forthcoming with law enforcement about defendant’s conduct and had in fact lied about certain aspects of the 2018 rapes because she feared the authorities would take away her children for continuing to spend time with defendant despite his prior acts of abuse. As Huggins aptly states, it is not misconduct “to ask the jury to believe the prosecution’s version of events as drawn from the evidence. Closing argument in a criminal trial is nothing more than a request, albeit usually lengthy and presented in narrative form, to believe each party’s interpretation, proved or logically inferred from the evidence, of the events that led to the trial.” (Huggins, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 207.) That is what the prosecutor did here. Defendant also contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s argument. Defendant’s burden to establish ineffective assistance on direct appeal is
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significant. Defendant must demonstrate “both that trial counsel failed to act in a manner to be expected of reasonably competent attorneys acting as diligent advocates, and that it is reasonably probable a more favorable determination would have resulted in the absence of counsel’s failings.” (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 623, citing Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687–696.) Moreover, counsel’s failure to object rarely constitutes ineffective assistance. (Huggins, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 206.) And, where, as here, the record on appeal does not show why counsel failed to object “ ‘unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation, the claim must be rejected on appeal.’ ” (Ibid.) Defendant cannot establish either element of an ineffective assistance claim for the simple reason that, as we explained ante, there was no improper vouching that warranted an objection. Any objection would have been overruled. 2. Senate Bill 567 Senate Bill 567 went into effect on January 1, 2022, while this appeal was pending. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) The legislation made significant changes to the law under which defendant was sentenced. Under former Penal Code section 1170, the trial court had the discretion to consider relevant aggravating and mitigating factors and to choose whether to impose an upper, middle or lower term sentence. The trial court here exercised its discretion to impose an eight-year upper term sentence on the kidnapping count (count 1), explaining its reasoning on the record in accordance with the law as it existed at that time.
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Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(2), as amended by Senate Bill 567, now provides that the trial court must impose the presumptive middle term of a sentencing triad unless “there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” There is one exception. Section 1170, subdivision (b)(3) provides that “[n]otwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), the court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.” As the People concede, the changes effected by Senate Bill 567 apply retroactively to defendant’s case as they are ameliorative in nature and therefore apply to all nonfinal appeals. (See, e.g., People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 323 [discussing rule of In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740].) Defendant argues the upper term sentence imposed on count 1 under the former version of Penal Code section 1170 is not valid. The People contend that defendant has not suffered prejudice as any error in imposing the upper term sentence is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Several appellate courts have concluded that harmless error analysis is appropriate in the context of Senate Bill 567 error. (See, e.g., People v. Flores (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 495, review den. Jun. 15, 2022, S274232; People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 459, review den. July 20, 2022, S274856 (Lopez); People v. Dunn (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 394, review granted Oct. 12, 2022, S275655.)
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We agree. “ ‘ “Failure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury, like failure to submit an element [of the crime] to the jury, is not structural error.” [Citation.] Such an error does not require reversal if the reviewing court determines it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, applying the test set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.’ ” (Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 465, review den., quoting People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 52–53.) However, there is disagreement about what exactly a reviewing court must find in order to conclude such error was harmless. Lopez appears to set the highest bar, holding that in order to conclude the trial court’s reliance on aggravating factors not found true by a jury or admitted by the defendant was not prejudicial, a reviewing court must “conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true beyond a reasonable doubt every factor on which the court relied, because the amended statute requires that every factor on which a court intends to rely in imposing an upper term, with the exception of factors related to a defendant’s prior conviction(s), have been admitted by the defendant or proven to a jury.” (Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at pp. 465–466, review den.) We need not resolve which formulation is the better reasoned. We conclude the record is clear that under any formulation, including Lopez, the error was harmless. At the sentencing hearing, the court commented on the trial evidence after hearing argument from counsel. The court said it found the case to be a difficult one and that it was miraculous A.H. did not sustain greater injuries. The court referred to some of the more egregious aspects of the April 2019 assault and noted that “the factors in aggravation are
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overwhelming.” The court largely focused on A.H. being a particularly vulnerable victim who was “tiny” compared to defendant and in a “desperate” situation–a cycle of violence that often resulted in her being assaulted in front of her young children. The court also cited defendant’s previous assaults on A.H. and that defendant was on probation at the time the current charges took place. The court allowed defendant to make some remarks and then imposed sentence. The court deemed the kidnapping count (count 1) to be the base term and imposed the upper term of eight years based on the fact that A.H. was a particularly vulnerable victim. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(3).) Earlier in the hearing, the court identified several other aggravating factors, including that the crime involved great violence, the defendant used a weapon during the commission of the crime, and defendant was on probation when the crime was committed. (Rule 4.421(a)(1), (2) & (b)(4).) The evidence was overwhelming and uncontradicted that defendant was significantly larger than A.H., who by all accounts was diminutive, and that defendant committed the violent assault on A.H.—an assault the violence of which was captured on video from multiple angles, and which occurred almost entirely in front of A.H.’s minor children. The defense case was focused mainly on arguing that defendant’s actions showed rash, impulsive and out-of-control behavior and no premeditation or intent to kill A.H. The jury acquitted defendant of attempted murder, but otherwise convicted him on all charges. We conclude from this record that it is beyond question the jury would have found beyond a reasonable doubt that A.H. was a particularly vulnerable victim and that the assault involved great
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violence. As for the use of a car as a deadly weapon, the jury found true that special allegation. And defendant stipulated to his prior 2017 conviction. Defendant was in fact on probation at the time of the assault, and therefore the jury would have found that fact was true beyond a reasonable doubt if it had been presented to them. Accordingly, any error was harmless. DISPOSITION The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
GRIMES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
HARUTUNIAN, J.
Judge of the San Diego Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the defendant's convictions and sentence, holding that the prosecutor did not commit misconduct and that any sentencing error under Senate Bill 567 was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Issues
Did the prosecutor commit misconduct by improperly vouching for the victim's credibility during closing argument?
Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's closing argument?
Was the trial court's imposition of an upper term sentence under Senate Bill 567 prejudicial error?
Disposition. affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“It is well settled that making a timely and specific objection at trial, and requesting the jury be admonished . . . , is a necessary prerequisite to preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for appeal.”
“We conclude the record is clear that under any formulation, including Lopez, the error was harmless.”