California Court of Appeal Nov 30, 2022 No. E077324Unpublished
Filed 11/30/22 P. v. Laguna CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E077324
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF1803494)
ARTHUR DANIEL LAGUNA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Matthew C. Perantoni,
Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Ellen M. Matsumoto, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Alan
L. Amann, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Arthur Daniel Laguna appeals from a conviction for
murder under Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a). On appeal, defendant contends
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that (1) the trial court erred in instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 361; and (2) the
unpaid portion of defendant’s booking fee must be vacated under Government Code
heartily agree that in light of the hostile reception this instruction has received of late
from legal logicians and semanticists [citations], it will always be unwise of a trial court
to include it among its general instructions without prior inquiry of the parties concerning
it. In fact, today it should not even be requested by either side unless there is some
specific and significant defense omission that the prosecution wishes to stress or the
defense wishes to mitigate. In the typical case it will add nothing of substance to the
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store of knowledge possessed by a juror of average intelligence. Furthermore, if its terms
are adhered to, as presumably they will be, its message will be essentially irrelevant in
the absence of some designated glaring hiatus in the defendant’s testimony. In such an
instance, of course, this lacuna will presumably be the subject of debate and emphasis
during the parties’ arguments to the jury, with or without the neutral guidelines contained
in this recently disfavored instruction.” (Id. at pp. 1119-1120.)
However, the erroneous use of CALJIC No. 2.62, the predecessor instruction, was
often found to be harmless. (See People v. Lamer (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1472.)
The instruction did not direct the jury to draw an adverse inference; it expressly applied
only if the jury found a failure to explain or deny evidence. It further cautioned that
failure to explain or deny did not create a presumption of guilt or otherwise relieve the
prosecution of its burden. (Ibid.)
In this case, we need not determine whether the trial court erroneously instructed
the jury with CALCRIM No. 361 because, even if the trial court erred in giving the
instruction, any alleged error was harmless. Courts have uniformly applied the harmless
error standard adopted in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, when reviewing the
erroneous use of CALJIC No. 2.62, the predecessor instruction to CALCRIM No. 361.
(People v. Roehler (1985) 167 Cal.App.3rd 353, 393.) In applying that standard, we must
determine whether it is reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to
defendant had the error not occurred. (Watson, at p. 836.) We disagree with defendant’s
contention that we must apply the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard under
People v. Chapman (1967) 386 U.S. 18. The error, if any, did not violate defendant’s
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federal due process rights. (See People v. Grandberry, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at pp. 610-
611 [rejecting argument that CALCRIM 361 violated federal due process right to a fair
trial]; People v. Rodriguez (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1066-1067 [rejecting claim that
CALCRIM No. 361 violated defendant’s due process rights].)1 Nonetheless, even if we
applied the standard under Chapman, we find that any error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
In this case, there was no dispute that defendant shot the victim to death. The
evidence clearly showed that defendant aggressively tailed the victim then confronted the
victim. Defendant then proceeded to shoot the victim, who was unarmed and sitting in
his car, multiple times. Even defendant admitted this. Nonetheless, defendant attempted
to argue that he was justified in killing the victim because he was afraid of the victim.
During his testimony, defendant agreed “that the sum total of times [he] saw [the victim]
in, approximately, three to four years was once on Brown Street and a couple of times on
Hunter Street.” Moreover, during this time, the victim never threatened defendant.
However, defendant was afraid of the victim because he “would mad-dog” defendant.
When asked what “mad-dog” meant, defendant stated that the victim “would look at me
as if I was a rival gang member. That is what I felt. [¶] . . . [¶] [The victim] wouldn’t
take his eyes off me until I looked away. He was just—I seen he was trying to be
intimidating to me.” Then defendant again admitted that he “saw [the victim] a total of
three times in three to four years, and he quote ‘mad-dogged [him]’ ” Defendant
1 Defendant has failed to address the harmless error analysis under Watson in either his opening or reply briefs.
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confirmed that the victim never directly threatened defendant but he was afraid because
of the victim’s reputation.
Moreover, there is no evidence in the record that the victim did anything to engage
defendant on the evening of the murder. In fact, defendant testified that the victim
essentially ignored defendant that night. Defendant, after seeing the victim, was free to
leave. However, defendant did not want to leave because he wanted to go try the food at
the new market. Instead of leaving the store after seeing the victim, whom defendant
stated he feared, defendant decided to engage with the victim. It was defendant who first
saw the victim, who wanted to talk to the victim, who proceeded to engage with the
victim, who left—then went back to the parking lot after retrieving his gun to find the
victim, and then got out of the car and shot the victim. The victim did nothing to make
defendant fear for his life on the night of the murder. There was no evidence that
supported defendant’s contention that he feared the victim on the evening of the murder.
In addition to the testimonies at trial, defendant’s conduct that led up to the murder
was captured on video. The jury evaluated the video in addition to the testimonies and
other evidence presented at trial.
Based on the above, we find that any error in instructing the jury with CALCRIM
No. 361 was harmless under any standard of review. The instruction simply permitted an
adverse inference if the jury found the necessary prerequisite of a failure to explain or
deny. The jury disbelieved defendant, not because of the perhaps erroneous inclusion of
a facially inapplicable instruction, but because his testimony was inherently not worthy of
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belief. Here, there is no doubt that defendant did not fear for his life on the night he
killed the victim.
B. GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION 6111
At sentencing, the trial court imposed a booking fee of $514.58 under Government
Code section 29550. Defendant argues and the People concede that the fee must be
vacated.
In 2020, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 1869 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.)
(AB 1869) to “eliminate the range of administrative fees that agencies and courts are
authorized to impose to fund elements of the criminal legal system.” (Stats. 2020, ch.
920, § 2.) Relevant here, AB 1869 added Government Code section 6111. Both
provisions became effective on July 1, 2021. (Pen. Code, § 1465.9, subd. (b); Gov. Code,
§ 6111, subd. (b).)
Government Code section 6111 now provides that criminal justice administration
fees imposed pursuant to Government Code section 29550 are “unenforceable and
uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those costs shall be vacated.”
(Gov. Code, § 6111, subd. (a).)
The plain language of the newly enacted statute dictates that any remaining unpaid
balance of the criminal justice administration fee is now unenforceable and uncollectible
and the portion of the judgment imposing such costs must be vacated. (Gov. Code,
§ 6111, subd. (a); People v. Pacheco (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 207, 214-215; People v.
Greeley (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 609, 626; People v. Lopez-Vinck (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th
945, 952-954; cf. People v. Clark (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 248, 259] [any balance on the
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defendant’s account “for probation supervision fees—that is, any amounts imposed but
not paid—is ‘unenforceable and uncollectible’ ” and must be vacated].)
Therefore, we agree with both defendant and the People that the $514.58 booking
fee awarded under Government Code section 29550 be vacated.
DISPOSITION
The portion of the $514.58 booking fee imposed by the trial court pursuant to
Government Code section 29550 that remains unpaid as of July 1, 2021, is vacated. In all
other respects, the judgment is affirmed. The clerk of the court is directed to modify the
abstract of judgment to reflect the modification and to forward a certified copy of the
amended abstract to the appropriate authorities. (People v. Quinonez (2020) 46
Cal.App.5th 457, 467.)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER Acting P. J.
We concur:
CODRINGTON J.
FIELDS J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that any error in instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 361 was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, and ordered the vacation of the defendant's unpaid criminal justice administration fee pursuant to Government Code section 6111.
Issues
Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 361.
Whether the unpaid portion of the defendant's booking fee must be vacated under Government Code section 6111.
Disposition. Affirmed as modified.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We find that any error in instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 361 was harmless under any standard of review.”
“Government Code section 6111 now provides that criminal justice administration fees imposed pursuant to Government Code section 29550 are “unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those costs shall be vacated.””