California Court of Appeal Jun 20, 2013 No. D061800Unpublished
Filed 6/20/13 In re A.L. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re A.L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D061800 THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. JCM222463)
v.
A.L.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Laura H.
Parsky and Richard R. Monroy, Judges, and Peter Fagan, Temporary Judge.* Affirmed.
Laurel M. Nelson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
* Pursuant to article VI, section 21 of the California Constitution.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, James D. Dutton and Donald W.
Ostertag, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A.L. appeals from the juvenile court's order declaring him a ward of the court after
sustaining an amended petition alleging he violated Penal Code1 section 148, subdivision
(a)(1) (resisting, delaying or obstructing a peace officer; count 1) and section 594,
subdivision (a) (vandalism; count 2), and after making a true finding that A.L. committed
the vandalism for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street
Thus, when a peace officer employs reasonable force to make a lawful arrest, the
officer is acting in the performance of his or her duties; the arrestee is obliged not to
resist and has no right of self-defense against such force. (People v. Adams (2009) 176
Cal.App.4th 946, 952; In re Bacon (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 34, 52, disapproved on other
grounds as stated in In re Brown (1973) 9 Cal.3d 612, 623 [noting that "it is the duty of
every citizen to submit to lawful arrest"].)
However, a peace officer is not engaged in the performance of his or her duties if
an arrest is unlawful. An arrest is unlawful if the officer uses excessive force. (People v.
Delahoussaye (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1, 7; People v. Olguin (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39,
45.)
7
C. Analysis
Here, A.L.'s contention involves the second element of section 148, subdivision
(a)(1), to wit: the requirement that Officer Pfannenstiel was engaged in the performance
of his lawful duties. A.L. contends there is insufficient evidence to establish this element
because Officer Pfannenstiel used excessive and unreasonable force. We disagree.
We conclude ample evidence in the record supports the finding that when Officer
Pfannenstiel pushed A.L. to the ground, he used objectively reasonable force as the
officer was then facing "very difficult circumstances" as found by the juvenile court,
which included chasing known members of a criminal street gang late at night, while
concerned that one or more of those members could be armed, and doing so alone. The
record also shows that A.L. initially ran when Officer Pfannenstiel ordered him to stop
and that A.L. also refused to follow the officer's simple instruction that he get on the
ground after the two crossed paths.
Moreover, the record shows that after Officer Pfannenstiel pushed A.L. to the
ground, Officer Pfannenstiel ordered A.L. to roll over onto his stomach. Again, A.L.
refused the officer's simple instruction and instead tensed up and clenched his fists. At
that point, the record shows Officer Pfannenstiel understandably was concerned the
minor might strike him. In response, Officer Pfannenstiel punched A.L. once in the
stomach as a "distraction blow" in order to secure A.L.'s compliance, but A.L. continued
to refuse to comply with the officer's instructions. Nevertheless, Officer Pfannenstiel
then was able to roll A.L. over and handcuff him. Under the circumstances, we conclude
8
substantial evidence also supports the finding that Officer Pfannenstiel's single
"distraction blow" to A.L.'s stomach was reasonable and not excessive force. As such,
we reject A.L.'s contention that the true finding in count 1 for violation of section 148,
subdivision (a) was not supported by substantial evidence.
II
Motion to Suppress
A.L. next contends the juvenile court erred when it denied his motion to suppress
evidence pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 700.1 because the arresting
officer lacked an arrest warrant.2
A. Background
Bernal Lund was the assistant pastor at the Canyon Ridge Baptist Church (church)
located in Linda Vista. On or about January 6, 2012, while checking church property, he
discovered what turned out to be gang graffiti on a concrete storm drain on the property.
Lund reported the incident to San Diego police.
San Diego Police Officer Joel Hoolihan testified at the suppression hearing that he
responded to a vandalism call at the church. After taking pictures and making a report of
the vandalism, Officer Hoolihan contacted San Diego Police Detective William Miles
because in the past the church had worked with Detective Miles in other incidents of
vandalism on the property.
2 We reach the merits of this issue despite the fact A.L. did not raise this specific ground in his motion to suppress. (See People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 128- 131 [specific ground for suppressing evidence must be litigated in trial court].) 9
Detective Miles testified that he was assigned to the graffiti strike task force and
that he was responsible for all graffiti-related incidents in Linda Vista. He investigated
the incident at the church, including reviewing the photographs and Officer Hoolihan's
report, and was able to make out a "gang set and monikers" for those responsible.
Specifically, Detective Miles determined the gang responsible was the "Linda Vista 13
Tiny Locos." Under the "gang set," Detective Miles identified two monikers, "Alex Boy"
and "Conejo1," followed by the letters "C.K." Based on his training and experience,
Detective Miles opined that "C.K." meant "Crip Killer."
Detective Miles testified he spoke to other gang experts in the police department
familiar with the Linda Vista area, conducted computer searches of these monikers in a
database and identified A.L. as the name associated with the "Alex Boy" moniker.
Detective Miles along with other San Diego police officers then went to A.L.'s residence.
A.L. was not present, but Detective Miles spoke to A.L.'s mother and younger sister.
A.L.'s younger sister confirmed that A.L. went by the moniker "Alex Boy."
A.L.'s mother subsequently contacted Detective Miles and he, along with another
officer, met A.L. and A.L.'s mother and father at a street corner near the family residence.
Detective Miles determined A.L. smelled of alcohol, but A.L. denied he had been
drinking. Because A.L. was uncooperative and because they were located on a street
corner, Detective Miles placed A.L. under arrest for the vandalism to the church.
The juvenile court, after hearing testimony and argument from counsel, denied the
motion to suppress, ruling as follows:
10
"Based on the evidence adduced during this hearing and having considered the
papers of both parties, the court finds that there was probable cause to arrest the minor.
[¶] The court is considering the totality of the circumstances and looking at it from the
point of view of a reasonable officer using ordinary care and prudence and finds that such
an officer would entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a crime had been
committed, specifically, that the vandalism had been committed, and the defendant or the
minor was the one who had done that.
"Based on the information he had from his database and the field interview of the
minor, who admitted to being Alex Boy, which was the graffiti which was on the church
property, the sister's comment that the minor had written down that moniker, 'Alex Boy,'
the detective's training and experience in working on graffiti and gang cases and
interviewing . . . people involved in graffiti and gang activity, and also this conservation
with [another gang expert], who also gave his opinions about the meaning of the graffiti
and connecting Alex Boy to Linda Vista 13. [¶] Based on all of those factors, the court
finds there was probable cause. Therefore, the motion is denied."
B. Governing Law and Analysis
"The standard of review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is well
established and is equally applicable to juvenile court proceedings. '"On appeal from the
denial of a suppression motion, the court reviews the evidence in a light favorable to the
trial court's ruling. [Citation.] We must uphold those express or implied findings of fact
by the trial court that are supported by substantial evidence and independently determine
11
whether the facts support the court's legal conclusions." [Citation.]'" (In re Lennies H.
(2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1236.)
As relevant here, under section 836, subdivision (a), a police officer may arrest a
person without a warrant when "(2) [t]he person arrested has committed a felony,
although not in the officer's presence" or "(3) [t]he officer has probable cause to believe
that the person to be arrested has committed a felony, whether or not a felony, in fact, has
been committed." Probable cause to arrest "is measured by an objective standard based
on the information known to the arresting officer, rather than a subjective standard that
would take into account the arresting officer's actual motivations and beliefs. . . ."
(Gillan v. City of San Marino (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1045.)
Here, A.L. wisely does not argue that Detective Miles lacked probable cause to
believe that A.L. was responsible (at least in part) for the vandalism on the church
property, inasmuch as the record contains ample evidence to support that finding.
Instead, A.L. contends his conduct in vandalizing that property was not a felony because
under section 594, subdivision (b)(1), vandalism that causes $400 or more in damage is
chargeable as a felony. According to A.L., because the assistant pastor of the church
testified at the suppression hearing that the church spent $150 to paint over the graffiti,
A.L's conduct could only have been charged as a misdemeanor. We reject this
contention.
First, that the church spent $150 after the fact to repair the vandalism is not
relevant to the issue of whether an arresting officer like Detective Miles had reasonable
12
cause at the time of arrest to arrest A.L. for the vandalism. (See Gillan v. City of San
Marino, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 1045.)
Second, under section 594.3, subdivision (a), it is a felony to vandalize a "church,
synagogue, temple, building owned and occupied by a religious educational institution, or
other place primarily used as a place of worship where religious services are regularly
conducted . . . ." For this separate reason, we find A.L.'s contention unavailing.
Finally, under section 186.22, subdivision (d), any misdemeanor offense may be
charged as a felony when, as here, it is committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or
in association with, any criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further
or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members. The record shows A.L. was properly
charged for, and ultimately the juvenile court made a true finding of, felony vandalism
under this statute. We thus independently conclude the record supports the finding of the
trial court that Detective Miles had probable cause to arrest A.L. without first obtaining a
warrant. (See In re Lennies H., supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1236.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's order declaring A.L. a ward of the court is affirmed.
BENKE, J. WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
HALLER, J.
13
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the juvenile wardship order, holding that the arresting officer used objectively reasonable force during the arrest and that the officer had probable cause to arrest the minor for felony vandalism without a warrant.
Issues
Whether there was sufficient evidence that the officer was engaged in lawful duties to support a conviction for resisting arrest under Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a)(1).
Whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress evidence based on the lack of an arrest warrant for a suspected misdemeanor.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We conclude ample evidence in the record supports the finding that when Officer Pfannenstiel pushed A.L. to the ground, he used objectively reasonable force”
“We thus independently conclude the record supports the finding of the trial court that Detective Miles had probable cause to arrest A.L. without first obtaining a warrant.”