P. v. Redding CA2/6

Filed 6/20/13 P. v. Redding CA2/6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B237901 (Super. Ct. No. PS027014) Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)

v.

BILLY RAY REDDING,

Defendant and Appellant.

Billy Ray Redding appeals from the judgment and order committing him as a sexually violent predator (SVP) within the meaning of the Sexually Violent Predators Act. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq., Act or SVP Act.) He contends the SVP Act violates his right to equal protection under both the state and federal constitutions because it treats SVPs differently from those involuntarily committed for treatment as mentally disordered offenders (MDOs) and those found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGIs). He further contends the Act violates his right to due process, double jeopardy protections and the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws. We have considered these arguments in light of our Supreme Court's recent opinion in People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172 (McKee I), the Court of Appeals' now final opinion on remand in the same case, People v. McKee (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1325 (McKee II), and the parties' supplemental letter briefs addressing that opinion. We concur with the holding in McKee II. In doing so, we join the Courts of

1

Appeal in People v. McDonald (March 28, 2013, G044963) ___ Cal.App.4th ___ [2013 WL 1246831], People v. Landau (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1, People v. McCloud (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1076, and People v. McKnight (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 860, in holding that the SVP Act's provisions concerning the indeterminate commitment of SVPs and the allocation of the burden of proof do not violate the equal protection rights of the person named in the SVP petition. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court committing appellant to the custody of the Department of Mental Health (DMH) as an SVP. Facts Appellant does not contest the trial court's finding that he meets the statutory definition of an SVP. Rather, he contends the SVP Act violates his federal and state constitutional rights to equal protection because it treats SVPs differently from mentally disordered offenders (MDOs) and persons found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGIs). Consequently, we provide only a very brief summary of the facts. The parties stipulated at appellant's nonjury SVP recertification trial that appellant meets the first statutory criteria for an SVP commitment because he has been convicted of more than one qualifying sex crime. Two clinical psychologists, Jeremy Coles, Ph. D. and Dr. Robert Owen, Ph. D., evaluated appellant and diagnosed him with two mental disorders: paraphilia not otherwise specified (sex with nonconsenting partners) and a personality disorder with anti-social and narcissistic traits.1 Both also concluded that appellant posed a high risk of sexually reoffending. Seven hospital staff members testified on behalf of appellant. None of the witnesses opined that he was ready for release, but they described his positive behavior in the hospital and his participation in treatment. The defense witnesses assessed appellant's risk of reoffending to be lower than the evaluators had.