Freden v. Ozel Fine Jewelry CA4/2 (2013) · DecisionDepot
Freden v. Ozel Fine Jewelry CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Jun 7, 2013 No. E054136Unpublished
Filed 6/7/13 Freden v. Ozel Fine Jewelry CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
TANYA FREDEN,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E054136
v. (Super.Ct.No. CIVSS805579)
OZEL FINE JEWELRY, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Donna G. Garza,
Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
Gutierrez, Preciado & House and Calvin R. House for Defendant and Appellant.
Law Offices of Timothy B. McCaffrey, Jr., Timothy B. McCaffrey, Jr., and
Natasha R. Chesler for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Tanya Freden (Freden) sued her former employer, Ozel Fine Jewelry (Ozel). A
jury found Ozel failed to pay Freden (1) overtime wages (Labor Code, § 510),1 and
(2) all the wages due to her when her employment was terminated. (§ 201.) For the
failure to pay overtime wages, the jury awarded Freden $21,000. The trial court entered
judgment in favor of Freden in the amount of $51,353.84, which was comprised of the
$21,000 for the overtime award and $30,353.84 for wait time penalties (§ 203).
compensation,” which included Freden’s economic damages for being unemployed “for
roughly six to seven months.” The jury awarded Freden $21,000 for Ozel’s failure to
pay her overtime wages.
The jury’s damages verdict is improper, because the jury should have only
awarded Freden the overtime wages due to her. The jury did not have the authority to
award Freden money for the months she was unemployed. (§ 1194, subd. (a).) Thus,
the damages award is erroneous and must be reversed.
The trial court, prior to rejecting Ozel’s motion for a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, explained why it believed the $21,000 award was proper. The trial court
stated that the overtime issue was “so intertwined” with the sexual harassment issue that
the two “blended tremendously.” The trial court conceded Freden’s sexual harassment
claim was not viable, but still concluded the overtime claim “intermingled” with the
sexual harassment and wrongful termination allegations. Thus, the trial court reasoned
there was a rational basis for the jury arriving at the $21,000 award for the overtime
cause of action. The trial court also denied Ozel’s motion for a new trial, because “there
was some rational basis for what [the jury] decided based on the evidence.”
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“‘A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be granted only if it
appears from the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the party securing the
verdict, that there is no substantial evidence in support. [Citation.] [¶] . . . As in the
trial court, the standard of review [on appeal] is whether any substantial evidence—
contradicted or uncontradicted—supports the jury’s conclusion.’ [Citation.]” (Cabral
v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 770.) There is nothing in the record
supporting overtime wages in the amount of $21,000. The trial court’s conclusion that
the evidence supported the $21,000 award is flawed because it relies on conflating
sexual harassment and wrongful termination damages with overtime wages. It appears
the trial court deduced how the jury might have combined causes of action to arrive at
the $21,000 award, but that does not mean the award is correct in light of the overtime
law. (§ 1194, subd. (a).)
In an overtime cause of action only the wages, interest, fees, and costs may be
awarded. Therefore, the trial court needed to look at the evidence to determine whether
it supported a finding of $21,000 being due for overtime compensation. Instead, the
trial court determined that the $21,000 award could be cobbled together from combining
the successful overtime cause of action with the unsuccessful sexual harassment and
wrongful termination causes of action. When determining whether substantial evidence
supports a damages award, a trial court should not combine elements from different
causes of action, i.e. lost earnings from sexual harassment and wrongful termination
with overtime wages, to justify the jury’s award. Rather, the court should look at the
evidence to determine whether it supports the finding on the element at issue. In this
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case, there was not evidence of $21,000 in overtime damages. Accordingly, Ozel’s
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been granted.
A motion for new trial may be granted when excessive damages are awarded.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 657.) “[An] appellate court ordinarily defers to the trial court’s
denial of a motion for new trial based on excessive damages, because of the trial judge’s
greater familiarity with the case. [Citations.]” (Rufo v. Simpson (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th
573, 614.) As explained ante, excessive damages were awarded in this case because the
Labor Code only authorizes a plaintiff to collect (1) the wages due, (2) interest due on
the wages, (3) attorney’s fees, and (4) costs. The $21,000 finding by the jury was far in
excess of the $291 in damages associated with the overtime claim. Accordingly, the
new trial motion should have been granted.
Freden argues, “[S]ubstantial evidence supports the logical inference that but for
the issue concerning overtime wages, Ozel would not have fired Ms. Freden, and she
would have remained employed there. Thus, her economic damages were caused by the
failure to pay overtime.” Freden’s argument is not persuasive because the Labor Code
does not permit a plaintiff to collect all damages that might flow from a failure to pay
overtime compensation. Rather, a plaintiff is entitled only to wages, interest, costs, and
fees. Thus, Freden’s argument that the overtime issue led to a wrongful termination,
does not persuade us that she is entitled to lost earnings for a wrongful termination.
Next, Freden asserts the $21,000 award is proper for the failure to pay overtime
wages because economic damages can be awarded for contractual causes of action.
Freden again argues that she was fired because Ozel did not want to pay her overtime
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wages, and therefore, her lost earnings are consequential damages related to being fired
for the overtime issue. Whether framed as a tort or a contract cause of action the Labor
Code remains the same. A plaintiff suing for failure to pay overtime wages may only
collect (1) the wages due, (2) interest due on the wages, (3) attorney’s fees, and (4)
costs. Presenting the excess damages as “consequential” contract damages does not
change the analysis that the statute does not authorize such damages for an overtime
compensation cause of action.
5. NEW TRIAL
During the trial it was unclear exactly how much money Freden was owed for
overtime wages. For example, Abraham Tekin, the owner of Ozel, testified that he did
not pay Freden for her overtime wages, but also stated he did compensate for her
overtime work with a pendant. Tekin’s son, who worked as an Ozel employee, testified
that he gave Freden a check in the amount of $1,600 for her overtime wages. The check
was written in different color inks and had White Out on it. Freden testified she had
been given the $1,600 check, but was asked to cash it for Tekin’s son, so she cashed the
check but gave the money to Tekin’s son. Freden explained she sometimes cashed
checks for Tekin’s son when they were the only two people working in the jewelry
store.
Given the foregoing evidence, it is unclear exactly how much money Freden is
owed for her overtime wages, because there was not an easily calculable amount that
was discussed at the trial court. Accordingly, this court cannot reduce the damage
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award because it is unclear what amount of money is due to Freden. Thus, a new trial
must be had on the issue.
We now examine the scope of the new trial. “It is well settled that ‘[t]here is no
constitutional impediment to a retrial of a limited issue, so long as that issue is
sufficiently distinct and severable from the others that a limited retrial would not result
in an injustice.’ [Citations.]” (Barmas, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th
372, 375.) It appears the damage issue is severable from the other issues at trial. While
the trial court found it to be intertwined with other causes of action, we disagree with
the trial court’s assessment. The overtime wage issue requires evidence of the hours
Freden worked and the amount of money she was paid—it is not a matter that is
intertwined with other causes of actions. Thus, we will order that a new trial be
conducted on the issue of damages alone, unless prior to the trial Freden agrees to a
reduction in the damage award that the trial court determines to be fair and reasonable.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 662.5, subd. (a)(2).)
B. WAIT TIME PENALTY
Ozel contends the trial court erred by miscalculating the wait time penalty. Ozel
asserts the wait time penalty should have been $6,916.80—not $30,353.84. Freden
concedes the trial court miscalculated the wait time penalty and agrees to reducing the
amount to $6,916.80. Although the parties agree to a particular sum, we will reverse the
damages award in its entirety. We do not rely on the parties’ calculation in this matter
because it is unclear from the record exactly how much money is due to Freden.
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Section 203, subdivision (a), provides that if an employer fails to pay an
employee’s wages then the “the wages of the employee shall continue as a penalty from
the due date thereof at the same rate until paid or until an action therefor is commenced;
but the wages shall not continue for more than 30 days.”
Ozel terminated Freden’s employment on January 24, 2008. Freden filed her
original complaint on April 25, 2008. Thus, the 30-day limit would apply to the wait
time penalty. Freden earned $10 per hour plus commissions. The parties agree
Freden’s longest shifts lasted 11 hours and use the 11 hour shifts as a basis for arriving
at the sum of $6,916.80, e.g., $20.96 (highest rate of pay) x 11 hours (longest shift) x 30
days. We find this problematic because one of Freden’s time cards reflects she worked
for 11.5 hours on two occasions. Tekin did not document Freden’s lunch breaks, so it is
unclear if a lunch break took place during the 11.5 hour shifts.
One of the 11.5 hour shifts allegedly occurred on Christmas Eve. Tekin testified
that Freden could not have worked for 11.5 hours on Christmas Eve, as she claimed on
her timecard, because she claimed to have worked until 10:00 p.m., but the store closed
at 6:00 p.m. Thus, it is unclear from the record exactly how many hours comprised
Freden’s longest shift. It is possible 11.5 hours was her longest shift, but it is also
possible the parties correctly agreed on 11 hours. Since we cannot be certain of how
many hours to use when calculating the wait time penalty, we will reverse this portion
of the award as well.
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DISPOSITION2
The damages portion of the judgment is reversed. The trial court is directed to
hold a new trial on the issue of damages, unless prior to trial Freden consents to a
reduction of damages that the trial court determines to be fair and reasonable. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 662.5, subd. (a)(2).) In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
Appellant is awarded its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER J.
We concur:
HOLLENHORST Acting P. J.
CODRINGTON J.
2 Abraham Tekin, also a defendant in the underlying case, did not file a brief at this court; and as he was not aggrieved by the judgment this appeal is final as to him as well.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that Labor Code section 1194 provides an exclusive remedy for unpaid overtime, limiting recovery to unpaid wages, interest, attorney's fees, and costs, and thus reversed the damages award because it improperly included economic damages for unemployment.
Issues
Whether the new right-exclusive remedy doctrine limits damages for unpaid overtime to those specified in Labor Code section 1194.
Whether the trial court erred in denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict when the jury's damages award was not supported by evidence of overtime wages.
Whether the trial court erred in its calculation of wait time penalties under Labor Code section 203.
Disposition. Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“the law reflects overtime compensation suits are subject to an exclusive remedy provision, which provides a plaintiff may collect: (1) the wages due, (2) interest due on the wages, (3) attorney’s fees, and (4) costs.”
“The jury’s damages verdict is improper, because the jury should have only awarded Freden the overtime wages due to her. The jury did not have the authority to award Freden money for the months she was unemployed.”