California Court of Appeal May 31, 2013 No. D059411Unpublished
Filed 5/31/13 Chau v. Chau CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
ROSEMARY CHAU, Individually and as D059411 Trustee, etc.,
Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. GIC875156)
v.
PAUL CHAU et al.,
Defendants and Appellants;
SYSTEMS CONSTRUCTION DESIGN & DEVELOPMENT LLC,
Defendant, Cross-complainant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Joan M.
Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Elliott Kanter, Elliott N. Kanter and Kourtney Bezanson for
Defendants, Cross-complainant and Appellants.
Bartlett & Lievers and Gregory Y. Lievers for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and
Respondent.
Paul Chau, Lana Lee, Systems Construction Design & Development LLC (Systems
Construction), and Systems Financial & Realty Development LLC (Systems Financial)
(together, defendants) appeal a judgment in favor of Paul's sister, Rosemary Chau.
Defendants appeal, contending (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the trial
court's finding that they committed fraud, (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the
review is not limited to appraising " 'isolated bits of evidence selected by the respondent.' "
(Id. at p. 873.) We are required to accept all evidence which supports the successful party,
disregard the contrary evidence, and draw all reasonable inferences to uphold the verdict.
(Minelian v. Manzella (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 457, 463.) Thus, it is not our role to
reweigh the evidence, redetermine the credibility of the witnesses, or resolve conflicts in
the testimony, and we will not disturb the judgment if there is evidence to support it.
(Reichardt v. Hoffman (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 754, 766.) Credibility is an issue of fact for
the finder of fact to resolve (Johnson v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. (1994) 28
Cal.App.4th 613, 622) and the testimony of a single witness, even that of a party, is
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sufficient to provide substantial evidence to support a finding of fact (In re Marriage of
Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 614).
B. Fraud
Defendants argue there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding
that they committed fraud. Specifically, they claim Rosemary's testimony that Hsu told
her he would work on the project demonstrates defendants did not intentionally
misrepresent Hsu's involvement to her. We reject defendants' contention.
In general, the elements of a fraud claim are "(1) a misrepresentation of a material
fact (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity;
(3) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting
damage. [Citation.]" (Collins v. eMachines, Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 249, 259.)
Here, defendants rely on Rosemary's testimony that Hsu told her he would work on
the project. They claim if Rosemary knew at any time that Hsu agreed to be involved in
the project, "her entire fraud claim fails because she would have known that [d]efendants
did not intentionally misrepresent to her that Mr. Hsu would work on her project." This
argument improperly focuses on Rosemary's knowledge rather than defendants' fraudulent
conduct and intentions. Specifically, the evidence demonstrated that defendants knew Hsu
was unwilling to work on the remodel yet prepared a contract for Rosemary to sign listing
Hsu as the project manager. According to Hsu, he informed defendants many times of his
unwillingness to be a part of the project, including before the home closed escrow in
October 2002. Despite Hsu's unequivocal rejections, Paul and Lee presented Rosemary
with the December Contract indicating Hsu was the project manager. This evidence shows
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defendants misrepresented Hsu's involvement and intended for Rosemary to rely on the
false representation. The issue is not whether there is other evidence in the record to
support a different finding, but whether there is some evidence that, if believed, would
support the findings of the trial court. (Rupf v. Yan (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 411, 429–430,
fn. 5.) We conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding of
fraud.
C. Controlling Contract
Defendants argue there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding
that the December Contract was the controlling contract between the parties. We disagree.
To support their argument, defendants claim Rosemary failed to dispute evidence
that her original signatures were on various documents that allegedly superseded the
December Contract, including the April 2003 contract with Systems Construction.
However, Rosemary did dispute this evidence by denying she signed the Systems
Construction contract and stating she only signed one contract. Rosemary's testimony was
sufficient to support the trial court's finding. (In re Marriage of Mix, supra, 14 Cal.3d at
p. 614 [testimony of a party is sufficient to provide substantial evidence to support a
finding of fact].)
Further, in determining which contract was the valid controlling contract, the trial
court concluded defendants' "testimony was not only disingenuous but simply implausible"
and disregarded it in its entirety. After reviewing the contracts, the trial court found it of
"grave concern" that Paul "managed to squeeze in new terms on the April 2003 contract
without the need to change the signature page." It is not our role to redetermine the
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credibility of the witnesses. (Reichardt v. Hoffman, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 766.)
Where, as here, the trial court's findings are supported by substantial evidence, we will not
disturb them on appeal.
II. Amended Complaint
A. Additional Background
Rosemary originally pursued her claims against defendants as the trustee of the
JRLR Trust. After defendants asserted a lack of standing defense, Rosemary requested to
amend her Fourth Amended Complaint (FAC) to add herself as an individual plaintiff.
The proposed amendment did not add any new causes of action or damages claims. The
trial court granted Rosemary's request to amend the FAC.
B. Analysis
Defendants argue the trial court erred in allowing Rosemary to amend her FAC
because the amendment was barred by the statute of limitations and did not relate back to
the original complaint. We reject defendants' contentions.
"The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow
a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any
party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other
respect . . . ." (Code Civ. Proc. § 473, subd. (a)(1).) "[C]ourts are bound to apply a policy
of great liberality in permitting amendments to the complaint at any stage of the
proceedings, up to and including trial [citations]," as long as there is no prejudice to the
adverse party. (Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 761.) We review the
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trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion. (Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1985)
39 Cal.3d 290, 296.)
Where the substantive causes of action have not changed, " '[n]o new facts are
alleged as a ground of recovery, [and] the only change [is] in the name of the plaintiff and
the capacity in which he sues,' " the court should permit the plaintiff to amend the
complaint. (Klopstock v. Superior Court (1941) 17 Cal.2d 13, 22.) "The power to permit
amendment is denied only if a change is made in the liability sought to be enforced against
the defendant. [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 20.) Further, "an amendment to substitute in the real
party in interest is entitled to relation-back effect." (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp.
(1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 1011.)
Here, Rosemary's amendment did not allege any new causes of action or make a
change in the liability sought to be enforced against defendants. Additionally, the
amendment was based on the same general set of facts as the FAC. Rosemary merely
requested to add herself individually as a plaintiff because defendants were challenging her
standing to bring claims as the trustee of the JRLR Trust. As the trial court noted, this
change "remedie[d] a technical defect in the pleadings to reflect the correct status of the
party entering into the contracts with [d]efendants" and was entitled to relation back effect.
Further, we are not convinced that defendants were prejudiced by the amendment.
Accordingly, the trial court acted well within its discretion in granting Rosemary's request
to amend the FAC.
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III. Proposed Statement of Decision
A. Additional Background
The trial court issued its tentative statement of decision on November 29, 2010
(Tentative Decision). Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1590, subdivision
(c)(4), the court stated the Tentative Decision would become the statement of decision
unless within 10 days a party specified controverted issues or made proposals not in the
decision. (All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.) On December
14, 2010, Defendants objected to the Tentative Decision detailing what they believed were
omissions and unsupported findings. Rosemary responded to the Tentative Decision with
a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law. A month later, the court issued its
statement of decision and judgment in this matter.
B. Analysis
Defendants argue the trial court abused its discretion by failing to issue a proposed
statement of decision following the Tentative Decision and not allowing the parties an
opportunity to object to a proposed statement of decision and judgment. We disagree.
After the court issues its tentative decision, "any party that appeared at trial may
request a statement of decision to address the principal controverted issues." (Rule
3.1590(d).) If a party makes that request, "the court must, within 30 days of announcement
or service of the tentative decision, prepare and serve a proposed statement of decision and
a proposed judgment on all parties that appeared at the trial, unless the court has ordered a
party to prepare the statement." (Rule 3.1590(f).) "Any party may, within 15 days after
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the proposed statement of decision and judgment have been served, serve and file
objections to the proposed statement of decision or judgment." (Rule 3.1590(g).)
Here, defendants objected to the trial court's Tentative Decision. Thereafter, the
trial court issued its final statement of decision and judgment. In its final statement of
decision, the court stated it considered defendants' objections and concluded "the Tentative
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. . . Decision did not omit the determination of any material, disputed issue except as
otherwise noted [t]herein." Even if the court was required to issue a proposed statement of
decision after defendants objected to its Tentative Decision, defendants have not shown
they were prejudiced by the error. (In re Marriage of Steiner & Hosseini (2004) 117
Cal.App.4th 519, 524 [" 'While a Rule of Court phrased in mandatory language is generally
. . . binding on the courts . . . departure from it is not reversible error unless prejudice is
shown.' "].) On this record, where the parties provided the court with detailed objections to
the Tentative Decision, the court considered those objections, and defendants failed to
show prejudice, we conclude any error was harmless.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to costs on appeal.
MCINTYRE, J.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, Acting P. J.
AARON, J.
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Holding. The court affirmed the judgment against defendants for fraud and money had and received, finding sufficient evidence supported the trial court's factual findings and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing a complaint amendment or in its handling of the statement of decision.
Issues
Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding of fraud.
Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that the December Contract was the controlling agreement.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the plaintiff to amend the complaint to add herself as an individual plaintiff.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to issue a proposed statement of decision and judgment.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding of fraud.”
“Where, as here, the trial court's findings are supported by substantial evidence, we will not disturb them on appeal.”
“Accordingly, the trial court acted well within its discretion in granting Rosemary's request to amend the FAC.”