Marriage of Bradley and Lind CA4/1 (2013) · DecisionDepot
Marriage of Bradley and Lind CA4/1
California Court of Appeal May 23, 2013 No. D059945Unpublished
Filed 5/23/13 Marriage of Bradley and Lind CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re the Marriage of WILLIAM ROBERT BRADLEY and BEATRIZ LAURENTINA LIND. D059945 WILLIAM ROBERT BRADLEY,
Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. DN131119)
v.
BEATRIZ LAURENTINA LIND,
Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Richard G.
Cline, Judge. Affirmed.
Kehr, Schiff & Crane and Joe Schiff for Appellant.
Trope & DeCarolis and Patrick DeCarolis, Jr., for Respondent.
This action involves the interpretation of language in paragraph 7.4.1 of a
premarital agreement between appellant Beatriz Laurentine Lind (Laura) and respondent
William Robert Bradley (Robert)1 that detailed the parties' rights regarding certain real
property owned by Robert.
The premarital agreement also provided that Laura would receive $3 million from
Robert shortly after the marriage. Approximately six months after the parties married it
was decided that a house would not be built on the property described in paragraph 7.4.1.
Robert filed an action for martial dissolution in December 2003.
"Under the parol evidence rule, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to contradict
express terms in a written contract or to explain what the agreement was." (Sunniland
Fruit, Inc. v. Verni (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 892, 898.) "The agreement is the writing
itself." (Ibid.) "Parol evidence cannot . . . be admitted to show intention independent of
an unambiguous written instrument." (Ibid.)
13
Laura contends that the court should have admitted her parol evidence for the
limited purpose of determining whether an ambiguity existed in the premarital agreement.
However, the court found that the premarital agreement was completely integrated,
unambiguous, and not reasonably susceptible to the interpretation proffered by Laura.
Thus, the court was not required to admit Laura's parol evidence.
By way of example, in Malstrom v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. (1986)
187 Cal.App.3d 299, the Court of Appeal held that when a contract was integrated and
provided that it superseded all prior agreements, evidence of an implied agreement which
contradicted the terms of the written agreement was not admissible, stating: "'[I]f the
court decides in light of this extrinsic evidence that the contract is not reasonably
susceptible to the offered interpretation, then the evidence is irrelevant and inadmissible
to interpret the contract.'" (Id. at p. 316.)
Laura also asserts that the court erred in giving a "precatory" meaning to the word
"intention," in paragraph 7.4.1 and should have looked at the entire clause of paragraph
7.4.1. However, the court did not just focus on the word "intention." Rather, in its
statement of decision the court stated: "Following are some, but not all of the factors
supporting the court's decision regarding interpretation of paragraph 7.4.1 of the
premarital agreement. The separate property of each of the parties is clearly described in
the agreement. This includes the Rancho Santa Fe property. Any claim of [Laura] to this
property necessarily involves a transmutation. The contract includes a complete
integration clause. The various obligations of the parties are clearly set forth in
mandatory language. The disputed language in paragraph 7.4.1 clearly is not mandatory
14
in nature. The word 'intention' by definition does not connote an 'obligation.' The
limitations on [Laura's] right to community property are clearly set out. Her right to a
community property interest in Via Del Mar, on the other hand, is clearly spelled out and
is limited. In several places the premarital agreement clearly specifies the limits upon
transmutation of separate property into community property; transmutation cannot occur
by acts [or] words alone; transmutation will occur only by a writing and only by the
construction of a residence on the Via Del Mar property. Use of the word 'intention' is
consistent with [the] remainder of the sentence and the paragraph: there is no obligation
to build on Via Del Mar and other property is being considered for a residence. The
paragraph contains an expression of current intention, not a future obligation." (Italics
added.)
Laura's reliance on Holmes v. Lerner (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 442 is also
unavailing. Holmes dealt with the enforceability of an oral agreement, specifically an
oral partnership agreement, not a fully integrated written agreement as we have in this
case. Further, Holmes did not address intent, but an actual verbal agreement. As the
Court of Appeal in Holmes stated: "Holmes was not seeking specific enforcement of a
single vague term of the agreement. She was frozen out of the business altogether, and
her agreement with Lerner was completely renounced. The agreement that was made and
the subsequent acts of the parties supply sufficient certainty to determine the existence of
a breach and a remedy." (Id. at p. 459, fn. omitted.)
Laura's reliance on Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th
793 also does not support her position. As Laura states in her opening brief, Weddington
15
merely stands for the proposition that an agreement is formed if the parties agreed on the
"same thing in the same sense." (Id. at p. 811.) In this case the premarital agreement
clearly states the parties' mutual intent.
The two other cases cited by Laura also do not support her position. Laura cites
Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 547 and Magpali v.
Farmers Group Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471 for the proposition that "statements of
intention to act . . . are in the nature of promises." However, in Yield, supra, 154
Cal.App.4th at page 575, the Court of Appeal stated that in order to prevail on a claim of
fraud, a party has to "introduce evidence sufficient to persuade the trial court that at the
time defendants entered into the asset transfer agreement, they lacked the intention to
perform their undertakings." (See 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law 10th ed. 2005) Torts,
§ 781, p. 1132 ["A declaration of intent, although in the nature of a promise, made in
good faith, without intention to deceive, and in the honest expectation that it will be
fulfilled, does not constitute fraud, even though it is not carried out.".) Magpali, supra,
48 Cal.App.4th at page 481 stands for the same proposition. However, in this case, the
court found that Laura failed to establish her claim of fraudulent misrepresentation.
Laura next asserts that paragraph 7.4.1 is reasonably susceptible to the meaning
she seeks to ascribe to it. In her opening brief, Laura recites all of the parol evidence she
sought to admit in support of her position. However, this evidence is not admissible if
the court has determined that the document at issue is fully integrated and not reasonably
susceptible to the meaning offered by Laura, which is what the court found in this case.
16
Laura contends that the court did not comply with applicable "procedural
mandates" in ruling on the motions in limine, which amounted to a "reconsideration" of
Robert's motion for summary adjudication. However, Robert and Laura both filed
motions in limine, placing the issue of admissibility of parol evidence before the court.
Moreover, as the California Supreme Court stated in Le Francois v. Goel (2005)
35 Cal.4th 1094, 1104-1105 (Goel), a restriction on a court's ability to sua sponte
reconsider its own rulings "would directly and materially impair and defeat the court's
most basic functions, exercising its discretion to rule upon controversies between the
parties and ensuring the orderly administration of justice. Courts are empowered to
decide controversies, a power derived from the state constitution. We are hard pressed to
conceive of a restriction that goes more directly to the heart of a court's constitutionally
mandated functions." Although the high court agreed there could be limits on a party's
ability to file repetitive motions, it did not limit a court's ability to reconsider a prior
ruling. (Id. at p. 1107.)
In Goel, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The court denied the
motion, finding that the plaintiffs had raised a triable issue of fact. Thereafter, the
defendants again moved for summary judgment on the same grounds. The motion was
originally scheduled to be heard by the judge who had heard the first motion, but
thereafter, was transferred to a second judge, who granted the motion. (Goel, supra, 35
Cal.4th at p. 1097.)
The plaintiffs appealed, asserting that the court's reconsideration of the motion for
summary judgment was improper. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the trial
17
court "had inherent power derived from the California Constitution to consider the
second motion." (Goel, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1096.) The California Supreme Court
affirmed the Court of Appeal's decision, holding that while a party may not make
renewed motions not based upon new facts or law, nothing "limit[s] a court's ability to
reconsider its previous interim orders on it own motion, as long as it gives the parties
notice that it may do so and a reasonable opportunity to litigate the question." (Id. at pp.
1096-1097.)
Laura's assertion that the trial court did not provide her with adequate notice and
an opportunity to be heard is also misplaced. Laura herself filed a motion in limine
putting the issue squarely before the court. In her motion in limine, Laura also asked that
the trial court "consider all opposition pleadings, declarations and exhibits and legal
authority filed by [Laura] in connection with the Motion for Summary Judgment as
further support of [the] Motion in Limine." In addition, Laura filed a response to Robert's
motion in limine on the same issue and addressed it in her reply memorandum of points
and authorities.
Laura's argument that the motions in limine should have been heard by the judge
who heard the motion for summary adjudication is also unavailing. The case was
assigned to Judge Cline for trial. However, Laura did not request that the case be
transferred back to the judge who denied the motion for summary in her motion in limine,
or opposition to Robert's motion in limine. Rather, Laura did not make this request until
after the trial court had ruled against her motion in limine. The fact that Laura did not
object to Judge Cline hearing her motion until after Judge Cline ruled on her motion
18
prevents her from now arguing that the motion should have transferred back to the judge
who had previously heard the motion for summary adjudication.
Laura also argues that Judge Cline was not allowed to "overrule" the decision of a
different judge in the same case. However, Judge Cline was not ruling on another motion
for summary adjudication, but on motions in limine that were presented to him by both
parties. An order denying summary adjudication "simply establishes the existence of a
triable fact when the order was made." (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil
Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2012) ¶ 10:364, p. 10:143.) It "does not
establish the merits or legal sufficiency of either party's case. Thus, the judge at trial may
direct a verdict in favor of the moving party despite the earlier denial of summary
[adjudication]." (Ibid., italics omitted.)
In fact, in her motion in limine, counsel for Laura specifically requested that Judge
Cline consider "all the opposition pleadings, declarations and exhibits and legal authority
filed by [Laura] in connection with the Motion for Summary Judgment as further support
of this Motion in Limine," thereby inviting Judge Cline to review Judge Von
Kalinowski's ruling denying Robert's motion for summary judgment. Also, as noted by
the court, Laura, by presenting Judge Cline with her motion in limine to introduce parol
evidence, was estopped from requesting that the issue be referred back to Judge Von
Kalinowski.2
2 Although the court stated in its ruling that it could and would reconsider the ruling denying the motion for summary judgment, it only actually was presented with and ruled on the motions in limine presented by both parties. We express no opinion on when or 19
Laura's reliance on In re Marriage of Herr (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1463 is also
unavailing. In In re Marriage of Herr, an untimely motion for reconsideration was filed
after a two-day trial. The trial court, on its own motion, granted reconsideration and
announced that all of the issues previously addressed during the trial would be revisited.
(Id. at p. 1465.) The Court of Appeal held this amounted to a new trial which the court
did not have authority to grant. (Ibid.)
Kerns v. CSE Ins. Group (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 368, 372 also does not assist our
analysis. There, the Court of Appeal held the trial court erred when it granted a motion
for summary judgment when a different judge had previously denied the identical
motion.
Here, the court did not rule on a motion for reconsideration or attempt to retry
issues previously heard. It did not grant a request for summary judgment that had been
previously denied. Rather, it only ruled on motions in limine regarding the issue of parol
evidence that had been properly placed before it by both parties.
D. Supplemental Briefing Re Fraud
On February 22, 2013, we granted [Laura's] request to file a letter brief addressing
the California Supreme Court's recent decision in Riverisland, supra, 55 Cal.4th 1169.
At issue in Riverisland was the admissibility of parol evidence to prove fraud. (Id. at p.
1177.)
under what circumstances one judge may reconsider a ruling by another judge. (Goel, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1097, fn. 2.)
20
In Riverisland, the plaintiffs alleged they negotiated an agreement to restructure
their debt to a production credit association. They alleged that the representative of the
credit association told them that their loan would be extended for two years in exchange
for additional collateral consisting of two ranches. These assurances were repeated when
they signed the restructuring agreement, which they signed where tabbed for their
signatures without reading it. But the agreement actually provided for only three months
forbearance and identified eight parcels as additional collateral. (Riverisland, supra, 55
Cal.4th at p. 1173.) The plaintiffs sued for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, rescission
and reformation of the restructuring agreement. The trial court granted summary
judgment on the ground that the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule did not allow
admission of promises at odds with the terms of a written agreement. (Ibid.)
The Court of Appeal reversed, and the California Supreme Court affirmed, that
decision. In doing so, the Supreme Court overruled Bank of America etc. Assn. v.
Pendergrass (1935) 4 Cal.2d 258. Pendergrass had limited the fraud exception to the
parol evidence rule by requiring that evidence offered to prove fraud "must tend to
establish some independent fact or representation, some fraud in the procurement of the
instrument or some breach of confidence concerning its use, and not a promise directly at
variance with the promise of the writing." (Id. at p. 263, italics added.) Characterizing
Pendergrass as "an aberration," the Supreme Court "reaffirm[ed] the venerable maxim
stated in Ferguson v. Koch [(1928)] 204 Cal. [342,] 347: '[I]t was never intended that the
parol evidence rule should be used as a shield to prevent the proof of fraud.'"
(Riverisland, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1182.)
21
However, in this case, both below and on appeal, [Laura] is not seeking to set
aside the premarital agreement based upon fraud. Rather, she seeks to introduce parol
evidence to ascribe a meaning to paragraph 7.4.1 that is, as we have discussed,
inconsistent with the plain and unambiguous language of the clause. Thus, the
RiverIsland case has no bearing on our resolution of this appeal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NARES, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
McDONALD, J.
AARON, J.
22
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the premarital agreement was a fully integrated, unambiguous document that did not create a mandatory obligation to build a residence or provide a substitute, and therefore properly excluded parol evidence.
Issues
Whether the trial court erred in excluding parol evidence to interpret the premarital agreement.
Whether the trial court improperly reconsidered a prior summary adjudication ruling when deciding motions in limine.
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The paragraph contains an expression of current intention, not a future obligation.”
“The determination of whether the parol evidence rule applies so as to preclude extrinsic evidence concerning the mutual intention of the parties is a question of law subject to de novo review.”