California Court of Appeal May 22, 2013 No. E056288Unpublished
Filed 5/22/13 P. v. Fisher CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E056288
v. (Super.Ct.No. FMB1100478)
VINCENT BURL FISHER, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Daniel W.
Detienne, Judge. Affirmed.
Sachi Wilson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Sabrina Lane Erwin and James D.
Dutton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant and appellant Vincent Burl Fisher pled
guilty to one count of possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 1
§ 11378) and admitted that he had served one prior prison term (Pen. Code, § 667.5,
subd. (b)).1 The crime occurred on September 4, 2011. The trial court sentenced
defendant to four years in state prison and awarded him 255 actual credits and 126
Most recently, the Legislature amended section 4019 to provide for up to two days
credit for each four-day period of confinement in local custody. (§ 4019, subds. (b) &
(c).) This scheme reflects the Legislature’s intent that if all days are earned under section
4019, a term of four days will be deemed to have been served for every two days spent in
actual custody. (§ 4019, subd. (f).) As relevant here, section 4019, subdivision (h),
provides: “The changes to this section enacted by the act that added this subdivision
shall apply prospectively and shall apply to prisoners who are confined to a county jail,
city jail, industrial farm, or road camp for a crime committed on or after October 1, 2011.
Any days earned by a prisoner prior to October 1, 2011, shall be calculated at the rate
required by the prior law.”
The first sentence of section 4019, subdivision (h) states: “The changes to this
section . . . shall apply prospectively and shall apply to prisoners who are confined to a
5
county jail, city jail, industrial farm, or road camp for a crime committed on or after
October 1, 2011.” (Italics added.) By the first sentence’s plain language, the changes to
section 4019 would not apply to defendant because he committed his crime prior to
October 1, 2011. Thus, the first sentence leads unmistakably to the conclusion defendant
is not entitled to conduct credit at the enhanced rate. (See People v. Rajanayagam (2012)
211 Cal.App.4th 42, 51 (Rajanayagam).)
The second sentence in section 4019, subdivision (h) provides: “Any days earned
by a prisoner prior to October 1, 2011, shall be calculated at the rate required by the prior
law.” (§ 4019, subd. (h).) Defendant states that this sentence “suggests” that any days
earned by a defendant after October 1, 2011, should be calculated at the rate required by
the current law (one-for-one credits). Accordingly, he claims he is entitled to additional
conduct credits for the days he spent in custody on and after October 1, 2011.
“‘“It is an elementary rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to
every word, clause and sentence of a statute.” A statute should be construed so that effect
is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or
insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy another unless the provision is the
result of obvious mistake or error.’” (Rodriguez v. Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th
1260, 1269 (Rodriguez), italics added.) As discussed ante, subdivision (h)’s first
sentence reflects the Legislature’s intent that the enhanced conduct credit provision to
apply only to those defendants who committed their crimes on or after October 1, 2011.
“Subdivision (h)’s second sentence does not extend the enhanced conduct credit
provision to any other group, namely those defendants who committed offenses before
6
October 1, 2011, but are in local custody on or after October 1, 2011. Instead,
subdivision (h)’s second sentence attempts to clarify that those defendants who
committed an offense before October 1, 2011, are to earn credit under the prior law.”
(Rajanayagam, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.) Moreover, we cannot read the second
sentence to imply that any days earned by a defendant after October 1, 2011, must be
calculated at the enhanced conduct credit rate for an offense committed before October 1,
2011, since that would render the first sentence superfluous. (Id. at p. 51; see also,
Rodriguez, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 1269.)
We conclude that the enhanced conduct credit provision applies only to those
defendants who committed their crimes on or after October 1, 2011. (Rajanayagam,
supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.) Thus, it does not apply to defendant.
B. Defendant Is Not Entitled to Additional Conduct Credits Based on Equal
Protection
Defendant further contends that applying the current version of section 4019 to
defendants whose offenses were committed after October 1, 2011, but not to those, such
as defendant, who were sentenced after October 1, 2011 for crimes committed before
October 1, 2011, violates equal protection principles. We disagree.
In order to succeed on an equal protection claim, defendant must first show that
the state has adopted a classification scheme that affects two or more similarly situated
groups in an unequal manner. (People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 1199.) For
purposes of the equal protection clause, we do not inquire “‘whether persons are similarly
situated for all purposes, but “whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law
7
challenged.”’ [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 1199-1200.) “If the first prerequisite is satisfied,
we proceed to judicial scrutiny of the classification. Where, as here, the statutory
distinction at issue neither touches upon fundamental interests nor is based on gender,
there is no equal protection violation if the challenged classification bears a rational
relationship to a legitimate state purpose. [Citations.]” (Rajanayagam, supra, 211
Cal.App.4th at p. 53; see also People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 838 [the
rational basis test applies to equal protection challenges based on sentencing disparities].)
“Under the rational relationship test, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along
suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal
protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could
provide a rational basis for the classification. [Citation.]” (Rajanayagam, at p. 53.)
Even if we were to agree that defendant was similarly situated to other defendants
who committed their crimes after October 1, 2011, we conclude there was no equal
protection violation, since the challenged classification bears a rational relationship to a
legitimate state purpose. The 2011 amendment was enacted as part of the legislation
addressing the state’s fiscal emergency, by effectuating an earlier release of persons
committing offenses on or after October 1, 2011, thus relieving the state of the cost of
their continued incarceration and also alleviating overcrowding in county jails. (See
Stats. 2011, ch. 12, § 35, pp. 5976-5977; Stats 2011, ch. 15, § 482, pp. 497-498.) We
perceive a legitimate legislative purpose for limiting the extension of additional conduct
credits to persons in local custody for crimes committed on or after October 1, 2011, but
not before. We first note that “the California Supreme Court has stated equal protection
8
of the laws does not forbid statutes and statutory amendments to have a beginning and to
discriminate between rights of an earlier and later time. [Citation.]” (Rajanayagam,
supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 55.)
Furthermore, the Legislature could have determined that the nature and scope of
the state’s fiscal emergency required granting additional conduct credits only to persons
in local custody for crimes committed on or after October 1, 2011, but not before, in
order to strike a balance between the state’s fiscal and jail-overcrowding problems, on the
one hand, and public safety concerns, on the other. (People v. Verba (2012) 210
Cal.App.4th 991, 997; Rajanayagam, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 55.)
We note defendant’s reliance on In re Kapperman (1974) 11 Cal.3d 542
(Kapperman), in support of his claim. Kapperman is distinguishable because it addressed
actual custody credits, not conduct credits. Conduct credits must be earned by a
defendant, whereas custody credits are constitutionally required and awarded
automatically on the basis of time served. (Rajanayagam, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at
p. 56.)
In sum, a rational basis exists for applying the 2011 amendment to section 4019 to
defendants who committed crimes on or after October 1, 2011, but not to those who
committed crimes before October 1, 2011. Thus, defendant’s equal protection rights
were not violated.
9
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
HOLLENHORST Acting P. J.
We concur:
RICHLI J.
MILLER J.
10
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in imposing restitution fines within the authorized statutory range and that the defendant was not entitled to enhanced presentence conduct credits for a crime committed before the effective date of the amendment to Penal Code section 4019.
Issues
Whether the imposition of $240 restitution fines violated the ex post facto clause.
Whether the defendant forfeited his challenge to the restitution fines by failing to object in the trial court.
Whether the defendant is entitled to enhanced presentence conduct credits for time served on or after October 1, 2011, for a crime committed before that date.
Whether the denial of enhanced conduct credits violates equal protection principles.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“the trial court had the discretion to impose a restitution fine ranging from $200 to $10,000 in 2011, and the $240 fine was well within that range.”
“the enhanced conduct credit provision applies only to those defendants who committed their crimes on or after October 1, 2011.”
“a rational basis exists for applying the 2011 amendment to section 4019 to defendants who committed crimes on or after October 1, 2011, but not to those who committed crimes before October 1, 2011.”