P. v. Edwards CA4/3

Filed 5/7/13 P. v. Edwards CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G046756

v. (Super. Ct. No. 11WF2032)

STEPHEN ALLEN EDWARDS, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Vickie L. Hix, Commissioner. Affirmed. Jeanine G. Strong, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, James D. Dutton and Meredith S. White, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. * * *

INTRODUCTION As of October 1, 2011, the rate at which a criminal defendant may accrue presentence custody credit changed. A defendant who committed a crime on or after October 1, 2011, may accrue two good conduct credit days for every two actual custody days. A defendant who committed a crime before October 1, 2011, accrues good conduct credit at the former rate of two days for every four days of actual custody. Defendant Stephen Allen Edwards committed burglary and other crimes in August 2011. He pleaded guilty and was placed on probation. In March 2012, after admitting to a violation of his probation, defendant’s probation was reinstated, and he was awarded presentence custody credit at the rate in effect before the October 1, 2011 statutory amendment. Defendant challenges the trial court’s refusal to calculate his good conduct custody credit at the higher accrual rate. We affirm. The statutory language clearly states that the higher accrual rate applies prospectively only. We reject defendant’s contention that the language of the statute is ambiguous. Further, we reject defendant’s claim that a prospective-only application of the higher accrual rate violates equal protection. Although criminal defendants who committed the same crime before and after October 1, 2011, are similarly situated, a rational basis exists for treating them differently in terms of the accrual of their good conduct credit.