Huryn v. Paiz CA2/8

Filed 5/3/13 Huryn v. Paiz CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

NATALIA HURYN, B240758

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. GC046838) v.

SALVADOR PAIZ,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Jan A. Pluim, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.

Hicks ǀ Gaumer and James B. Hicks for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Richardson, Fair & Cohen and William P. O’Kelly for Defendant and Respondent.

__________________

Plaintiff Natalia A. Huryn appeals from the order dismissing her personal injury complaint against Salvador Paiz after the trial court sustained Paiz’s demurrers without leave to amend. We reverse as to Huryn’s negligence and battery causes of action because there is a reasonable possibility she can amend those claims to show they were not barred by the statute of limitations. We affirm as to her claim alleging unfair competition because she has failed to state such a cause of action.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On Monday, February 14, 2011, Natalia A. Huryn filed a complaint against Salvador Paiz, alleging that she was injured when Paiz drove his truck into her as she crossed the street on February 10, 2009. Huryn’s complaint included three causes of action: (1) battery; (2) negligence; and (3) unlawful business practices (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200) because Paiz was driving for business purposes when the incident occurred. Although the statute of limitations for unfair competition claims is four years (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17208), claims for battery and negligence must be brought within two years (Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1). In order to address the fact that Huryn’s complaint was filed after February 10, 2011, when the limitations period on her two tort claims would have ordinarily expired, her complaint alleged that her attorney had had settlement discussions with Paiz’s insurer on February 7, 2011, and that the insurer agreed to extend the limitations period until Friday, February 11, 2011, to give the parties time to settle the case. Huryn alleged that because she relied on the statements made by Paiz’s insurer, and because no settlement had been reached, her complaint was timely. The original complaint was never served on Paiz. Instead, on September 20, 2011, Huryn filed a first amended complaint that was served on Paiz. The amended complaint was identical to the original complaint in all meaningful respects with one exception: it