People v. Torkelson CA4/1

Filed 11/10/22 P. v. Torkelson CA4/1 Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D078237

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD193624)

JAMES DAVID TORKELSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, John M. Thompson, Judge. Reversed and Remanded with Directions.

Waldemar D. Halka, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant and Defendant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Alan Amann and Kristen Kinnaird Chenelia, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. In 2009, a jury convicted James David Torkelson on two counts of felony first degree murder for his role in an armed robbery in which two employees were shot and killed. The superior court sentenced him to two

consecutive terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole. Torkelson filed a petition for resentencing in 2019, following statutory changes that narrowed the scope of felony-murder liability and authorized resentencing for those convicted under the prior laws. The superior court concluded he was ineligible for relief based on felony-murder special-circumstance findings made by the jury. Torkelson appealed and, in our initial opinion, we affirmed the superior court’s order. The Supreme Court of California granted Torkelson’s petition for review and held the case for its decision in People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 (Strong). In Strong, the Supreme Court held that a defendant is not precluded from eligibility for resentencing based on a jury’s true findings on felony-murder special-circumstance allegations made before it issued its decisions in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), which provided substantial guidance on the meanings of the phrases “major participant” and “with reckless indifference to human life” as used in the statute defining the felony-murder special circumstance. After issuing its opinion in Strong, the Supreme Court remanded Torkelson’s appeal to us with directions to vacate our opinion and to reconsider the matter in light of the decision. In compliance with those directions, we hereby vacate our prior opinion. And, based on Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th 698, we reverse the order denying Torkelson’s resentencing petition and remand the matter for further proceedings.