People v. Stanley

Filed 7/9/12

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, ) ) Plaintiff and Respondent, ) ) S185961 v. ) ) Ct.App. 3 C063661 LEROY STANLEY, ) ) Yolo County Defendant and Appellant. ) Super. Ct. No. 09-3110 ____________________________________)

By statute, a crime victim who has suffered property damage is entitled to have the defendant pay restitution for “the replacement cost of like property, or the actual cost of repairing the property when repair is possible.” (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(A); further statutory references are to the Penal Code.) Here, defendant Leroy Stanley in 2009 vandalized Patricia Short-Lyster‟s 1975 Dodge Adventurer four-door, three-quarter-ton pickup truck, extensively denting it and damaging the driver‟s side rear door so badly that it could no longer be opened. Some 18 months before the vandalism, Short-Lyster paid $950 for the truck, which was in excellent condition. Her father, a former auto mechanic, had checked out the truck and advised her to buy it. Defendant entered a plea of no contest to felony vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)) in exchange for a 16-month prison sentence and the dismissal of other charges. The trial court ordered restitution in the amount of $2,812.94, reflecting an automotive body shop‟s written estimate of repair cost. The Court of Appeal affirmed, rejecting defendant‟s contention that the trial court should have limited restitution to the victim‟s $950 purchase price of the used truck. In reaching that conclusion,

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the Court of Appeal expressed its agreement with a decision by another Court of Appeal, In re Dina V. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 486 (Dina V.), but its disagreement with the opposite holding in People v. Yanez (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1622 (Yanez). We granted review to resolve the conflict. We affirm the Court of Appeal‟s judgment in this case. DISCUSSION In 1982, California voters enacted Proposition 8, an initiative measure also known as the “Victims‟ Bill of Rights,” which added to the California Constitution a provision that “all persons who suffer losses” resulting from a crime are entitled to “restitution from the persons convicted of the crimes causing the losses.” (Cal. Const., art. 1, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(A).) The Legislature was directed to enact implementing legislation. (Id., art. 1, § 28, subd. (a)(8); see People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 655 (Giordano).) The Legislature did so. In 1983, it enacted section 1202.4, which is at issue here. (Stats. 1983, ch. 1092, § 320.1, p. 4058.) “In keeping with the [voters‟] „unequivocal intention‟ that victim restitution be made, statutory provisions implementing the constitutional directive have been broadly and liberally construed.” (People v. Lyon (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1521, 1525; accord, People v. Phu (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 280, 283; People v. Mearns (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 493, 500.) Section 1202.4, at issue here, states that “in every [criminal] case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant‟s conduct,” the trial court must order the defendant to pay restitution “in an amount . . . based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim . . . or any other showing to the court.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).) The statute further provides that the trial court “shall order full restitution unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons” not to do so (ibid.); the restitution order must “fully reimburse the victim . . . for every determined economic loss incurred as the result