People v. Androshchuk CA3
Filed 10/13/22 P. v. Androshchuk CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento) ----
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, C094802
v. (Super. Ct. No. 07F07669)
EDWARD VLADIMIROV ANDROSHCHUK,
Defendant and Appellant.
In 2008, a jury convicted defendant Edward Vladimirov Androshchuk of kidnapping for robbery and sexual assault, sexual battery, forcible rape, forcible sodomy, forcible oral copulation, forcible digital penetration, forcible oral copulation in concert, and rape in concert with force. The jury also found true allegations that triggered application of the one strike law. The trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 75 years to life plus a consecutive determinate term of 45 years. The Legislature subsequently enacted and later amended Penal Code section 30511 to provide a youth offender parole hearing to certain individuals. (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 4; Stats. 2017, ch. 684, § 1.) But the statute excludes a defendant sentenced under the one strike law. (§ 3051, subd. (h).)
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
Defendant nevertheless filed a motion under section 1203.01, asserting that because he was between 21 and 23 years old at the time he committed his various offenses, he was entitled to a parole hearing during his 25th year of incarceration and also, well before that date, entitled to a hearing to present evidence that could be beneficial in his eventual parole hearing. The trial court appointed counsel for defendant and ultimately denied his request, concluding defendant is not entitled to such relief because he was sentenced under the one strike law. Defendant now contends the section 3051 exclusion of one-strike offenders violates equal protection. (See People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193, 200 [trial court order denying relief in this context is appealable as a postjudgment order affecting the defendant’s substantial rights]; see § 1237, subd. (b).) Because defendant did not raise this claim in the trial court, he only asserts a facial challenge to section 3051. (See In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 881-882, 885 [although an as-applied challenge to a law is generally forfeited when not raised at the trial level, a facial challenge is not].) We conclude the section 3051 exclusion of one-strike offenders withstands rational basis scrutiny and does not violate equal protection. We will affirm the trial court’s order. DISCUSSION A The equal protection clause of the federal Constitution provides that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” (U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1.) There is a similar clause in the California Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a).) Both serve to prevent “governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.” (Nordlinger v. Hahn (1992) 505 U.S. 1, 10 [120 L.Ed.2d 1]; see People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288 (Chatman).) Both also employ different standards of review depending on the challenged classification, with a lower level of scrutiny in cases like this one that do not
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