California Court of Appeal Sep 30, 2022 No. E078374Unpublished
Filed 9/30/22 In re I.Q. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re I.Q., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, E078374 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. J281478) v. OPINION I.Q.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Charles J. Umeda,
Judge. Affirmed.
Cynthia M. Jones, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Laura Bagget and Robin
Urbanski, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 801, subdivision (a), defendant
and appellant I.Q. (minor) appeals from an order transferring the matter from juvenile to
adult criminal court. For the reasons set forth post, we affirm the court’s order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 24, 2019, a wardship petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section
Penal Code section 422, subdivision (a) (count 2); and misdemeanor battery on school
property under Penal Code section 243.2, subdivision (a)(1) (count 3). On July 22, 2019,
minor entered into a stipulated agreement for informal probation under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 654.2.
On September 24, 2019, a first amended wardship petition added count 4, carrying
a concealed firearm under Penal Code section 25400; count 5, possession of a firearm by
a minor under Penal Code section 29610; and count 6, receiving stolen property, a
handgun, under Penal Code section 496, subdivision (b). On October 10, 2019, minor
admitted count 4 (carrying a concealed firearm), and the juvenile court placed him on
formal probation. The People dismissed the remaining counts.
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
2
On August 11, 2020, a subsequent wardship petition alleged that minor committed
one count of felony vandalism under Penal Code 594, subdivision (b)(1). Minor failed to
appear on this petition several times. On February 3, 2021, minor was arrested. At the
time of his arrest, minor was the passenger in a car that had been involved in a car-to-car
shooting where the driver of minor’s car died. As to his wardship petition, on February
5, 2021, minor admitted the allegation as a misdemeanor and the juvenile court placed
him on formal probation.
On May 13, 2021, another subsequent wardship petition, the current matter,
charged minor with one count of murder under Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a)
(count 1). The petition also alleged that (1) minor personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm under Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivisions (d), and (e)(1);
and (2) the offense was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in
association with a criminal street gang under Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision
(b)(1)(C).
In the petition, the People requested a transfer hearing to determine whether minor
should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction pursuant to section 707,
subdivision (a)(1). The transfer hearing commenced on December 13, 2021. On January
4, 2022, the juvenile court ordered the matter transferred to adult criminal court.
On January 14, 2022, minor filed a timely notice of appeal.
B. FACTUAL HISTORY
On April 27, 2021, minor and two friends were in a parked van; they were all
juveniles. Isaac R. was in the driver’s seat, Christopher R. was in the rear passenger seat,
3
and minor was in the front passenger seat. Minor and Christopher were both members of
the 10th Street Mellow Mafia Bloods criminal street gang. They, however, were not
engaged in a gang activity that evening. They were in the neighborhood to meet some
girls; they parked their van to wait for the girls to finish getting ready.
After seeing the van parked outside, the fiancé of the victim called the police to
report that they suspected people were stealing catalytic converters.
After watching the van for approximately 10 minutes, the victim got into his
vehicle and drove past the van. The victim stared at the minors as he slowly drove past
them. Minor described the victim as an adult Mexican who was “all tatted up.” A
subsequent toxicology report indicated that the victim had a high level of
methamphetamine in his system.
After the victim drove by, minor told Isaac to drive away. The victim proceeded
to follow the van.
The victim followed the van for about 30 minutes—from Rialto to San
Bernardino. The vehicles travelled on and off the freeway, with speeds up to 120 miles
an hour at times. Minor called another Mellow Mafia member, Exaviear Bradford.2
Isaac heard minor tell Bradford that they were being followed so they were going to
shoot at the vehicle. Minor directed Isaac to go to a particular intersection. When they
first arrived at the intersection, Bradford was not there. Minor told Isaac to drive away
then return to the intersection. When they returned, Bradford was at the intersection.
2 Exaviear is also referred to in the record as Xavier.
4
There, both minor and Bradford started to shoot at the victim’s vehicle; minor shot from
the van and Bradford shot from the sidewalk at the intersection.
One of the shots hit the victim in the heart and killed him. There were 11 bullet
strikes to the victim’s vehicle as follows: six bullet strikes to the hood, three to the left
front quarter panel, one to the left headlight, and one to the lower left portion of the
windshield.
After the shooting, minor told Isaac to drive to a residence, which was later
determined to be minor’s residence. When they arrived, minor collected Bradford’s gun,
left the van, and approached the house through an alleyway. Minor then returned to the
van without any guns.3 They went to Isaac’s residence. Thereafter, minor left with
Bradford and Christopher in Christopher’s vehicle.
When law enforcement searched minor’s residence, they found a .22-caliber
handgun and methamphetamine. The weapons used in the murder were not found. The
victim was not armed with a firearm and there was no gun in his vehicle. After the
murder, minor left San Bernardino and went to Arizona.
Minor, Bradford, and Christopher were all members of the 10th Street Mellow
Mafia Bloods; Bradford was the leader.
Minor had an Instagram account. The account contained numerous messages
related to guns and gun sales. The day after the shooting, minor posted the following on
his account: “IM fin go down for murder.”
3 Bradford told a detective that he threw his gun into a field.
5
About three months prior to the shooting, minor had been in a similar situation
where his friend Leonardo had been shot. Leonardo had picked up minor to go for a ride
in Leonardo’s new car; a car followed them, then pulled up next to them at a red light. A
person in the back of the car started shooting at minor and Leonardo. One of the shots hit
Leonardo in the head. Minor stayed with Leonardo until paramedics arrived. The
responding officers arrested minor at the scene for a probation violation.
DISCUSSION
Minor contends that the juvenile court erred in finding him unsuitable for juvenile
court based on his criminal sophistication because the court failed to take into account
minor’s youth, childhood trauma, and diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
Moreover, minor contends that the court erred by failing to appropriately factor into its
assessment the gravity of the offense, the victim’s behavior prior to the shooting, and the
evidence suggesting that minor acted in the heat of passion in response to the victim’s
aggressive conduct. For the reasons set forth post, we find that the juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion in ordering minor to adult criminal court.
A. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Under section 707, a minor may only be tried as an adult if the juvenile court finds
the minor is unfit for juvenile treatment and orders the minor transferred to adult criminal
court. Section 707, subdivision (a)(3), sets forth five criteria for the juvenile court to
consider in deciding whether a minor is unfit for juvenile treatment. The five criteria are:
(1) “The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor”; (2) “Whether the
minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction”;
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(3) “The minor’s previous delinquent history”; (4) “Success of previous attempts by the
juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor”; and (5) “The circumstances and gravity of the
offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor.” (§ 707, subd.
(a)(3)(A)-(E).)
B. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In this case, Probation Officer Castro prepared a section 707, subdivision (a),
report. Prior to preparing the report, Officer Castro was minor’s probation officer for
over a year. The officer knew minor to be a member of the 10th Street Mellow Mafia
Bloods criminal street gang based on his associates, social media posts, and a tattoo on
his face paying homage to a fallen gang member. With respect to the first factor when
considering a transfer request under section 707, subdivision (a), a court must evaluate
the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor. In his report, Officer Castro
found significant evidence showing that, not only was minor a gang member, he also had
access to firearms and had a history of being in possession of firearms. Moreover, the
officer found the evidence, showing that minor concealed his firearm after the murder to
avoid detection, to be relevant.
In considering the degree of criminal sophistication of the offense in this case,
Officer Castro considered the offense sophisticated because, instead of trying to escape
while minor and his friends were being followed by the victim, minor called another gang
member, who was allegedly a leader of the gang, to seek support. After the phone call, in
a coordinated effort, both minor and Bradford participated in shooting the victim’s
vehicle at the same time. The officer described it as an ambush shooting in which the
7
gang members lured the victim into an open area and then fired from multiple directions.
As to the second, third, and fourth factors—whether minor could be rehabilitated prior to
the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, the juvenile’s previous delinquent
history, and the success of previous attempts to rehabilitate the juvenile—Officer Castro
concluded that minor could not be rehabilitated before the expiration of juvenile court
jurisdiction. In reaching this conclusion, the probation officer considered minor’s history
of criminal delinquency, and the fact that minor had failed numerous times on probation
by failing to report, provide his address, and participate in rehabilitative classes. The
probation officer stated that minor’s prior delinquent history rendered him unfit for
treatment in the juvenile system. Although the probation officer stated that minor did not
demonstrate a desire to participate in rehabilitative programs, the officer acknowledged
that there were rehabilitative programs from which minor could benefit and found minor
suitable under the fourth factor. With respect to the fifth factor, the gravity of the
offense, Officer Castro concluded that minor was not suitable for the juvenile justice
system based on the sophistication of the offense, minor’s possession of guns, and
minor’s participation in a gang.
The parties stipulated to Dr. Marjorie Graham-Howard’s qualifications to testify
as an expert witness on behalf of minor. Dr. Graham-Howard prepared a psychological
evaluation of minor. She reviewed the police reports associated with his case, but she did
not review the probation reports.
While Dr. Graham-Howard was interviewing minor, he discussed his family
history. Minor stated that he grew up in a home with domestic violence, primarily
8
consisting of his father abusing his mother. When minor tried to intervene, his father
would hit him, too. Minor also told the doctor that both his parents used drugs, and his
father had a criminal history. Minor’s parents separated when he was eight years old; he
is now mostly estranged from his father.
Minor described having behavioral issues in school. Minor was diagnosed with
ADHD in the fourth grade. Moreover, he had been suspended repeatedly and was failing
his classes. Minor also told Dr. Graham-Howard that most of his friends were
delinquent, either criminally or behaviorally. Minor admitted that he was a member of a
gang. He reported using marijuana and prescription medication. Furthermore, although
minor had no treatment history for mental health issues, the doctor noted that minor
“endorsed a number of depressive- and anxiety-related symptoms” during the evaluation.
Dr. Graham-Howard suspected that minor might be experiencing PTSD from witnessing
domestic violence as a child, and from the prior incident where he witnessed his friend
die in a shooting. Dr. Graham-Howard testified that minor’s full scale IQ score fell
within the average intellectual functioning range. In terms of his risk for recidivism,
minor scored in the high-risk category. Dr. Graham-Howard explained that a portion of
that score was based on historical facts about minor that would never change, like his
exposure to violence in his home. She, however, noted that treatment has been shown to
reduce recidivism. Dr. Graham-Howard diagnosed minor with major depression, PTSD,
conduct disorder with adolescent onset, and cannabis-use disorder.
As for the section 707, subdivision (a), criteria, Dr. Graham-Howard found minor
to be criminally sophisticated based on his gang affiliation and “poor behavior across
9
multiple settings.” She also found the crime in this case to be criminally sophisticated
given the information that weapons were involved, there were coparticipants, and an
effort to conceal evidence. As to the second factor, Dr. Graham-Howard believed minor
could be rehabilitated by the time he was 25 years old. As to the third factor, the doctor
opined that minor had a noteworthy history of criminal delinquency. Nonetheless, she
qualified that it was “not beyond the bounds of what [she] think[s] is appropriate for
youth who [are] retained in the juvenile justice system.” As to the fourth factor, Dr.
Graham-Howard observed that minor had not done well on probation. She, however,
further explained that minor had not received treatment for his mental illness, so she was
not ready to give up on rehabilitative measures for minor. As to the fifth factor, minor
having “a gun in his hand” counted as an aggravating factor. The doctor found the fact
that the victim had been chasing minor, in addition to minor’s mental health issues and
family history, as mitigating factors that could have contributed to minor’s state of mind
at the time of the murder. Dr. Graham-Howard opined, based on her assessment of these
factors, that minor could remain in the juvenile justice system without being transferred
to adult court.
Beth Henry, a retired probation offer who now prepared “mitigation reports,”
testified on behalf of minor. Henry prepared a mitigation report on behalf of minor.
While working on the report, Henry learned many of the same things Dr. Graham-
Howard learned, which included (1) minor’s mother’s history of drug abuse; (2) minor’s
father’s criminal history; (3) minor’s parents’ volatile relationship, which included
domestic violence; (4) minor’s poor academic performance in school; (5) minor
10
witnessing the death of his friend while the two of them were sitting in the car together;
and (6) minor being a gang member and using drugs and alcohol. Minor told Henry that
he regretted what happened; he did not want anyone to die. Although minor did not do
well on juvenile probation, Henry opined there were programs associated with the
juvenile probation system that could benefit minor.
Probation Officer Todd Holmes testified on minor’s behalf. Officer Holmes
opined that minor would benefit from gang counseling, school, and other programs
available to juveniles.
After the testimonies and evidence were presented to the court, the court made its
determinations as follows.
As to the first factor under section 707, subdivision (a)—the degree of criminal
sophistication—the court referenced Dr. Graham-Howard’s evaluation, which provided
that minor was of average intelligence but also met the criteria for diagnoses of
depression and PTSD. The court, however, determined that those factors did not mitigate
the criminal sophistication minor exhibited in executing the murder. The court noted
minor’s actions following the murder, mainly his posts and messages on his social media
account, showed he appreciated the risks and consequences of his criminal actions.
Minor also had access to firearms via the transactions he conducted on social media and
even sold firearms while on probation. In fact, minor committed the offense with a
semiautomatic firearm. Moreover, the court took note that minor was a member of a
criminal street gang. While minor and his cohorts were being followed by the victim,
minor called Bradford, a fellow gang member, to arrange a meeting place. Minor
11
directed Isaac to drive to the location where Bradford and minor agreed to meet. At that
location, both minor and Bradford simultaneously fired at the victim’s vehicle. After the
shooting, minor told Isaac to drive to minor’s residence where minor proceeded to
conceal the weapons used in the crime. Furthermore, the court noted that both Dr.
Graham-Howard and Officer Castro agreed both minor and the offense were criminally
sophisticated. Accordingly, with respect to the first factor, the court concluded minor
“exhibited a very high level of criminal sophistication.” Therefore, minor was not
suitable for juvenile court.
As to the second factor under section 707—whether defendant could be
rehabilitated prior to the expiration of juvenile court jurisdiction—the juvenile court
noted that minor was 17 years old at the time of the hearing; therefore, eight years of
juvenile court jurisdiction remained. The court observed that the parties had not
presented much information as to what counseling and treatment minor might undergo if
he remained in the juvenile justice system. The court again referenced information that
showed minor was heavily involved in his gang, and minor’s sale and possession of
firearms while on formal probation. The court also noted that prior to the murder at
issue, minor had witnessed the murder of his friend Leonardo, a fellow gang member, but
was not deterred from continuing with his gang lifestyle. Moreover, the court found it
important that minor called another gang member immediately prior to the shooting in
order to coordinate the ambush of the victim. The court then recognized that there were
treatment programs available that could provide minor an opportunity for rehabilitation.
In fact, minor had completed several programs while in juvenile hall. Additionally, the
12
court acknowledged that although minor had exhibited a pattern of disobeying and
disrespecting staff, his behavior summaries indicated his behavior had improved over the
course of time. Furthermore, minor generally exhibited good behavior with his peers in
juvenile hall, with the exception of being cited for fighting on two occasions. The court
then concluded that the prosecution had failed to meet its burden with respect to showing
what programs were available to minor and whether the programs would serve to
rehabilitate him. No evidence was admitted to suggest minor was unlikely to be
rehabilitated by the programs. Therefore, the court found minor suitable for juvenile
court under the second factor.
As to the third factor—minor’s prior delinquency history—the court recounted
minor’s delinquency hearing discussed, ante. The court summarized minor’s pattern of
criminal behavior over a three-year span with the most serious offense, prior to the
charged murder, being possession of a firearm. The court noted that other juveniles with
similar histories, who were also members of gangs, had been found suitable for juvenile
court. As such, the court found minor suitable for juvenile court under the third factor.
As to the fourth factor—the success of previous attempts by the juvenile justice
system to rehabilitate minor—the court again discussed minor’s history of delinquent
behavior. The court stated that prior attempts at rehabilitating minor on probation had
been unsuccessful. The court, therefore, concluded minor was not suitable for juvenile
court under the fourth factor.
Finally, as to the fifth factor—the gravity of the offense—the court noted that the
gravity of the murder charge was not in dispute. All the witnesses at the transfer hearing
13
agreed on that point. The court then reiterated that minor coordinated with a fellow gang
member by calling him and discussing where to meet in order to lure the victim, and the
two of them fired numerous rounds at the victim’s vehicle at the same time. The court
acknowledged the evidence that the victim had been pursuing minor and his cohorts at
high speed prior to the shooting. The court found that fact relevant to minor’s state of
mind at the time of the shooting. The court went on to express that a trier of fact could
conclude the victim’s conduct created fear in minor, but also noted that a trier of fact
could conclude minor did not perceive the incident as being so imminent that the only
solution was to lure the victim to the area where the fellow gang member, who was
armed, would also join them. The court ultimately concluded that the victim’s behavior
did not mitigate the seriousness of the offense, and found minor not suitable for juvenile
court under the fifth factor.
At the conclusion of the hearing, based on the totality of the circumstances, the
court ruled that minor was not suitable “to be dealt with within the juvenile court” and
ordered the matter transferred to adult criminal court.
C. STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal, we review a juvenile court’s order on a motion to transfer for abuse of
discretion. (Kevin P. v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th
173, 187.) The court’s “findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its
conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is
reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” (J.N. v. Superior Court (2018) 23
Cal.App.5th 706, 715 (J.N.).) “The standard is deferential: ‘When a trial court’s factual
14
determination is attacked on the ground that there is no substantial evidence to sustain it,
the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on
the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will
support the determination.’ ” (People v. Jones (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 681, fn. omitted
(Jones).)
“To justify the transfer of a minor from juvenile court to the criminal court system,
the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the
minor is not a suitable candidate for treatment under the juvenile court system.” (J.N.,
supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 715.)
Moreover, the weight to be given to each of the five factors under section 707 is
within the court’s discretion. (D.W. v. Superior Court (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 109, 116.)
“Nothing in section 707 indicates that the . . . court [is] required to give equal weight to
each of the five criteria or that it would necessarily be an abuse of discretion to find that
one criterion outweighed the other criteria.” (C.S. v. Superior Court (2018) 29
Cal.App.5th 1009, 1035.)
D. ANALYSIS
Minor contends that “the juvenile court erred in holding minor was unfit for
juvenile court based on his criminal sophistication and the gravity of the offense.” 4 We
disagree with minor’s contention, as set forth in detail post.
4 Minor does not challenge the court’s holding that minor’s previous attempts at rehabilitation had not been successful.
15
On January 4, 2022, after acknowledging its adherence to the law and standard of
review, and acknowledging that it had considered the testimonies and relevant evidence
presented, the juvenile court granted the People’s request to transfer minor’s case to adult
criminal court. The court acknowledged that the People had the burden of proof; the
standard was preponderance of the evidence.
1. MINOR EXHIBITED A DEGREE OF CRIMINAL
SOPHISTICATION
Minor contends that the court erred in finding that he exhibited a degree of
criminal sophistication that weighed in favor of granting the motion to transfer. He
argues the court erred by failing to consider whether his criminal sophistication was
mitigated by his youth, upbringing, and PTSD. However, as discussed in detail ante, the
record shows that the juvenile court considered minor’s mitigating factors.
“The criminal-sophistication criterion ‘requires a juvenile court . . . to consider the
whole picture, that is, all the evidence that might bear on the minor’s criminal
sophistication, including any criminal sophistication manifested in the present crime.’ ”
(Kevin P. v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 192,
quoting Jones, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 683-684.) In evaluating this factor, the “court
may give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s age,
maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and emotional health at the time of
the alleged offense, the minor’s impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and
consequences of criminal behavior, the effect of familial, adult, or peer pressure on the
16
minor’s actions, and the effect of the minor’s family and community environment and
childhood trauma on the minor’s criminal sophistication.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).)
In this case, the court, in explaining its reasoning behind its finding, noted that it
had considered the testimonies presented at the hearing, the arguments of counsel, as well
as the reports submitted by the probation officer, Dr. Graham-Howard, Beth Henry, and
summaries of minor’s behavior while at juvenile hall.
In addition to his testimony at the hearing, Probation Officer Castro, in his report,
noted minor was a known gang member who had access to firearms and the ability to
summon fellow gang members when he needed their help, as minor did in this case.
Minor had a history of possessing firearms. In fact, he used a firearm in the charged
offense and then successfully concealed it; officers never found the weapons used in this
offense. Officer Castro also noted that the current offense was an ambush where minor
planned the attack with the assistance of a fellow gang member—intentionally causing
harm to the victim, leading to his death. In the officer’s opinion, the organization and
planning of the assault involved “an extremely high level of sophistication.” In addition,
the officer observed that had minor feared for his safety, he had other alternatives to help
him feel safe without shooting someone else.
Moreover, both Beth Henry and Dr. Graham-Howard discussed minor’s
childhood—including his mother’s drug abuse and domestic violence in the home. Both
of them discussed that minor suffered from PTSD due to his childhood and from
witnessing Leonardo get shot. Henry noted that minor’s family upbringing made minor
feel rejected, insecure, and have low self-esteem and self-worth. Henry also reported that
17
minor stated he was “consumed by fear” at the time of the murder. Henry expressly
stated that minor’s past “clearly impacted his decision making and ability to control his
impulsive behavior.” Moreover, Dr. Graham-Howard opined that the current crime was
criminally sophisticated because it included the use of weapons, multiple participants,
efforts to avoid apprehension, and efforts to get rid of the evidence.
While making its finding the court acknowledged, “[a]t the time [minor]
committed the current offense, he was 16 years old. The Court reviewed the evidence
regarding [minor]’s maturity, intellectual capacity, mental and emotional health at the
time of the offense.” The court then noted Dr. Graham-Howard’s testing, which showed
minor was functioning at an average range of intelligence, and that minor “endured
symptoms of depression and anxiety and meets the criteria for diagnosis of depression
and [PTSD].” The court, however, clearly stated “that these factors did not mitigate the
criminal sophistication exhibited by [minor].” Thereafter, the court discussed in detail
minor’s actions on social media, conversations regarding the murder investigation, and
statements regarding his state of mind after the shooting of the victim, and found that
minor “appreciated the risk and consequences of his criminal behavior.” Additionally,
the court noted minor’s active gang membership, access to and the sale of firearms—even
while on probation, and possession of a semiautomatic pistol during the time of the
shooting. Furthermore, the court noted that during the chase, minor called Bradford to
coordinate a plan, then directed Isaac to a location where Bradford showed up with a
firearm, where they both shot at the victim’s vehicle from different angles. Then, after
the shooting, minor “direct[ed] the other individual to the location where the firearms
18
used in the shooting are concealed.” The court recognized that Dr. Graham-Howard and
Probation Officer Castro both opined minor exhibited a high level of criminal
sophistication based on all the evidence presented in this case. Therefore, the court found
under the criminal-sophistication criterion that minor was “not considered to be suitable
to be dealt with under juvenile law, court law.”
On appeal, minor agrees the facts of the crime, taken in isolation, demonstrate
criminal sophistication and that “there was substantial evidence to support the court’s
factual findings.” Minor, however, claims that the court abused its discretion because
“[t]he court failed to properly account for the impact of minor’s youth, childhood trauma
and [PTSD] on the minor’s decision-making process when the court evaluated minor’s
criminal sophistication.”
We disagree with minor. Here, the juvenile court carefully and thoughtfully
considered minor’s personal circumstances and age. The court was well aware of the
detailed evidence in this case. The court indicated that it had considered all the reports
filed and evidence presented in this case. The mitigating factors regarding minor’s
background were thoroughly detailed in the evidence and acknowledged by the court.
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the “court here erroneously treated the
factors as irrelevant and therefore did not properly take them into account,” as minor
suggests. On the contrary, the court noted that “[a]t the time [minor] committed the
current offense, he was 16 years old. The Court reviewed the evidence regarding
[minor]’s maturity, intellectual capacity, mental and emotional health at the time of the
offense.” After considering the totality of the evidence, the court exercised its discretion
19
and concluded that the ambush aspect of the murder, minor’s repeated possession and
sale of firearms even while on probation, and his active membership in a criminal street
gang reflected criminal sophistication that was not mitigated by his personal
circumstances.
Based on the juvenile court’s careful and thoughtful consideration of the evidence
in this case, we agree with the court’s finding of criminal sophistication and discern no
abuse of discretion by the court.
2. THE VICTIM’S CONDUCT DID NOT MITIGATE THE GRAVITY
OF THE OFFENSE
Next, minor contends that the juvenile court erred in finding that the gravity of the
offense rendered him unfit for juvenile court. We disagree.
The gravity criterion focuses on the offense “ ‘alleged in the petition’ ” (D.W. v.
Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 119), and like the other statutory criteria, it is
“based on the premise that the minor did, in fact, commit the offense.” (Jones, supra, 18
Cal.4th at p. 682.) However, the allegation that a minor committed a serious offense,
including murder, does not “automatically require a finding of unfitness.” (Ibid.; J.N.,
supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 724.) In evaluating this criterion, a juvenile court may rely
on evidence that, “while not justifying or excusing the crime, tends to lessen its
magnitude,” (Jones, at p. 685), “including, but not limited to, the actual behavior of the
person, the mental state of the person, the person’s degree of involvement in the crime,
the level of harm actually caused by the person, and the person’s mental and emotional
development.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(E)(ii).)
20
First, minor claims that the court erred by evaluating this factor based on whether
a jury could conclude minor was guilty of murder.
Here, as provided ante, the court expressly acknowledged the evidence presented
at the hearing as to this factor required the court to resolve whether the victim’s actions in
pursuing minor and his cohorts lessened the gravity of the offense. The court stated:
“The victim’s high speed pursuit created a situation where [minor]’s state of mind is
relevant in evaluating his conduct.” The court then stated:
“The victim’s conduct of pursuing [minor] over a period of time created fear and
apprehension in [minor] as to the victim’s intention; however, the Court believes [the]
trier of fact could potentially infer from the circumstances surrounding the pursuit and
shooting that [minor] did not view the threat posed by the victim as so imminent that he
didn’t have sufficient time to lead the victim to a location where a co-participant was
waiting.
“The victim’s conduct initiated the incident; however, his car pursuit of [minor]
must be evaluated as part of the entire incident, including [minor]’s state of mind and his
participation in shooting at the victim with a co-participant.
“Clearly the circumstances of shooting raises issues for the trier of fact regarding
[minor]’s state of mind, self defense, and conspiracy with a co-participant to commit
murder while lying in wait.
“The Court believes the victim’s conduct does not mitigate the extreme
seriousness in the high gravity of the offense; therefore under this criterion, [minor] is not
considered to be suitable to be dealt with under juvenile court law.”
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Based on the court’s statement minor argues that the court misunderstood that it
was required to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that minor was not fit for the
juvenile court system. Instead, the court improperly focused on the fact that a trier of fact
could find minor guilty of murder.
We disagree with minor’s assessment of the juvenile court’s statement. The court
in this case acknowledged that the issue of minor’s mental state and claim of self-defense
were factors that had to be considered at an eventual trial as to minor’s guilt. The
juvenile court did not rely on the fact that a trier of fact might ultimately find minor
guilty as the reason the court was finding minor unsuitable for juvenile court under this
criterion. Instead, the court observed there were facts that could potentially be viewed as
mitigating the gravity of the offense; for example, the victim initiated the incident and
pursued minor and his cohorts at a high rate of speed. After observing these potentially
mitigating factors, the court ultimately concluded that the victim’s conduct did not
mitigate the gravity of the offense, regardless of what an eventual trier of fact may
conclude.
Moreover, minor contends that the court erred in finding that the murder could not
be mitigated if he was not in imminent fear of harm. Minor relies on the court’s
statement that the victim’s conduct resulted in minor feeling afraid and a trier of fact may
conclude that minor did not view the conduct as an imminent threat of harm. Minor then
goes on to argue an imminent threat of harm is not a requirement to reduce or justify a
charge of murder, but rather sufficient provocation can reduce murder to manslaughter.
Therefore, minor claims that because the juvenile court made a factual finding that minor
22
was afraid, which necessarily supported a heat-of-passion defense, the court’s subsequent
finding that the victim’s behavior did not mitigate the gravity of the offense was an abuse
of discretion.
Again, we disagree with minor’s assessment of the trial court’s ruling. When
making its ruling, the juvenile court confirmed that it understood it was entitled to rely on
evidence that lessened the gravity of the crime, even if it did not justify or excuse it.
Thereafter, the court expressly acknowledged that the evidence showed the victim
initiated a high-speed pursuit and minor was afraid. The court’s statement that minor
experienced fear did not automatically require the court to find that the fear mitigated the
gravity of the offense. Here, the court made no factual finding that the fear minor
experienced was sufficient to lessen the gravity of his offense. Instead, the court made an
express finding to the contrary: “The Court believes the victim’s conduct does not
mitigate the extreme seriousness in the high gravity of the offense.”
Here, during the high-speed chase, minor called Bradford. Together, they planned
to meet at a specific location. Thereafter, minor directed Isaac to drive to that location.
Eventually, they saw Bradford—and when the victim appeared—both minor and
Bradford fired at the victim’s vehicle from different angles. Thereafter, minor directed
Isaac to flee the scene and take him to minor’s residence, where minor disposed of the
weapons. The evidence in this case clearly demonstrated minor’s egregious conduct that
led to the victim’s murder. Therefore, we find that substantial evidence supports the
court’s finding that the victim’s conduct did not mitigate the gravity of the offense.
23
In sum, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings that (1) minor
exhibited a degree of criminal sophistication; (2) minor’s previous attempts at
rehabilitation were unsuccessful; and (3) the victim’s conduct did not mitigate the gravity
of minor’s offense. Moreover, we find that the court thoughtfully and carefully
considered and weighed all the evidence in making its ruling on the motion to transfer the
matter to adult criminal court. We discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court; the
court was neither arbitrary nor capricious in making its determinations. Therefore, we
affirm the court’s order transferring minor’s case to adult criminal court.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order transferring minor’s case to adult criminal court is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER Acting P. J.
We concur:
SLOUGH J.
MENETREZ J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the minor's transfer to adult criminal court, finding that the minor's criminal sophistication and the gravity of the offense outweighed other factors.
Issues
Did the juvenile court abuse its discretion in finding the minor unfit for juvenile court based on criminal sophistication and the gravity of the offense?
Did the juvenile court fail to appropriately consider the minor's youth, trauma, and mental health in its transfer determination?
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering minor to adult criminal court.”
“the court concluded minor “exhibited a very high level of criminal sophistication.””
“the victim’s behavior did not mitigate the seriousness of the offense, and found minor not suitable for juvenile court under the fifth factor.”