Williams v. Superior Court CA4/2 (2022) · DecisionDepot
Williams v. Superior Court CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Sep 30, 2022 No. E078694Unpublished
Filed 9/30/22 Williams v. Superior Court CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
KYLE WILLIAMS,
Petitioner, E078694
v. (Super.Ct.No. CIVDS2017161)
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF OPINION SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY,
Respondent;
CITY OF CHINO,
Real Party in Interest.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ. John M. Pacheco,
Judge. Petition granted.
Kassouni Law and Timothy V. Kassouni for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Aleshire & Wynder, G. Ross Trindle III and Priscilla George for Real Party in
Interest.
1
In 2018, real party in interest the City of Chino (the city) sued Loring Winn
Williams and Sherlyn K. Williams,1 as trustees of the Loring Winn Williams and
Sherlyn K. Williams Family Trust dated February 29, 2000, alleging causes of action for
nuisance and other claims related to real property the defendants owned in Chino. The
court abuses its discretion when it erroneously denies a peremptory challenge as
untimely. (Daniel V. v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 28, 39.) “‘Because the
trial court exercises no discretion when considering a section 170.6 motion, it is
“appropriate to review a decision granting or denying a peremptory challenge under
section 170.6 as an error of law.”’” (Prescription Opioid Cases, at p. 1046.)
5
“Generally, a section 170.6 challenge is permitted any time before the
commencement of a trial or hearing. There are, however, three exceptions to the general
rule: the all-purpose assignment rule, the 10-day/5-day rule, and the master calendar rule.
[Citation.] For any given factual scenario, a court must determine whether any of the
exceptions apply, or whether the general rule applies. [Citation.] ‘“‘As a remedial
statute, section 170.6 is to be liberally construed in favor of allowing a peremptory
challenge, and a challenge should be denied only if the statute absolutely forbids it.’”’”
(Entente Design, Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 385, 389-390.)
The five-day rule provides: “If the judge, other than a judge assigned to the case
for all purposes, court commissioner, or referee assigned to, or who is scheduled to try,
the cause or hear the matter is known at least 10 days before the date set for trial or
hearing, the motions hall be made at least 5 days before that date.” (§ 170.6,
subd. (a)(2).) And in civil cases, the all purposes assignment rule provides: “If directed
to the trial of a civil cause that has been assigned to a judge for all purposes, the motion
shall be made to the assigned judge or to the presiding judge by a party within 15 d ays
after notice of the all purpose assignment, or if the party has not yet appeared in the
action, then within 15 days after the appearance.” (Ibid.) Neither party to this
proceeding contends the master calendar rule applies, so we will not discuss it.
B. The Peremptory Challenge Was Timely Under the All-purposes Assignment
Rule.
We agree with petitioner that the February 3, 2022 consolidation order had the
effect of assigning the second lawsuit to Judge Apaloo’s department for all purposes and
6
triggered the 15 days within which to file a peremptory challenge. Because he had not
made an appearance in the first lawsuit, petitioner’s February 17, 2022 peremptory
challenge was timely because he filed it 14 days after Judge Apaloo’s order.3 To avoid
this result, the city argues the triggering event was not the consolidation order, but rather it
was the city’s December 8, 2021 notice of motion to consolidate the two cases. Relying
exclusively on Sunrise Financial, LLC v. Superior Court (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 114
(Sunrise Financial), the city argues, as of the date it moved to consolidate the two
lawsuits, petitioner was placed on notice that the second lawsuit might be assigned to
Judge Apaloo for all purposes, thus triggering the 15 days in which petitioner had to file
his peremptory challenge.
Sunrise Financial, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th 114, is easily distinguishable. There, the
plaintiff moved to transfer and consolidate lawsuits it had filed in the San Diego,
Los Angeles, and San Bernardino County Superior Courts. Some of the defendants in the
San Bernardino lawsuit, who were not yet named defendants in the San Diego action, filed
written oppositions to the motion in the San Diego case. Six days after the judge in the
San Diego lawsuit granted the motion, the defendants filed a peremptory challenge to him.
(Sunrise Financial, at pp. 119-122.) The judge denied the peremptory challenge as
untimely. (Id. at p. 122.)
3 Petitioner also argues that if the city were to claim the second lawsuit is merely a continuation of the first and that a peremptory challenge could not be filed in the second lawsuit (see Birts v. Superior Court (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 53, 58), such a claim would fail. The city made no such assertion in its response to the petition.
7
The Court of Appeal agreed with the defendants’ assertion that, because they were
not yet defendants in the San Diego lawsuit when the judge was originally assigned to
that case for all purposes, they were not required to file their peremptory challenge
“within 15 days after notice of the all purpose assignment.” (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(2).)
“[T]hey obviously had no obligation to file any peremptory challenge within 15 days of
that time. The statutory time period triggered by the notice of assignment applies when
the existing parties (those who have appeared in the action) receive the notice of the
assignment.” (Sunrise Financial, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 124.) However, the
appellate court noted the defendants “largely ignore or minimize the second statutory
trigger for the 15-day time period: ‘if the party has not yet appeared in the action, then
within 15 days after the appearance.’ (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(2), italics added.)” (Sunrise
Financial, at p. 124.) The court held the defendants made a general appearance in the
San Diego lawsuit when they filed their written opposition and evidentiary objections.
(Id. at pp. 124-126.) And, because the defendants did not file their peremptory challenge
to the San Diego judge within 15 days of making that general appearance, it was not
timely filed. (Id. at p. 126.)
Unlike in Sunrise Financial, the record before us demonstrates petitioner made no
appearance in the first lawsuit whatsoever. As indicated, he did not join in the opposition
to the city’s consolidation motion that Loring and Sherlyn filed in the first lawsuit, and he
himself did not file one in either lawsuit. To repeat, the triggering event for the 15 days
was the assignment of Judge Apaloo to preside over the second lawsuit for all purposes.
8
(§ 170.6, subd. (a)(2).) And, as already stated, because petitioner filed his peremptory
challenge 14 days after the order consolidating the lawsuits, it was timely.
Nor are we persuaded by the city’s assertion that, as early as December 8, 2021,
petitioner was on notice that Judge Apaloo might be assigned to preside over the second
lawsuit, and it was that notice that triggered the time to file a peremptory challenge. This
argument is based on a rather liberal paraphrasing of the following quote from Sunrise
Financial: “[W]here, as here, an independent calendar judge has already been assigned
for all purposes in the existing action, and all parties and potential parties are aware of the
identity of the trial judge when a transfer motion is brought, the parties would be on
notice that this judge will be presiding over the trial.” (Sunrise Financial, supra,
32 Cal.App.5th at p. 128.) But the very next sentence is crucial: “They are aware that if
they intend to challenge this trial judge, they have 15 days to do so after making an
appearance in the judge’s department.” (Ibid., italics added.) Merely knowing the
identity of the judge who will preside for all purposes if two lawsuits are consolidated is
not enough to trigger the 15 days.
Moreover, the city’s argument appears to rest on a very loose conception of the
type of notice of an all-purpose assignment that will trigger the 15 days. The courts have
expressly rejected the argument that “constructive notice” of an all-purpose assignment
will trigger the time to file a peremptory challenge, and they have instead required
“actual notice.” (Jones v. Superior Court (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 390, 395, 403-404
[rejecting the prosecutor’s argument that the 10 days in criminal cases is triggered by
“constructive notice” of an all-purpose assignment, and holding “actual notice” is
9
required]; see Cybermedia, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 910, 914
[“general notice” of civil case assignment from court public information office was not
sufficient to trigger the 15 days because it “was not addressed to the attorney assigned to
petitioners’ case” and “[i]t did not reference the case name and full case number”].)
True, once the city filed its motion to consolidate the first and second lawsuits,
petitioner might have reasonably anticipated the first lawsuit would be deemed the lead
one and that Judge Apaloo, who was already assigned to hear the first lawsuit, would be
assigned to hear both. But that result was not necessarily foreordained, and “courts have
refused proposed readings of section 170.6 that would require parties and courts to
‘guess’ about the triggering date for relevant time periods.” (Bontilao v. Superior Court
(2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 980, 998, citing Jones v. Superior Court, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th
at p. 404.)
In sum, the peremptory challenge was timely filed, and Judge Pacheco abused his
discretion by denying it as untimely.
C. The Five-day Rule Did Not Apply to the Peremptory Challenge.
Finally, the city argues, in the alternative, that the peremptory challenge was
untimely under the five-day rule because as of December 8, 2021, petitioner knew Judge
Apaloo—who was not yet assigned to the second lawsuit for all purposes—would hear
the motion to consolidate yet he did not file his peremptory challenge at least five days
before the hearing. (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(2).) But, as petitioner asserts in his reply, the
city’s argument fails for the simple reason that the hearing on the city’s motion to
consolidate did not “involve[] a contested issue of law or fact.” (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(1).)
10
“A ‘hearing’ within the meaning of section 170.6 has been defined as ‘a hearing wherein
the court is called upon to rule upon some disputed issue of law or fact based upon legal
argument or evidence or both before the court.’” (Grant v. Superior Court (2001) 90
Cal.App.4th 518, 526.) Pretrial conferences and other pretrial motions often do not
involve the resolution of disputed issues of law or facts. (See ibid. [“Presiding at a case
management conference does not involve ruling on contested issues of law or fact.”].)
Although Judge Apaloo was required to determine whether the first and second
lawsuits “involv[ed] a common question of law or fact” when deciding whether to
consolidate the lawsuits (§ 1048, subd. (a), italics added), neither the city’s motion to
consolidate nor the opposition to it presented any contested issues of law or fact that had
to be resolved at that time. At most, the opposition argued consolidation would cause
unnecessary delays because the second lawsuit was ready for trial. Therefore, the mere
fact that petitioner knew Judge Apaloo would hear the motion, and the mere fact she
presided over such a pretrial motion, which did not “involv[e] a determination of
contested fact issues relating to the merits” (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(2)), did not preclude
petitioner from later seeking to disqualify Judge Apaloo when she granted the motion and
was assigned to preside for all purposes over the second lawsuit.4
4 The city cites no on-point authority to support its claim that petitioner waived his right to file a peremptory challenge by not opposing the motion to consolidate. We need not address it further.
11
III.
DISPOSITION
The petition for writ of mandate is granted. Let a writ of mandate issue, directing
the superior court to vacate its February 24, 2022 order denying petitioner’s peremptory
challenge and to enter a new order disqualifying the Honorable Khymberli S.Y. Apaloo.
The stay of proceedings issued by this court on March 25, 2022, is hereby lifted.
Petitioner shall recover his costs. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.493(a)(1)(A).)
Petitioner is directed to prepare and have a writ of mandate issued, copies served,
and the original filed with the clerk of this court, together with proofs of service on all
parties.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER J. We concur:
RAMIREZ P.J.
RAPHAEL J.
12
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The trial court abused its discretion by denying the petitioner's peremptory challenge as untimely because the challenge was filed within 15 days of the consolidation order that assigned the judge to the petitioner's case for all purposes.
Issues
Whether a peremptory challenge filed 14 days after a consolidation order assigning a judge for all purposes is timely under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6.
Whether notice of a motion to consolidate constitutes notice of an all-purpose assignment sufficient to trigger the 15-day deadline for a peremptory challenge.
Disposition. granted
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The trial court abused its discretion by denying, as untimely, the peremptory challenge, and we grant the petition.”
“Because petitioner filed his peremptory challenge less than 14 days after Judge Apaloo granted the city’s motion to consolidate the two lawsuits, his challenge was timely filed.”
“The courts have expressly rejected the argument that “constructive notice” of an all-purpose assignment will trigger the time to file a peremptory challenge, and they have instead required “actual notice.””