People v. Lamar CA3

Filed 9/15/22 P. v. Lamar CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento) ----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, C091243

v. (Super. Ct. No. 80035)

SHYRL IRENE LAMAR,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Shyrl Irene Lamar was convicted of murder and several other offenses based on her participation in a burglary. She petitioned the trial court for resentencing under Penal Code1 former section 1170.952 based on changes made to the felony-murder

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 to section 1172.6, with no change in the text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10). For purposes of clarity and conformity with the petition, we will continue to refer to the statute as section 1170.95 throughout the opinion. The Legislature further amended section 1170.95 effective January 1, 2022, under Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551). This amendment to former section 1170.95 has no impact on the issues raised by this appeal.

1

rule by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437). The trial court denied defendant’s petition, reasoning she was ineligible for resentencing because the jury found true two felony-murder special-circumstance enhancement allegations. On appeal, while not challenging the special-circumstance findings directly, defendant nevertheless argues the trial court erred in denying her petition because “the finding of intent to kill, which was part of the special circumstance finding, does not act to bar resentencing for murder.” She adds, however, that if the murder conviction is vacated, the special-circumstance findings would also need to be vacated. Concluding there was no error, we will affirm the trial court’s order. BACKGROUND A detailed recitation of the underlying facts is set forth in our prior opinion in this case. (People v. Scott (Feb. 16, 1994, C010153 & C010317) [nonpub. opn.] (Scott).) To summarize, in 1986 the two victims purchased some used furniture from defendant and codefendant Lawrence Scott, Jr. Scott and defendant helped move the furniture to the victims’ apartment, and the victims invited the two to stay for a drink. The victims loaned defendant and Scott $30 and allowed them to spend the night, since they had sold the victims their bed. While the victims were in bed, Scott stabbed them and robbed them of $60 and some jewelry. Meanwhile, defendant was in the kitchen eating a sandwich. During trial, Scott testified that the actual killer was the boyfriend of defendant’s 17-year-old daughter. Defendant and Scott were each convicted on two counts of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), robbery (§ 211), and burglary (§ 459). In addition, the jury found true the following special circumstances: (1) murder during a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i)), (2) murder during a burglary (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(vii)), and (3) multiple murders (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)). The jury also found true that Scott personally used a deadly weapon. Scott and defendant were each sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. (Scott, supra, C010153 & C010317.)