California Court of Appeal Sep 8, 2022 No. E077992Unpublished
Filed 9/8/22 P. v. Williams CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E077992
v. (Super.Ct.No. FSB17000744)
STEVEN MICHAEL WILLIAMS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Harold T. Wilson,
Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Sally Patrone Brajevich, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel and
A. Natasha Cortina, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Defendant and appellant Steven Michael Williams exposed his penis and
masturbated in front of several observers in front of a Stater Brothers store in Loma
Linda. Deputy Bernabe Ortiz responded to calls about the indecent exposure and found
defendant sitting in his vehicle. A two-foot long wooden baton/Billy club was found by
Based on the change to statutory language, the onus of retaining records is placed
on the department or agency as of January 1, 2022. We are unaware of any case law or
statutory provision prior to 2022 that required the prosecution, the trial court or the
department or agency to preserve the records that are reviewed by the trial court during
the in-camera Pitchess hearing, which are eligible for destruction under section 832.5, for
a possible appeal.
In Los Angeles, supra, 29 Cal.4th 1, the court examined whether California’s
statutory scheme of not requiring disclosure of complaints of police officer misconduct
that occurred more than five years before the crime with which the defendant is charged
was contrary to Brady and violated a defendant’s federal constitutional right to due
process. (Los Angeles, at p. 10.) The court found that the time limitation was not
unconstitutional on its face. (Ibid.)
The court noted, “A law enforcement agency’s destruction of a citizen’s complaint
violates a defendant’s right to due process only when the complaint’s exculpatory value
to a particular criminal case is readily apparent before its destruction. [Citation.] The
mere ‘possibility’ that the complaint might be exculpatory in some future case is
12
insufficient. [Citation.] Unless there is bad faith by the law enforcement agency, the
destruction of records does not implicate a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial;
routine destruction by a law enforcement agency ‘acting . . . “in accord with [its] normal
practice” ’ tends to indicate ‘ “good faith.” ’ ” (Los Angeles, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 11-
12.)
Here, the record supports that the item reviewed during the first Pitchess motion
was destroyed sometime after the hearing during a normal purging of records pursuant to
section 832.5. There is no evidence of bad faith on the part of the county or county
counsel. Defendant is unable to show that his federal constitutional rights to a fair trial or
due process are implicated by the routine destruction of the document in question.
Defendant contends the destruction of the evidence in this case was in bad faith as
county counsel was on notice to preserve the two items based on the appeal filed in this
case. As stated, the items were destroyed based on the statutory policy that records more
than five years old are routinely destroyed. Defendant has provided no relevant case law
or statutory provision prior to January 1, 2022, which requires that the items had to be
retained in Deputy Ortiz’s file. Further, county counsel attested that the county was
unaware of the ongoing litigation. The missing item was not destroyed based on bad
faith.
Additionally, defendant assumes that the destroyed item was “material” and
“exculpatory” evidence. He contends that trial court erred by not preserving the
evidence. However, there is nothing that supports the assumption that this was material
and exculpatory evidence. This was one unsubstantiated complaint against Deputy Ortiz.
13
Moreover, there is no support for defendant’s claim that the trial court and county
counsel were required to maintain the records during the ongoing litigation.3
Defendant relies on People v. Zamora (1980) 28 Cal.3d 88. In Zamora, a
defendant was arrested for battery on a police officer and resisting an officer and sought
to obtain records of any excessive force complaints against several police officers. (Id. at
p. 94.) A city ordinance different from section 832.5 allowed for the destruction of
citizen complaints in personnel files for police officers and led to the destruction of
records in the arresting officers’ files that were less than five years old. (Id. at pp. 93-95,
97-98.) The California Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s convictions finding that
the city wrongfully destroyed portions of the officers’ records. (Id. at pp. 98-100.) In
remanding the case for retrial, the high court determined that as a sanction for the city’s
wrongful destruction of the evidence, the jury should be instructed the destroyed files
contained evidence the officers had used excessive force in the past and that the jury may
rely on this information to infer the officers were prone to use excessive or unnecessary
force. It found dismissal of the charges was an excessive sanction as there was no
showing of bad faith. (Id. at pp. 99-103.)
Initially, Zamora was based on a city ordinance that allowed for the destruction of
records that were two years, rather than five years, old. The California Supreme Court
found that such ordinance could not be relied on to support the argument that there
3The court notes that under Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at page 1229, the trial court should make a record of the documents reviewed during a Pitchess motion but there is no mandatory provision that it maintain the records.
14
should be no sanction as the records were destroyed before five years. (Zamora, supra,
28 Cal.3d at pp. 97-98.) Here, section 832.5 has been upheld against prior constitutional
challenges. Based on our review of the in-camera hearing here, the records were purged
in compliance with the five-year timeline. Moreover, Zamora was based on People v.
Hitch (1974) 12 Cal.3d 641,4 which was overruled by Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. 479.
(See People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 942-943 [after Trombetta, in order to show a
due process violation for failure to retain evidence, a defendant must show “bad faith”
and that the “exculpatory value of the evidence at issue.”].)
Based on the foregoing, there was no mandatory provision prior to January 1,
2022, that required the county to retain all of the records in Deputy Ortiz’s file pending a
possible appeal of the Pitchess motion. Moreover, there is no evidence that the county
was aware the documents in Deputy Ortiz’s file could be potentially relevant to future
litigation by defendant. Dismissal of defendant’s conviction is not an appropriate
sanction based on the routine destruction of evidence.
Defendant also asks this court to review the in-camera hearing to determine if the
trial court properly determined that the remaining item in Deputy Ortiz’s file was not
subject to discovery. We have reviewed the hearing and find the trial court properly
determined that the one item was not discoverable in this case. We find the trial court
properly reinstated defendant’s judgment.
4 Hitch held that “the intentional suppression of material evidence favorable to a defendant who has requested it constitutes a violation of due process, irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecution.” (People v. Hitch, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 646.)
15
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER Acting P. J. We concur:
CODRINGTON J.
SLOUGH J.
16
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the routine destruction of a Pitchess-related personnel record pursuant to statutory retention policies, absent evidence of bad faith or apparent exculpatory value, does not violate a defendant's due process rights or warrant dismissal of a conviction.
Issues
Whether the destruction of a Pitchess document pursuant to Penal Code section 832.5 violated the defendant's due process rights.
Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss the conviction following the destruction of the record.
Whether the trial court properly determined the remaining Pitchess record was not discoverable.
Disposition. affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“There is no evidence of bad faith on the part of the county or county counsel. Defendant is unable to show that his federal constitutional rights to a fair trial or due process are implicated by the routine destruction of the document in question.”
“Dismissal of defendant’s conviction is not an appropriate sanction based on the routine destruction of evidence.”