Siri v. Sutter Home Winery

Filed 8/25/22 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR

SAYS SIRI, Plaintiff and Appellant, A161923

v. (Napa County SUTTER HOME WINERY, INC., Super. Ct. No. 26-59035) Defendant and Appellant.

Says Siri appeals from a judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court granted a motion by Sutter Home Winery, Inc., doing business as Trinchero Family Estates (Trinchero) to enforce a settlement agreement pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998 (section 998). Siri contends the judgment must be reversed because the court exceeded its authority by purporting to adjudicate whether the parties’ offer and acceptance formed a binding agreement. While it may be that in an appropriate procedural context the formation of a binding settlement agreement can be established–—an issue we do not decide—the trial court erred in holding that such an agreement had been reached pursuant to the procedures of section 998. Therefore, the judgment of dismissal must be reversed. Factual and Procedural History This is the second appeal in this case; our opinion in Siri v. Sutter Home Winery, Inc. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 598 sets forth the underlying facts and procedural history. For present purposes, suffice it to say that the prior decision enabled Siri to pursue a cause of action against her former employer Trinchero for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. On remand,

1

in October 2019, Trinchero served an offer to compromise pursuant to section 998. The offer was to pay Siri $500,000 in exchange for her dismissal with prejudice of all claims. The offer stated that it “may be accepted by signing the below Notice of Acceptance,” and it was accompanied by a page so captioned, with signature lines for Siri and her lawyer. During the 30-day period in which Trinchero’s section 998 offer remained in effect, the parties’ lawyers communicated about whether Siri’s potential acceptance would trigger a right to prejudgment interest.1 Siri had served Trinchero with a section 998 offer for $499,999 at the outset of litigation in 2012, which had not been accepted, and Siri claimed that her acceptance of Trinchero’s 2019 offer for a higher sum would trigger the cost- shifting provisions of Civil Code section 3291,2 entitling her to recover

1 In support of its motion to enforce the settlement, Trinchero offered evidence of those discussions, to which Siri objected based on Evidence Code section 1152. (Ibid. [“Evidence that a person has, in compromise . . . offered . . . to furnish money . . . to another who . . . claims that he or she has sustained . . . loss or damage, as well as any conduct or statements made in negotiation thereof, is inadmissible to prove his or her liability for the loss or damage.”].) The trial court sustained Siri’s objection, in a ruling from which Trinchero has filed a purported cross-appeal. Rulings on evidentiary objections, however, are not appealable (Dabney v Wilhelm (1923) 190 Cal. 340, 340–341), so the purported cross-appeal must be dismissed. Nonetheless, were the excluded evidence relevant to the disposition of Siri’s appeal, the merits of the ruling could be considered in that connection. Trinchero did not seek to use the challenged evidence for the purpose forbidden by Evidence Code section 1152, so the disputed ruling was erroneous, as Trinchero argues and Siri does not dispute. Thus, we briefly describe that evidence, although for the reasons indicated in text, the erroneously excluded evidence has no bearing on the outcome of this appeal. 2 Under that statute, if a plaintiff in a personal-injury action serves a section 998 offer that a defendant does not accept, and the plaintiff later obtains a more favorable judgment, the judgment will bear interest at 10 percent per year from the date of the offer. (Civ. Code, § 3291.)