California Court of Appeal Aug 5, 2022 No. E076010Unpublished
Filed 8/5/22 Granado v. Faqih CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
HEATHER GRANADO,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E076010
v. (Super.Ct.No. COC2003299)
JASMINE CHRISTINE FAQIH, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Craig G. Riemer, Judge.
Dismissed.
Ensberg Law Group and Stephen E. Ensberg, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In this restraining order action, defendant and appellant Jasmine Christine Faqih
contends that the trial court erred when it granted plaintiff and respondent Heather
Granado’s civil harassment restraining order against her. We dismiss the appeal as moot.
On July 30, 2020, Granado filed a request for a civil harassment restraining order
against Faqih, her landlord. (See Civ. Code, § 527.6.) Granado alleged that Faqih had
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made unwanted advances toward her and then tried to evict her and her family when she
asked Faqih to stop. Granado also alleged various other forms of harassment, including
merely analogizes her situation (without citation to authority) to that of a lawyer facing
disciplinary action by the State Bar, and she separately claims that she could be “subject
to potential claims . . . as related to her being a real estate agent,” broadly citing the Real
Estate Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 10000 et seq.) without further elaboration. We
construe Faqih’s lack of citation to a specific, relevant provision subjecting her to
increased exposure to liability as a concession that none exists.
This case is not like Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, where the
Court of Appeal determined that an appeal on a civil harassment restraining order (like
the one at issue here) was not moot; there, the order had been renewed prior to its
expiration. (Id. at pp. 495-496.) Nothing in the record suggests that there was a similar
renewal here. In sum, the case is moot, and we decline to exercise our discretion to
decide it on the merits.
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DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. The parties shall each bear their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAPHAEL J.
We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J. FIELDS J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court dismissed the appeal as moot because the underlying civil harassment restraining order expired while the appeal was pending and no exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied.
Issues
Whether an appeal from an expired civil harassment restraining order is moot.
Whether any discretionary exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply to the expired restraining order.
Disposition. Dismissed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We dismiss the appeal as moot.”
“‘“If relief granted by the trial court is temporal, and if the relief granted expires before an appeal can be heard, then an appeal by the adverse party is moot.”’”
“In sum, the case is moot, and we decline to exercise our discretion to decide it on the merits.”