Cavana v. Ingram CA3
Filed 7/21/22 Cavana v. Ingram CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Amador) ----
JOE CAVANA et al., C091873
Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Super. Ct. No. 19CV11315)
v.
KAREN INGRAM,
Defendant and Respondent.
Joe and Terri Cavana filed a defamation action against Karen Ingram, and Ingram responded with a special motion to strike the complaint as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP motion).1 The trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motion and awarded costs and attorney fees to Ingram.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
1
The Cavanas now appeal, contending the trial court erred by (1) finding Ingram’s statement was made in connection with an issue of public interest, (2) concluding the Cavanas did not make a showing of probability of prevailing on the merits, and (3) sustaining Ingram’s objections to evidence the Cavanas submitted in opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion. Finding no error, we will affirm. BACKGROUND A Section 425.16 provides that “[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) The statute “sets out a procedure for striking complaints in harassing lawsuits that are commonly known as SLAPP suits . . . , which are brought to challenge the exercise of constitutionally protected free speech rights.” (Kibler v. Northern Inyo County Local Hospital Dist. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 192, 196.) When a defendant files an anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court engages in a two- step analysis. First, the trial court considers whether the defendant has established that the gravamen of the complaint challenges activity protected by section 425.16. If the defendant establishes that the complaint relates to protected activity, the trial court must determine whether the plaintiff has satisfied the burden of showing that there is a probability of success on the merits. (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788 (Monster Energy).) We apply the independent standard of review to the trial court’s ruling on the anti- SLAPP motion. (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 325.)
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