Brandt v. Clark
Before: Works
Synopsis
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.
The contract of sale referred to in the opinion described by metes and bounds a tract of land situated in Pasadena, bordering on the Arroyo River and running to its center, and provided that the vendor should complete, at her own expense, “a sixty-foot private roadway for perpetual use of the parties hereto, their heirs, etc., from Orange Grove Avenue to the frontage of the lot conveyed, also running .thence northerly, each party to give twenty-five feet for a like private roadway for like use of said parties, their heirs, etc., which said roadway the party of the first part agrees to continue in same direction and width, and open through to the Arroyo drive for like use by the parties, their heirs, etc.” The contract also described “as appurtenant to said tract of land the regular portion of water stock usually deeded with lands similarly located.” The plaintiff alleged a mutual mistake in omitting from the description a portion of lot 5 of the Mrs J. H. Hood tract, as shown upon a recorded map, which the complaint avers was intended to be described in the agreement, and including about one half an acre of land lying between the western boundary of said lot 5 and the Arroyo River, of .which plaintiff was not the owner, and which did not exceed twenty-five dollars in value. The complaint asked for a reformation of the contract accordingly, and for an enforcement of the contract for the purchase-money. The defendant denied the mistakes alleged by plaintiff, and averred a mistake in the description of the last line of the tract, and denying the intention merely to convey lot 5 as alleged, averred that it was the intention of the parties to convey a strip of land from the center of the private roadway in front of lot 5 of the uniform width of one hundred and seventy-five feet to the center of the Arroyo River; and averred that the strip of land seventy-five feet in width, extending from the west end of said lot 5 to the river, with the riparian rights thereto belonging, is of the value of five thousand dollars, exclusive of the sum of about ten thousand dollars expended in improvements, and that defendant has been deprived of said strip of land, by eviction under title paramount. The cross-complaint of defendant sought a reformation of the contract to correct said mistake, and described the land intended to be conveyed by reference to a map of the Mrs. J. H. Hood tract, which had been recorded since the date of the contract, and alleged that there was appurtenant to the land the number of shares of the capital stock of the Pasadena Water Company in the ratio of two shares to each vara; that plaintiff agreed to sell and convey to defendant, as appurtenant to the land, the private roadways described in the contract; that, at the time of the execution of the contract, the tract which plaintiff owned, without the land lying west of lot 5, was worth at least five hundred dollars less than the whole tract agreed to be sold, and that said land sold to which plaintiff had no title was, at the time of the commencement of the action and ever since, of the value of two thousand dollars. Defendant alleged a tender of the balance of the pnrchase-money due under the terms of the contract, and a deposit with the clerk of one thousand dollars for the use of plaintiff, and prayed a specific performance of the contract upon payment of said sum. The evidence was conflicting as to the value of the Wood lot No. 22 at the date of the contract. The court found that the land described in the agreement included not only lot No. 5 of the Mrs. J. H. Hood tract, as shown upon the recorded map, but also all that portion of Wood lots Nos. 21 and 22, which extended from lot 5 to the Arroyo River; that a mistake had occurred in the agreement, as alleged by defendant; that, at the time of the contract, plaintiff was the owner of Wood lot No. 21, but not of Wood lot No. 22, and that the land sold was worth one hundred dollars less by reason of the failure of title to Wood lot No. 22; that the plaintiff had not tendered a proper deed; that three shares of water stock of the Pasadena Land and Water Company is the proper amount to be deeded with the land; that defendant never tendered the full amount of money due under the agreement; that one thousand dollars is not an adequate consideration for the land; that plaintiff did not agree to sell the private roadways as an appurtenance to the land agreed to be conveyed; but that said private roadways were constructed and opened by plaintiff, as agreed. The decree reformed the contract in the particular claimed by defendant, and ordered a conveyance by plaintiff to defendant of lot 5 of the Mrs. J. H. Hood tract, as per the recorded map thereof, and of that portion of Wood lot No. 21, which extends to the middle of the Arroyo River, and of the right of way in common with plaintiff, her heirs and assigns, over a roadway sixty feet wide, leading from Orange Grove Avenue to the frontage of said lot 5, and over a street fifty feet wide, extending northerly along the east side of lot 5, located as shown upon the recorded map of the Mrs. J. H. Hood tract. The recorded map of said tract, referred to in the pleadings and in the decree, represents the roadways as open through to the Arroyo drive, and represents that drive as extending northeasterly, across lot No. 5, cutting it in two, and connecting with the extension of the private roadway at a point northeast of lot No. 5. The defendant was allowed three shares of water stock, and was ordered to pay one half the costs of the action. The amount of the allowance of water stock was made to depend upon the fee of the land, the evidence showing that there were one and one half acres of land, excluding the roadways. Further facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Works, J. There is a motion in this case to strike out the statement. As is usually the ease, the motion is the result of inattention to the simple provisions of the code by the attorneys for the appellants. The appeal is from the judgment. The point made is, that the paper containing the evidence and the exceptions of the appellants is a statement of the case made in support of a motion for a new trial; that no motion for a new trial was made; and that under section 950 of the Code of Civil Procedure such a statement can only be used on an appeal from the judgment where it has been used in support of a motion for a new trial. This is the language of the section referred to. But counsel for the appellants say the paper relied upon may be treated either as a statement of the case, or as a bill of exceptions. This isastrictiy true. It is entitled “ statement and exceptions,” and might with equal propriety be treated as a statement of the case, a bill of exceptions, or neither the one nor the other. We have never been able to understand why a statement was provided for in the code, and having been provided for, we are equally at a loss to know why it should ever be
[639]resorted to in practice. A bill of exceptions has always been a well-known means of preserving exceptions and. bringing up the evidence on appeal. It is a simple and convenient method of accomplishing these results, and is equally applicable to any and all hinds of appeals provided for by the code. (Code Civ. Proc., secs. 646, 653, 661, 950.) If attorneys could be induced to abandon entirely the practice of using or attempting to use a statement of the case, and resort exclusively to a bill of exceptions, much of the uncertainty and confusion that has crept into the practice on appeals to this court might in time be removed, and some degree of order and system in the practice in this respect be reasonably hoped for. As it is, a great portion of the time of this court that should be devoted to the decision of cases on their merits is taken up with these petty questions of practice.
As to the question presented by the motion in this case, we have not been able to satisfy our own minds whether the point made is well taken or not. If the language of the section is to be construed literally, a statement prepared on a motion for a new trial cannot be used on an appeal from the judgment unless it has been used in support of the motion. But there is no reason apparent to us why this should be so. We are inclined to the belief that the section should not receive this strict and literal construction, but the conclusion we have reached on the merits of the case renders it unnecessary to decide the point, and we prefer to leave it open for further consideration, if it should ever become necessary.
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